UNITED STATES AND PEACE MEDIATION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF THE NIGERIA - BIAFRA WAR

BY

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That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

Title Page

United States and Peace Mediation in Africa: A Case Study of the Nigeria - Biafra War

Approval page

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That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

Dedication

With gratitude to God, I dedicate this work to the Crusaders of the Brotherhood of Man; Men who know that War is an unnecessary evil; Men who strive to bring Peace to the World; Men who sacrificed their lives that others might have Peace. To you I dedicate this work.

Acknowledgements

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

It is my esteemed honour to say Thank You to all who contributed to the success of this Project.

To God I say a big Thank You for sustaining our lives: the life of my Lecturers, my Supervisor, my colleagues, and myself.

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It would be ingratitude not to say thank you to Mr. Chilaka of the Center for American Studies (CASTS) University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Thank you for your supports.

To all these people mentioned here and those not mentioned, I give you the credits for this work, and for the 'inebriatedness', ineptitude of this work, I take the responsibility. Thank you all and may God bless you.

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Acronyms

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U.S./U.S.A. : United States/United States of America or America

O.A.U : Organization of African Unity

AU : African Union

UN : United Nations

ICBM : Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles

UNHCR : United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WCC : World Council of Churches

AFRICOM: African Command

AGOA: African Growth and Opportunity Act

ICU: Islamic Courts Union

UNAMIR: UN Mission for Rwanda

UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia

ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

Abstract

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

The persistent and consistent trend in the U.S. peace mediation in Africa has been chiefly characterized by the U.S. economic interests in Africa. Hence, it has always followed the consistent trend of who gets what, when and how, at the expense of the harangued and impoverished African masses. It is also observed that the interest of America in conflict resolution in the war torn regions of Africa is made expedient in order to safe-guard U.S. nationals in the region, and to protect their investments from destruction. Hence, economic considerations are placed over human and corporate existence and survival of Africans. Premised on these assertions therefore, this study sets out to investigate the dynamics of U.S involvements at peace mediation in Africa, and the Nigeria civil war in particular. As an instrument of political enquiry, this discourse employs the Marxian political economy paradigm, which investigates the super-positioning of the social sub-structure (economy) over the super-structure (politics, etc). Hence we arrived at the conclusion that America's interest in Africa, and her involvements at peace mediation and conflict resolutions are informed by her economic interests in Africa. As a method of data collection, we employed the observation method of the political enquiry. We made use of already existing materials, such as documents, textbooks, internet materials, etc, as our secondary sources of information.

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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

"There is no easy walk-over to freedom anywhere, and many of us will have to pass through the valley of shadow again and again before we reach the mountain-tops of our desire" (Jawaharlal Nehru). America as the "world police" has an enormous power and resources to wage the tide of ethnic, intra-ethnic, and inter-ethnic wars in Africa. But the question is: is she prepared to do it if it does not serve her (America) national interests? U.S. involvement in conflict resolution in Africa has been championed by economic considerations, and other national interests, other than the well-being of the embattled and impoverished African populace. According to Gerald LeMelle (2008),

> Oil is at the center of the intersection between growing militarization and U.S. economic interests in Africa. To many U.S. and African civil society groups, all roads seem to point to Bush's 2006 State of the Union address where he stated his intention to replace 75% of U.S. oil imports from the Middle East by 2025. It is expected that the United States will get 25% of its oil from Africa by 2015. Unfortunately, many Africans in oil-producing countries comment that the black gold can be not only a blessing, but also a curse.

In other instances, authors have argued that,

- Somalia like many African countries was plunged into fratricidal war as a result of internal political cataclysms and 'a surfeit of arms provided by the superpowers in their competitive pursuit of local advantages. Both in 1972 and 1990, both Somalia and Ethiopia received US$ 18.26 billion worth of weapons and ammunition from both the U.S. and Soviet Union (Isiaka, 2005: 69-70).

- The failure of UN and US interventions which were inconsistent and unsystematic aggravated the already tense situation (Isiaka, 2005: 72).

- Angola was quickly overwhelmed by the conflict between the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and anti-Marxist National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Because of the prevailing cold war climate, the Soviet Union and Cuba supported the MPLA, while the U.S and South Africa supported UNITA. The U.S in particular provided substantial amounts of military hardware (Isiaka, 2005: 73).

- The United States, as one of then foremost actors in this global political theatre, 'showed no strategic interest' in Africa. This explains the indifference and reluctance US showed during the Nigeria civil war. The war did not generate significant interest in Washington for two main reasons. One, there was benign sympathy for the Biafran cause in the

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United States, contrary to the thinking that the U.S supported the Nigeria government. Two, the war had no clear ideological coloration that would have justified decisive American intervention (Odoh, 2008).

Africa is a war ravaged and conflict prone continent. The African woe is a hydra-headed and multi-faceted sourced pandemic. The Africa problem is 'external in origin, but internal in outlook'. Hence, it is a long standing aphorism that no house crumbles without the tacit or implicit support of its occupants. So, for Africa to heap all the blames on the external factors of underdevelopment and impoverishment – slave trade, colonialism, imperialism, liberalism, etc, is nothing but playing the cowardly act of 'the Pilate' of the 21st century. Africa must wake up to the challenges of the modern age, hence, eschewing mediocrity in all its ramifications. Africa should aspire for excellence, and give rewards for excellence.

U.S., 'the peace mediator in Africa' is a hypothetical statement. The U.S. peace mediation in Africa and strategic interests in the continent is a long time established fact that until recently, U.S. sees Africa as a continent without any strategic importance or interests to her. Hence, just like the proverbial Pharaoh that plays his flute while Rome burns, America has watched in idle curiosity while Africa is ravaged. During the Cold War period, there was a paradigm shift in the concept towards Africa, in which she became a pawn in the chase-game of the ideological warfare of capitalism over communism. At the end of this titanic contest of supremacy, Africa became a rejected and discarded 'ugly' bride that was once so highly priced for the sake of her beauty alone. On this premise therefore, we are going to examine the contributions of the U.S. in peace mediation and conflict resolution in Africa in general and Nigeria civil war in particular.

Chapter One of this discourse is the Introduction. In this chapter, we looked at the Statement of the Problems, the Objectives of Study, the Significance of the Study, the Literature Review, the Theoretical Framework, the Hypotheses, the Method of Data Collection, and the Method of Data Analysis.

Chapter Two takes a look at the U.S. and the African Relations. In this chapter, we treated the Trans-Atlantic slave trade; the colonial era; the Cold War era; the post-colonial era; the U.S. – Africa Foreign Policy: This chapter makes a serious effort to unearth the directions

and the thrusts of the U.S. foreign policies towards Africa. Hence, in this chapter, we saw U.S./Africa Policy before the Cold War era; U.S./Africa Policy during the Cold War era; U.S./Africa Policy after the Cold War era; U.S./Africa Foreign Policy during Ronald Reagan's regime (1981 – 1989); U.S./Africa Policy during George Herbert Walker Bush's regime (1989 - 1993); U.S./Africa Policy during Bill Clinton's regime (1993 - 2001); U.S./Africa Policy during George W. Bush's regime (2001 - 2009); and U.S./Africa Policy during Barack Obama's regime (2009 – 20?); U.S National Strategic Interests in Africa;. National Interest as defined by Obasi Igwe (2007) is "whatever may promote the realization of the objectives of the state and its *raison d'etre* as defined by the ruling class" (Igwe, 2007: 282). Donald E. Nuechterlein (2002) in his article "Defining U.S. National Interests: An Analytical Framework", opines that national interests fall into four categories: Survival, Major, Vital and Peripheral. He averred that when U.S interests are clearly defined, these interests drive the actions of the U.S. abroad. According to him,

> **Survival** interest exists when there is an imminent, credible threat of massive destruction to the homeland if an enemy state's demands are not countered quickly. Such crises are easy to recognize because they are dramatic and involve an armed attack, or threat of attack, by one country on another's home territory. **Major** interests involve issues and trends, whether they are economic, political, or ideological, that can be negotiated with an adversary. An interest is **vital** when the highest policymakers in a sovereign state conclude that the issue at stake is so fundamental to the political, economic, and social well-being of their country that it should not be compromised—even if this conclusion results in the use of economic and military sanctions. And finally, a **peripheral** interest "is one that does not seriously affect the well-being of the United States as a whole, even though it may be detrimental to the private interests of Americans conducting business abroad (Nuechterlein, 2002).

The United States, this work maintains has not yet proved itself a force to be reckoned with in conflict mediation, resolution and management in Africa, or under whatever name or appellage this issue might be discussed. Hence, United States relationship with Africa, which stands to be disproved as false and unfounded, presents the case of a giant misplaced priorities, continental antagonism, and social, political, and economic superpower indifference on the African continent. The United States, no doubt, has enormous powers on her disposal. But are these powers used to pursue the common good

of all men? This work believes the contrary, and is poised to prove this to its logical conclusions with facts and figures that the problems of the Africa's instabilities and underdevelopment which are anchored on internecine wars has their roots and origins in the big power politics of the West and the Allied Forces, which America, has come to represent.

Statement of the Problem:

America is a super-power and the modern day world 'hegemon', there is no disputing that fact. That Africa is grossly underdeveloped, embattled, impoverished, poor, sick – both mentally, spiritually, psychologically, emotionally, just name it, is an open secret, an undisputable fact. But in this discourse, our interest goes beyond these time established facts. We shall be concerned with the dynamics and the inter-plays of these our established facts to determine how one affects the other, so as to form a working link. America is by no means a Father Christmas, nor a Mr do it well or know it all, she has her national interests to protect, and perhaps some 'assumed' limitations. One could rightly adduce that the Vietnamese war is a sour wound and a bad lesson in the history of the America's interventionism. Having said all these, what then are the problem(s) that confront(s) the U.S. peace mediation in Africa, and Nigeria civil war in particular? As guide to this enquiry, we pose our research questions thus:

> ➢ Did economic considerations and national interest conditioned U.S. peace intervention and mediation in Africa? How has these militated against U.S. peace mediation in Africa?
> ➢ What are the roles played by the United States government in peace mediation at the Nigeria/Biafra war of 1967 – 1970? And how did economic considerations affected the conduct of the war?
> ➢ Thirdly, why is Africa dependent upon external forces to solve her internally generated problems and conflicts?
> ➢ Fourthly, does dependency on the western powers lead to instability and political crisis in Africa?

These are the problems this study would tackle, hence, their achievement would amount to the successful realization of our objectives in this study, and therefore, the impetus for embarking on this academic exercise.

Objectives of the Study:

Africa is a continent in dire need of peace. How does this peace come about? Will it be internally generated, or will it be externally imported? Our case here is that neither has been a reality: that Africans have not been able to solve their problems, and that external interventions have not been able to achieve a sustainable peace in Africa, because of some inert self-seeking interests to serve. Hence, this study has broad objective and specific objectives.

Our broad objective is to explore the synergy between the U.S. peace mediation in Africa and the civic unrests in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. The U.S. peace mediation in Africa is a contentious issue of improbable result. Hence, our broad objective is to explore the dynamics of this relationship of two unequal parties, formed by dependency on one side and expediency on the other side.

On the specific objectives, we propose to:

❖ Find out if economic considerations and national interest conditioned U.S. peace intervention and mediation in Africa.
❖ Examine the roles played by the United States government in peace mediation at the Nigeria/Biafra crises of 1967 – 1970, and how economic considerations affected the conduct of the war.
❖ Discover why Africa is dependent upon external forces to solve her internally generated problems and conflicts.
❖ Ascertain the relationship between dependency, instability and political crisis in Africa.

Significance of the Study:

This study has both practical and theoretical significances. On the practical significance of this study, we earnestly believe that it will help policy makers to better appreciate the intra-

exigencies in the U.S. peace mediation in Africa. We believe that it is high time Africans believed in their self; that the time is here for Africa to claim Africa for Africans, that we have no other home but Africa. It is very imperative to realize that the Africa problems are caused by Africans, and that the solutions to correct it could come from no other place but from Africa. It is high time Africans realized that nobody could like us more than we like our self; and that nobody could be more interested in our problems than our self. Hence, the over-dependence on external help is indeed an anathema. The West has always seen Africa as a pawn, and as an instrument of gratifying inordinate ambitions, and of serving their national interests. Hence, when they have nothing to gain, the logic equally follows that they would certainly be unwilling to lose anything. So, why get involved? Africa had never been 'important' to the West (except in criminal exploitation of her human and natural resources), and no one can change the tide over-night, except that we Africans work to make Africa better. Nobody will do this for us.

It is equally imperative to bear in mind that 'how a man makes his bed, so he will lie on it'. Our fore-fathers, out of greed, or whatever might have been their reasons, engaged the continent in the inhuman slave trade. They were not forced to do that, but chose to do it, hence today, the West believes that Africa is a continent one can buy over with, with a bottle of whisky or a piece of Jorge. How correct they are! But the question here is: can we make an honest effort to correct this sordid impression of Africa? Your guess is as good as mine! So now, the ball is in our court.

On the theoretical aspect of this study as an academic enquiry, it is believed that it will fill in some gaps in the pool of literatures on the subject under discussion: U.S. Peace Mediation in Africa: A Case Study of the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War. Africa has been held down by forces too strong for it to overcome, but we believe that we can overcome if we say 'We can!' the will is in us, and also the power to achieve it is equally in our hands. Strife is no one man's heritage, and so, we cannot accept perpetual underdevelopment, impoverishment, poverty, sickness, backwardness, greed, slot, etc, as our lot in life - our God specially given inheritance. We say no to it, and we believe that you agree with us! We have no other better alternative; it is our chance and we must take it with both hands. History is not a fool, hence, it keeps repeating itself because men refused to learn. So, this work is especially significant because it is aimed at proffering solutions to today's problems.

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Literature Review:

Literature review, as defined by Obasi Igwe (2002) is "the systematic examination and summary of as many documents and other materials as are available, necessary and possible in an aspect of knowledge that is a subject of serious enquiry". Our literature review will focus on the U.S. – Africa relations, with emphasis on peace mediation. U.S. – Africa relations has passed through many grueling stages: slave trade, cold war, and civil wars. In all these phases of relationships, Africa has being on the receiving ends; the relationship has always been that of the 'master / servant' kind of interchange. Africa has never squared up to America in any thing. Here, we shall x-ray the opinions of writers on this U.S. – Africa relations, and how it has affected U.S involvements at Peace Mediation in Africa.

U.S. – Africa relations is a lop-sided relationship; it is a relationship established on the premise of weakness and want on the side of Africa, and benevolence on the side of America. According to Sulayman S. Nyang (2005),

> Over the last century, relations between the United States and Africa have undergone many changes. The relationship between these two geographic zones has been defined primarily by the slave trade and the cold war". He further opines that, "the fact remain that Africa and the United States of America have come to be associate in the minds of most people around the world only in terms of their black populations and their political and military connections during the cold war (Nyang, 2005).

Another issue raised by Nyang (2005) on the U.S. – Africa relations, is the issue of race. He opines that the "relationship between these two geographic zones will always revolve around the race question, which is an extension of the slave trade and its consequences for Americans and Africans".

The end of World War 11 saw America playing a vital role in settling the "Post-war Order". The Atlantic Charter of August 1941, signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, held out a promise of freedom for colonized peoples in Asia, the Pacific, Africa and the Caribbean, on the part of the United States and Britain. In the article 3 of this charter, it states: "They (the two countries) respect the right of all peoples, to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-

government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them" (Fitzroy Andre Baptiste, 2005). The euphoria of the victory of the allied forces in the World War 11 which brought about this charter had hardly died down when a new vista in the history of the global community was opened. Now the struggle has shifted from political war-fare to ideological battle. Who are made the sacrificial lamb? Africans! Africa became the theatre of the ideological war-fare. Africa became the highly courted bride that would soon be discarded as a bundle of misused rag. Still basking in the euphoria of this victory, and the apparent desire for a new world order, Roosevelt mandated the State Department to establish a Committee on Colonial Policy (CCP), which were charged to formulate an overall policy relating to non-governing territories. The committee produced a three-point policy as follows: Dependent peoples desiring independence should have the opportunity to attain that status. Second, nations responsible for the future of colonial areas should fix, as soon as possible, dates upon which independence would be granted. Third, the establishment of an international \trusteeship system (Baptiste, 2005).

A paradigm shift occurred in the 'colonial question' being championed by the U.S. According to Baptiste (2005), "Another index was that the San Francisco conference that founded today's world body, the United Nations, barely discussed colonial issues. Research has shown that the delegates of the United States and of the European Colonial Powers saw to that happening. But the "reality" above all else that forced the shift of the United States on the "Colonial Question" was the advent of the Cold War and, with it, of the missile age warfare". With the impending dangers of the communists onslaught on France, Italy, and Greece, the Western alliance led by the U.S., launched a counter-defence strategy to contain USSR and China in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central European Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) as shields against the USSR and China; the launching of the Marshall Plan for economic aid to Western Europe and its Asian equivalent, the plan for the economic recovery of Japan; and the formation of the Central intelligence Agency (CIA). An aftermath to this paradigm shift in ideology and interests, is the United States shift to "enlightened self-interest" on issues pertaining to colonial "self-government" and/or "self-determination", everywhere.

> The expression "enlightened self-interest" was that of Henry A. Byroads, Assistant Secretary for Near East, South Asian and

African Affairs in the State Department. He used it in an address entitled "The World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies: A Challenge to America", which he gave before the World Affairs Council of North California at Asilomar, California on October 31, 1953: "The policies of the United States Government towards colonial questions have not always been clearly understood. -Our basic policy, however, is relatively simple. We believe in eventual self-determination for all peoples, and we believe that evolutionary development to this end should move forward with minimum delay. Our Government must approach colonial questions in terms of the enlightened self-interest of the United States. We recognise that the disintegration of the old colonialism is inevitable-We recognise that self-determination will not always be exercised in the form of national independence. Some people may choose voluntarily to unite or associate themselves, on a free and equal basis, with the nations which have governed them in the past - There are regions where human beings are unable to cope with disease, famine, and other forces of nature. Premature independence for these peoples would not serve the interests of the United States nor the interests of the free world as a whole. Least of all would it serve the interests of the dependent peoples themselves-The withdrawal of foreign influence from a territory not yet capable of independent exercise does not mean that the area will simply disappear from the world community. Instead, there will be created a power vacuum, an area of weakness which invites internal disorder and external aggression-let us be frank in recognising our stake in the strength and stability of certain European nations which exercise influence in the dependent areas. These European nations are our allies. They share many common interests with us. They will probably represent, for many years to come, the main source of the free-world defensive power outside our own. We cannot blindly disregard their side of the colonial question without injury to our own security. In particular, we cannot ignore the legitimate interests which European nations possess in certain dependent territories. Nor can we forget the importance of these interests to the European economy which we have contributed so much to support" (Baptiste, 2005).

The overriding words here are: (a) ...injury to our own **security**; (b) ...the **legitimate interests** which European nations possess in certain dependent territories; and (c) Nor can we forget the importance of these **interests to the European economy** which we have contributed so much to support. In all these, one thing is very glaringly clear. And that issue is a total disregard for the interest and the opinion of Africans in a case that borders on their very existence. Is this not the greatest height of callousness and western 'machonism'?

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The post-Cold War period posed new challenges to the global politics and America's relationship with Africa. Writing on the thrust of the America's foreign policy towards Africa, Uzor, Udokanma Christiana (2001) posits that in the America's ideology of liberal capitalism, her Cold War policy of containment changed to trade liberalization and democratization. Hence, U.S. national interest in Africa, according to this writer, is self-seeking rather than for the development of the African states.

Slave trade, colonialism, and neo-colonialism are the triple devil, according to Okereke, Nnaemeka Chibueze (2006) on which the tripod stand that has carried the U.S – Africa relations in historic perspective. According to him, "the recurrence of civil and interstate wars in Africa is the logical consequence of the several centuries of exposure to western imperialism and exploitation" (Okereke,2005).

Okonkwo, Ifenna K. (2000), in a work titled "The United States of America and Conflict Management in Africa: A Case Study of Somalia and Angola", is of the opinion that among all the super powers, and western powers, no country has played as much role as the United States of America in conflict resolution and peace management in Africa. According to Okonkwo (2000) quoting Rothchild (1995), "The United States of America has made efforts more than any other country in bringing back peace to Africa. In fact the end of rivalry between the super-powers has occurred (sic) the United States to return to its natural position as order's conservator".

On the U.S. strategies for peace mediation and conflict resolution in Africa, Okonkwo (2000) alludes that the U.S. diplomatic involvements in the African conflict resolution processes during and after the cold war has taken many forms, namely: conflict prevention; behind-the-scene support for the mediation of disputes by African third party actors; the backing of regional actors (ECOMOG in Liberia, OAU in Rwanda); assistance for an extra-continental actors; the promotion of international organizations' initiatives (UN in Congo, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, etc); pressure on local actors to negotiate; humanitarian intervention and diplomatic facilitation (Somalia); the organization of regime transition; and direct third party mediation between internal parties.

F. Chidozie, Ogene, in his treaty, "Interest Groups and the Shaping of Foreign Policy: Four Case Studies of United States of African Policy", contends that the intrigues in the formulation of the America's foreign policies has internal dynamics which ordinarily, much does not meet the eyes. In his exposition, he asserts that pressure groups, lobby groups and interest groups have high stakes in the shaping of the America's foreign policies, particularly issues that borders on the continent of Africa. According to him, "Two major characteristics of the United States African policy have so far being singled out for study and explanation. The first is the relatively low level of concern which the U.S. government has shown toward black Africa by comparison with other parts of the world. The other is the inconsistency of U.S. policy and its fluctuation between 'idealistic declamations and hard-headed pursuit of national interest' (Ogene, 1983:2). Lending his weight to the powerful forces of the lobby groups in the U.S. Congress as purported by Ogene (1983), Franck et al (1979) opines that,

> House International Relations Committee Chairman Zablocki has said, "Congress is too responsive to the lobbies of ethnic and special interests in the U.S. to be able to take lead in foreign policy-making without endangering the national interest" (Franck et al, 1979: 165). Correlating to this, James Reston commented that "the 'goodness' of the American people is overwhelmed by the special interest lobbies" (Franck et al, 1979: 165).

Still on the apparent reasons for the low profile of the Africa's issues in the United States foreign policy department, Rupert Emerson (1967) "argues that the colonial status of most Africa before 1960 prevented the United States from operating freely in these areas. The United States had to work through colonial powers that were not ready to authorize extensive American activities in their colonies" (Ogene, 1983:2). Further on this, it has being suggested that official concern and attention toward Africa depend on developments elsewhere in the world. For example, America's preoccupation with the Cold War and the Communist confrontation tended at first to raise the significance of Africa in American eyes. Hence, later troubles within the Atlantic Alliance, crises in the Cuba, Berlin, and Vietnam, and the informal détente between the United States and the Soviet Union tended to reduce this level of attention (Ogene,1983). What this scenario purports according Ruppert Emerson (1967), is that Africa is considered to be of little strategic or economic significance to the United States. Hence, by desire or design, Africa

has continued to carry little weight in global affairs, and so, remains weak, economically underdeveloped, politically fragmented and unstable, and militarily insignificant.

In the words of Ogene (1983), the United States' responses to the African question is determined by her (America's) calculations of her national interests, which include: interest in the military, political and economic security/interests. Also considered inclusive in the above mentioned factors are the balance of payments situation, social unrest in the cities, and the racial composition of the United States population. Also, another issue to be considered here is what according to Ruppert Emersion (1967) is "the most vital and unique concern of the United States with Africa which derives from the existence of that 10 percent of the American population originating from the Africa" (Ogene, 1983: 4).

Still on the U.S national interest in Africa and her relations, Professor McKay sees the United States economic interest in Africa as of little direct importance to U.S. , but very significant for the American business companies involved. He opines that the special interests of American groups are a vital element of the foreign policy of the United States, because they directly affect the United States relations with Africa, and indirectly influence the foreign policy adopted by the government (Ogene, 1985).

On the influence of the group pressure on the U.S. foreign policy initiatives, Bernard Cohen (1959) assures us that the interest groups comprising business organizations, trade associations, etc, have more influence than other groups. He further pointed out that specific business and trade groups have been found to have some influence on policies which relate to their special area of interest. Next to the trade or the business group, according to Cohen (1959) is the labour organizations, then, followed by ethnic or minority group (Ogene, 1983).

Donald Rothchild (1995) in an article "The United States and Conflict Management in Africa" observed two dimensions to the U.S. peace mediatory roles in the African conflicts. These dimensions are the types (the patterns) and approaches (processes) of the peace mediation. Hence, the patterns of the United States conflict mediation in Africa include:

➤ Conflict prevention (the assemblage of information, measures of reconciliation, and pressure for human rights and democratization);
➤ Behind- the-scene support for mediation of disputes by African third- party actors (Nigeria in Sudan, Zambia in Angola);

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➢ The backing of regional actor (ECOMOG in Liberia, OAU in Rwanda);
➢ Assistance for extra-continental actor (Britain in Zimbabwe, support for Portugal in negotiating the internal settlement in Angola and for Italy in Mozambican negotiations);
➢ The promotion of an international organizations initiative (the U.N. in Congo, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Namibia, and Angola – after signing of the Bicesse accords);
➢ Pressure on local actors to negotiate (South Africa, Sudan);
➢ Humanitarian intervention and diplomatic facilitation (Somalia);
➢ The organization of a regime transition (Ethiopia); and
➢ Direct third party mediation between internal parties (Sudan 1989 – 1992, Zaire 1992), as well as between international parties (Angola – Namibia). To some extent, then, the United States has become a part of the attempted resolution of these African conflicts, seeking to use its political and economic resources to move the peace ahead (Rothchild, 1995:210).

The other dimension of the United States peace mediation in Africa as noted by Rothchild (1995) is the approaches. These include:

❖ Pressures on internal actors to negotiate

❖ Indirect mediatory roles

❖ Direct mediation

❖ Military Diplomatic intervention

Nigeria – Biafra war was a civil strife for independence for the Biafra. It was a fierce battle from the 6th of July 1967 to 12th of January 1970. Luke Nnaemeka, Aneke (2007), in his book "The Untold Story of The Nigeria – Biafra War", gave a chronological account of the Nigeria – Biafra war. This is a book that starts with the elections of the federal Government of Nigeria in 1964, and ends with the return of the evacuated Biafran children to the eastern region, hence, ending with the hypothetical statement of if the war was actually ended by the Biafra surrender of 12th January, 1970, to the Federal Forces, or with the return of Ojukwu from Ivory Coast in 1982; or whether the war is still going on in the minds and the sub-consciousness of the parties involved. With the present realities, even going by what Joe Achuzia (*Daily sun,* February 4, 2008) said that, "Whether Nigeria likes it or not, the issue of the civil war was inconclusive and remains inconclusive till date". Nigeria – Biafra war is a sad history very difficult to be forgotten. Aneke (2007) is of the opinion that this is a difficult issue to be decided, because, the evidence of these hypotheses were apprehensible; they were verifiable.

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

The American Government's involvement in this arms struggle between the Nigeria and Biafra could be described as any other thing but mediation. On May 30, 1967, "The United States Department announced today that its consular office in Enugu, will remain open to cater to Americans in the former Eastern Region but that should not be construed as recognition for Biafra. The announcement maintained that the U.S. has not recognized the new regime but declined to say if there was any thought of doing so" (Aneke, 2007: 102). This stand was to be maintained throughout the duration of the civil war.

Raph Uwechue (1971), in the "Reflection On The Nigerian Civil War: Facing The Future", gives a reflection on the Nigeria – Biafra civil war. A war according to Uwechue was a struggle of two unmatched opponents.

The superpowers interventionism in the Nigeria – Biafra war has been described as being politically and economically self-interestedly motivated. Uwechue (1971) agrees with Ogene (2007) that the intervention by the superpowers was a gamble for political and economic gains. According to Uwechue (1971), "We are fighting a war which is being fed by outsiders, who have strings attached to the arms they supply". He also unequivocally condemned the O.A.U. lack-luster input in the civil war and her policy of non-interference in domestic affairs, arguing that a private issue that has public implications has ceased to be a private matter. Hence, he would have appreciated a pro-active action from the continental body.

Ogene (1983) in his book "Interest Groups and the Shaping of Foreign Policy" observed two currents in the America's involvement in the Nigeria – Biafra war. The first phase was a period from 1966 to 1968. This period was marked, in the America's foreign relations with Nigeria by high-handedness of the U.S. State Department and the U.S. embassy in Nigeria, on its relation with the war situation in Nigeria. At this period it completely disregarded every directives coming from the White House, coupled with the free hand that was given to it by the President. Its pro-Nigeria posture was flagrantly displayed. At this period, the issue of political and economic gains were placed above moral and humanitarian assistance to war devastated area of the Biafra. The second phase of the U.S. involvement in the civil war was the period from 1968 – 1970. This period was characterized by the triumph of moral and humanitarian issues over the political and economic gains. At this period in the U.S policy, African initiatives were mainly in the hands of the President, the White House staff, and the Congress. This was the

period of conscious American involvement in the Nigerian – Biafran impasse. This period witnessed a massive American humanitarian assistance to both Nigeria and Biafra. This period witnessed America's conscious efforts at alleviating the sufferings and starvation in Biafra. At this period, starvation as a legitimate instrument of warfare was de-emphasized.

LITERATURE GAP:

Africa's problems could only be solved by Africans, not in the African way any more, but through a 'rational and informed' means. This does not mean that Africans have not been rational or informed about their Africa's peculiar problems, but this calls for a more sober and reflective approach, and an introspective assault to the African problems. Hence, borrowing a leaf from the adage that says, "nought is without, for within, in the human interior lies the truth". Africa has to stop this mad rat-race for external salvation. The Jews are still waiting for Jesus to come, whereas the whole world has been saved!

Having made these comments, we want to state, inter alia, that dependency has been at the root cause of instability in Africa. In our literature review, we discovered that the issue of dependency in the African politics, vis - a - vis its relationship with America and the West, has not been given enough attention, hence, this essay is poised to fill this gap. Dependency syndrome is a beggar's approach to life. We discovered dependency at the root cause of America's lack-lustre foreign policy drive on Africa. If Africa is less dependent on the West for food, clothing, war consumables, technology, just name it, America would have taken Africa serious in foreign policy and in her relationships. But since what Africa offers to the world economy is what she knows very little about (raw materials), how then could she command attention as just mere consumer of finished goods that she enjoys without knowing how it came about? And so, this discourse will give focus to the Africa's dependency syndrome, because, he who has nothing to give, has no power to command. Africa must curtail enjoying what she cannot afford; it is a crime against charity and prudence. Greed!

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

Theoretical Framework:

Figure 1: Karl Heinrich Marx

Marx in 1875.

Source :http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Marx

Originally, political economy meant the study of the conditions under which production or consumption within limited parameters was organized in the nation-states. In this way, political economy expanded the emphasis of economics, which comes from the Greek oikos (meaning "home") and nomos (meaning "law" or "order"); thus political economy was meant to express the laws of production of wealth at the state level, just as economics was the ordering of the home. The phrase économie politique (translated in English as political economy) first appeared in France in 1615 with the well known book by Antoine de Montchrétien: Traité de l'economie politique. French physiocrats, Adam Smith, David Ricardo and

German philosopher and social theorist Karl Marx were some of the exponents of political economy. In its contemporary meaning, political economy refers to different, but related, approaches to studying economic and political behaviours, ranging from the combination of economics with other fields to the use of different,

fundamental assumptions that challenge orthodox economic assumptions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_economy).

Political Economy, according to Nwogbaga (2007), is described as the inter-play between politics and the economy in the social life. Hence, quoting Ake (1981), he opines that the approach to Political Economy lays emphasis on three aspects of the social realities, as: the primacy of the material conditions, the dynamic character of reality, and, the relatedness of different elements of society (Nwogbaga: 62 - 63). As a theoretical framework of analysis for this discourse, we shall employ the Marxian Political Economy theory.

The Marxian Political Economy theory is anchored on the Karl Marx theory (prognosis) of the historical materialism. Historical materialism is the expounding of the concept of the stages of the material development in a social system. These stages include:

1. Primitive Communism: as in co-operative tribal societies.
2. Slave Society: a development of tribal progression to city-state; Aristocracy is born.
3. Feudalism: aristocrats are the ruling class; merchants evolve into capitalists.
4. Capitalism: capitalists are the ruling class, who create and employ the proletariat.
5. Socialism: workers gain class consciousness, and via proletarian revolution depose the capitalist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, replacing it in turn with dictatorship of the proletariat through which the socialization of the means of production can be realized.
6. Communism: a classless and stateless society. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxism).

As an instrument of political analysis in relation with the U.S. peace mediation in Africa, and Nigeria civil war in particular, Marxism gives impetus to the hypothesis or an assertion that material and economic gains guided the U.S. peace mediatory roles in African the crises and the Nigeria – Biafra war. The Marxian political economy approach integrates the analysis of domestic productive structure and relations with international structure, relations and transactions. The approach also analyses relations among the international conditions of production including international division of labour, international exchange, world market and crises.

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Just like in Nigeria and every other independent state in Africa, with or without civil conflict, the U.S. presence, in whatever form in these places are brought about by politico-economic reasons. As the base or the sub-structure of the super-structure, materialism has always been observed as an overriding index in the U.S. – African relations. As was evident in the Nigeria – Biafra war, economic interest determined the direction of the U.S. political direction. Hence, it is very imperative that the understanding of the U.S. – Africa peace mediation should be fully explained and understood with this parameter.

Hypotheses

A hypothesis is simply a tentative statement which is open to confirmation or rejection when exposed (subjected) to empirical verification (Obasi, 1999). According to Asika (1991: 147), hypothesis is defined as "a prediction or a conjecture stated well in advance of observation (or actual collection of data), about what can be expected to occur under stated or given conditions". Hence, as 'a tentative statement' or 'a conjecture well stated in advance', we thus propose our hypothesis saying:

- ➢ Economic considerations and national interest conditioned U.S. peace intervention and mediation in Africa.
- ➢ The United States government's involvement in peace mediation at the Nigeria/Biafra crises of 1967 – 1970 was an economic gamble of 'who gets what and how much'.
- ➢ Dependency syndrome has been the Africa's waterloo.
- ➢ Dependency on the western powers leads to instability and political crisis in Africa.

Method of Data Collection

Observation method of the data collection is what we employed as the method of data collection for this study. According to Obasi (1999: 169), observation method can be scientifically defined "as a purposefully planned and systematically executed act of watching or looking at the occurrence of events, activities and behaviours which constitute the subject or focus of research or study". Observation as a method of data collection has two forms: the

participant observation method and the onlooker (spectator) observation method (Obasi, 1999). Hence, our source of data being the secondary source materials, we are therefore limited to 'the onlooker (spectator) observation method'.

A secondary source of material is the material sourced from already existing materials such as books, journals, magazines and News papers, Government (official) documents, internet materials, etc. As an onlooker observer, we observed these already existing materials for information on the subject of our enquiry: U.S. and Peace Mediation in Africa: A Case Study of the Nigeria – Biafra War.

An onlooker observer is a non-participatory observer. According to Obasi (1999: 171), "the observer on-looker is non-involved in the activities being watched. As a non-participant observer, he is restricted to watching only the activities that he has the opportunity to watch". Hence, in the course of this study and of gathering information, we made use of text books, dictionaries, journals, magazines and News papers, Government (official) documents, dissertations and seminar papers, and internet materials.

Documentary method of data collection, according to Nwana (1981: 177) "refers to any written material (whether hand-written, typed, or printed) that was already in existence, which was produced for some other purpose than the benefit of the investigator". They are published and unpublished materials on activities of public and private organizations, and found mainly in libraries, achieves and in such public and private organizations. Usually these documents are produced for reasons such as historical documentation of the nature, dynamics and trends of events (Obasi, 1999). Hence, our method of data collection is both observatory and documentary. Observatory and documentary in the sense that we observed the relevant documents that guaranteed the success of this enquiry.

Method of Data Analysis

The method of data analysis employed for this research is qualitative-descriptive data analysis. According to Asika (1991), qualitative-descriptive data analysis is used to verbally summarize the information generated in a research.

CHAPTER TWO

U.S. – AFRICA RELATIONS

Over the last century, relations between the United States and Africa have undergone many changes. The relationship between these two geographic zones has been defined primarily by the slave trade and the cold war. Although historians familiar with the details of the two zones could come up with a number of events that to some degree characterize the unique nature of this relationship, the fact remains that Africa and the united states of America have come to be associated in the minds of most people around the world only in terms of their black populations and their political and military connections during the cold war. The presence of millions of people of African descent, and their growing power and self-assertiveness in the American political process, have combined to make U.S - Africa relations an issue of greater scholarly interest.

No one who is a student of Africa over the last century can deny the impact of European people on the face and history of this continent. If Africa was not a major theater during the first and second world wars, the cold war and its ravages in Africa can still be seen after the cold war's conclusion in 1989. The presence of Cuban troops in Angola, the hazards of land mines in that country, the thousands of Africans who lost their lives in the ideologically charged civil wars in Ethiopia, and the large number of Africans who became refugees around the world, are all definite signs of the cold war and its aftermath. What is being said here is that US - Africa relations, like all things within nature, are ongoing. There have been moments of conflict and moments of reconciliation.

U. S. – Africa relations from its earliest time in antiquity has been marked by inequalities. Africa's earliest encounter with the U.S. was at the period of the Transatlantic Slave Trade. This unequal, slave driven intercontinental interchanges has persisted up till this present age. Hence, in this chapter, we shall investigate some of these unequal interchanges starting with the era of slave trade which most apparently marked the beginning of the U.S. – Africa relationship. We shall also look at the colonial era, the cold war era, and the post-cold war era. Also to be investigated in this chapter are: U.S. – Africa Foreign Policies, U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa, and U.S. Foreign Aid and Assistance to Africa. These are the epochs in the U.S. – Africa

relationship that would be investigated in this chapter.

2.1 The Era of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade:

The **Atlantic slave trade**, also known as the **transatlantic slave trade**, refers to the trade in slaves that took place across the Atlantic Ocean from the sixteenth through to the nineteenth centuries. The vast majority of slaves involved in the Atlantic trade were Africans from the central and western parts of the continent, who were sold by African slave dealers to European traders, who transported them to the colonies in North and South America. There, the slaves were made to labor on coffee, cocoa and cotton plantations, in gold and silver mines, in rice fields, the construction industry, timber, and shipping or in houses to work as servants.

The shippers were, in order of scale, the Portuguese, the British, the French, the Spanish, the Dutch, and North Americans. European- and American-owned fortresses and ships obtained enslaved people from African slave-traders, though some were captured by European slave-traders through raids and kidnapping. Most contemporary historians estimate that between 9.4 and 12 million of Africans arrived in the New World, although the actual number of people taken from their homes is considerably higher (Eltis et al, 2002).

Figure 2: A handbill advertising a slave auction in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1769.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_slave_trade

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The slave trade is sometimes called the *Maafa* by African and African-American scholars, meaning "holocaust" or "great disaster" in Swahili. Some scholars, such as Marimba Ani and Maulana Karenga use the terms **African Holocaust** or **Holocaust of Enslavement**. Slavery was one element of a three-part economic cycle — the triangular trade and its Middle Passage — which ultimately involved four continents, four centuries and millions of people. (http://www.africanholocaust.net/html_ah/holocaustspecial.htm).

The Atlantic slave trade is customarily divided into two eras, known as the First and Second Atlantic Systems. The First Atlantic system was the trade of enslaved Africans to, primarily, South American colonies of the Portuguese and Spanish empires; it accounted for only slightly more than 3% of all Atlantic slave trade. It started (on a significant scale) in about 1502 (Anstey, 1975:5), and lasted until 1580, when Portugal was temporarily united with Spain. While the Portuguese traded enslaved people themselves, the Spanish empire relied on the asiento system, awarding merchants (mostly from other countries) the license to trade enslaved people to their colonies. During the first Atlantic system most of these traders were Portuguese, giving them a near-monopoly during the era, although some Dutch, English, Spanish and French traders also participated in the slave trade (Emmer, 1998: 17). After the union, Portugal was weakened, with its colonial empire being attacked by the Dutch and British.

The Second Atlantic system was the trade of enslaved Africans by mostly British, Portuguese, French and Dutch traders. The main destinations of this phase were the Caribbean colonies, Brazil, and North America, as a number of European countries built up economically slave-dependent colonies in the New World. Amongst the proponents of this system were Francis Drake and John Hawkins (Lovejoy, 1994). The first enslaved Africans to reach what would become the U.S. arrived in January of 1526 as part of a Spanish attempt at colonizing South Carolina near Jamestown. The 17th century saw an increase in shipments with enslaved people arriving in the English colony of Jamestown, Virginia in 1619, although these first kidnapped Africans were classed as indentured servants and freed after seven years; chattel slavery entered Virginia law in 1656. Irish immigrants brought slaves to Montserrat in 1651, and in 1655, slaves arrived in Belize (Behrendt, 1999). The following table shows the distribution of slaves to different slave-country dealers from 1519 – 1867. While table 2 and 3 show the world population at this period.

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Table 1: Distribution of Slaves (1519 – 1867)

Destination	Percentage
Portuguese America	38.5%
British America (minus North America)	18.4%
Spanish Empire	17.5%
French Americas	13.6%
British North Americas	6.45%
English Americas	3.25%
Dutch West Indies	2.0%
Danish West Indies	0.3%

Source: Stephen D. Behrendt (1999), "Transatlantic Slave Trade". Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience.

Table 2: World Population (in millions)

Year	1750	1800	1850	1900	1950	1999
World	791	978	1,262	1,650	2,521	5,978
Africa	106	107	111	133	221	767
Asia	502	635	809	947	1,402	3,634
Europe	163	203	276	408	547	729
Latin America and the Caribbean	16	24	38	74	167	511
North America	2	7	26	82	172	307
Oceania	2	2	2	6	13	30

Source: UN report, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/sixbillion/sixbilpart1.pdf

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Table 3: World Population (by percentage distribution)

Year	1750	1800	1850	1900	1950	1999
World	100	100	100	100	100	100
Africa	13.4	10.9	8.8	8.1	8.8	12.8
Asia	63.5	64.9	64.1	57.4	55.6	60.8
Europe	20.6	20.8	21.9	24.7	21.7	12.2
Latin America and the Caribbean	2.0	2.5	3.0	4.5	6.6	8.5
North America	0.3	0.7	2.1	5.0	6.8	5.1
Oceania	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.5

Source: UN report, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/sixbillion/sixbilpart1.pdf

On February 24, 2007 the Virginia General Assembly passed House Joint Resolution Number 728 acknowledging "with profound regret the involuntary servitude of Africans and the exploitation of Native Americans, and call for reconciliation among all Virginians." With the passing of that resolution, Virginia became the first of the 50 United States to acknowledge through the state's governing body their state's involvement in slavery. The passing of this resolution came on the heels of the 400th anniversary celebration of the city of Jamestown, Virginia, which was the first permanent English colony to survive in what would become the United States. Jamestown is also recognized as one of the first slave ports of the American colonies (House Joint Resolution Number 728, 2009).

On June 18, 2009, the United States Senate issued an apologetic statement decrying the "fundamental injustice, cruelty, brutality, and inhumanity of slavery". The news was welcomed by President Barack Obama, the nation's first President of African descent (Agence France-Presse, 2009).

2.2 The Colonial Era:

The U.S. – Africa relations during the colonial era was defined by what Henry A. Byroads (the Assistant Secretary for Near East, South Asian and African Affairs in the State

Department) termed 'United States enlightened self-interest', in an address titled "The World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies: A Challenge to America". Byroads opines that

> The policies of the United States Government towards colonial questions have not always been clearly understood. Our basic policy, however, is relatively simple. We believe in eventual self-determination for all peoples, and we believe that evolutionary development to this end should move forward with minimum delay. Our Government must approach colonial questions in terms of the enlightened self-interest of the United States. We recognise that the disintegration of the old colonialism is inevitable-We recognise that self-determination will not always be exercised in the form of national independence. Some people may choose voluntarily to unite or associate themselves, on a free and equal basis, with the nations which have governed them in the past (Andre Baptiste, 2005).

At the end of the World War 11, in August 1941, the U.S. President, Franklin D. Roosevelt and his British counterpart, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, on behalf of the great leaders of the Grand Coalition forces, signed the Atlantic Charter, to give freedom or self-rule to the colonized states of the world. Inter alia, article 3 of this the Atlantic Charter reads thus: "They (the two countries) respect the right of all peoples, to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them" (Andre Baptiste, 2005). Under the euphoria of the World Wart 11 victory, this charter was signed, but future events proved that this ordinance was only given a lip service against the exigencies of the time in what Andre Baptiste (2005) called "the United States' blindness to the 'Challenge to the Colonial Powers".

The communist threats and the age of ICMB (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles) shaped and brought a new vista to the U.S. – Africa relations during the post-World War 11 era. This shift in the colonial question was brought about, not to achieve and sustain the world peace, but to guarantee the U.S. national interest and her security. Hence, the African interest was not at all considered. And so, the U.S. – Africa relations during this period was guided by two issues: the purported U.S. "enlightened self-interest", and the ideological warfare of the communist containment. Therefore, Africa at this period became a beautiful bride to be courted by her merits, but to be discarded as soon as her priced endowments have been plucked. At this era in

the U.S. – Africa relations, America was not for Africa, but for herself and for the interests of her western allies. In these contexts was U.S. – Africa relationship anchored until the fall of the Soviet Union. And so, "One cannot find a better rationale for the US Marshall Aid Plan to revive the weakened economies of Western Europe, including Britain, in the first decade and more after the end of World War II. To aid the process of revival, the United States concurred in the strategy of the European Colonial Powers of exploiting the wealth of their colonies" (Andre Baptiste, 2005).

2.3 The Cold War Era:

The cold war era was a period between the end of the World War 11 (1945) and the disintegration of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (U.S.S.R) in 1990. As an ideological warfare, it was a period in the world history characterized by an intense antagonistic relationship between the West (championed by the U.S. and her allies), and the Eastern Block (spearheaded by Russia). As already noted, maintenance of the security of NATO by not just the United States but also her Western allies in the face of the threat posed by the USSR bloc emerged as the key planks in their foreign and military policy in the Cold War. This is evident in a host of Operation Plans of the United States Military Establishment from 1947. For example, General Emergency Operation Plan No. 47 of the United States Atlantic Fleet, dated 10 September, 1947, stated:

> The U.S.S.R. is the world power whose political and economic objectives conflict in the greatest degree with those of the U.S. As the U.S.S.R. is the most probable enemy of the U.S., it is possible that war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. can be precipitated because of an incident or as the result of a premeditated military action by the U.S.S.R. to achieve her national aims. The satellite countries of the U.S.S.R. will contribute their economic and manpower resources.

In light of this, the priority mission of the United States and member states of NATO was to deploy air, surface and underwater (ASW) forces to defend the North America, the Atlantic-Caribbean and Western Europe, especially Germany. By the 1950s, the US-NATO strike forces included the Strategic Air Command, warships and submarines increasingly armed with nuclear ICBMs. Overall command in the Atlantic Ocean was assigned to the US Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet and his forces. Their specific mission was: 1. to defend the United States and

Western Europe against attack through the Atlantic Ocean; 2. to control the sea and secure the airways through the Atlantic except otherwise assigned; 3. to support the U.S. and NATO forces in Europe and in the Mediterranean; 4. to support the forces of the Northeast and Caribbean Commands; and 5.to support U.S. and NATO policy within the scope of his command responsibility (Andre Baptiste, 2005).

The strategic importance of Africa south of the Sahara was stated in document #5818 of the US National Security Council as follows:

> The strategic value of Africa south of the Sahara stems principally from the area's geographic location athwart alternate air and sea routes to the Far East, and from its strategic materials. In the event of war or loss of Western access to sea and air routes through the Middle East, control of sea and air communication through Africa South of the Sahara would be extremely important. Recent events increasingly jeopardize our sea and air lanes through the Middle East, thereby increasing the strategic significance of Africa South of the Sahara. From bases in certain areas of Africa South of the Sahara, the Communists could pose a serious threat to communications in the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea, as well as to our important North African strategic facilities, the Mediterranean littoral, and the flank of NATO. Therefore, under these circumstances, our primary strategic interest is to deny Africa South of the Sahara to Communist control.' (Andre Baptiste, 2005).

2.4 The Post-Cold War Era:

The constant theme of American foreign policy during the period 1947-1988, when the ideological struggle for world hegemony between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international politics, was the global containment of communism. This theme was a function of the Soviet Union's ideological and political expansion to Eastern Europe after World War 11 and its threat of further expansion to volatile world regions outside Europe (Ugboaja, 1992). The U.S. relations with Africa in the post-cold war era was characterized by the America's lack of interest in Africa, with the belief that the colonized States of Africa are under the exclusive control of the colonial Masters' spheres of influence, hence, the policy of non-interference. This policy was adopted not for the interest of the colonized States of Africa, but in

order not to annoy the sensibility of the western allies who had spheres of control in Africa; of protecting America's national interest of safe-guarding her relationship with the Western allies. Hence,

> Interest in the continent of Africa seemingly increases or decreases with the change in the United States political administration. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has pursued a distant relationship with Africa based on our foreign policy. Initially, the United States used the strategy of "containment" in an effort to prevent the spread of communism as the basis for U.S. interests in African affairs. Having accomplished this, the United States reverted back to that distant relationship, not visibly showing much interest in the continent's establishment of governments, economic development or other issues that plagued the continent.
> With the fall of the Soviet Union and communism, another change in the United States strategy came as a result of the civil unrest, political and military corruption and various other social issues in Africa, which created serious challenges to stability in the region (Cumbo, 2003).

2.5 U.S. – Africa Foreign Policies:

The persistent and consistent trend in the U.S. foreign policy towards Africa has been characterized solely by the U.S. national interests, and propelled by exploitative economic drives. And so, four phases has emerged: the period before the Cold War (characterized by the lack of interest in the Africa and African affairs); the period of the Cold War (a period of containment marked by the U.S. conscious courting of the Africa's support and relationship); the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union (a revert to the phase of lack of interest in the African affairs); and finally, the present period of increasing interest in Africa in security issues (the global war against terrorism) and economic interest in oil. By inference, it is apparently clear that U.S. has never taken any interest in Africa for the Africa's self, but on the issues and moments that serves the American's national interests. According to Peter Beinart (1995),

> During the 1870s and 1880s this changed. Indifference gave way to a frenzied scramble for territory. The 1884 Berlin Conference, which divided Africa among the European powers, ushered in a century during which Western governments used the continent as a field on which to play out their rivalries. This continued during the cold war. Today, however, with Western governments

disengaging, the nineteenth-century model has returned. Convinced that Africa has no impact on the rest of the globe, First World governments are ceding control to aid agencies and lending institutions. Though this epochal shift has hardly been noticed in the United States and Europe, it is wreaking havoc in Africa. During the 1880s Africa became a safety valve for conflicts among the great powers.

Llyod N. Cutler (1985) made a case for U.S. right to intervene or not to intervene in international conflicts as was the cases in Africa. The right or the willingness to intervene in international conflicts as we have been trying to investigate in this study is formed by economic and security reasons, other than by moralistic judgments. Hence, in contradiction to the U.S. foreign policy in Africa, Llyod N. Cutler (1985) argues that,

We face many foreign policy decisions—how to respond to the fighting in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Salvador, Angola, Kampuchea, the Philippines and soon, perhaps, South Africa—that involve the legality of intervening in a civil war. The international law journals are full of scholarly discussions on this subject. They are hard for non-scholars to follow. They disagree sharply, as scholars are wont to do, in their argumentation and conclusions. For readers who are not scholars of international law, this article tries to explain how the rules have evolved, where they now stand, and how they might be clarified to relieve the rising tension between the principle of nonintervention and the human rights of self-determination and open democratic elections.

Does it matter whether our military interventions in civil wars, or those of the Soviet bloc, violate international law? Only the U.N. Security Council has the legal power to enforce international law, and it in fact has no such power against the Soviet Union or the United States if either chooses to exercise its right of veto. The columnist George Will has suggested that Americans ought to care less about whether we have the legal right to intervene than whether intervention in a particular civil war is the right thing to do.

But it does matter whether our actions comply with international law. It matters precisely because we are a practicing democracy with both philosophical and geopolitical reasons to encourage the democratic aspirations of all peoples. Democracy cannot flourish in a lawless climate; it depends on widely accepted principles of law for its survival. That is obvious with respect to national law. It

> is equally important with respect to international law, especially our treaty commitments under the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. No democratic nation—least of all a democratic superpower—can afford to act in a manner that admittedly flouts international law. To sustain free-world support of our leadership, our actions must be confined to steps we can justify as consistent with a principled interpretation of the law as we see it.

Yes indeed, U.S. has been interpreting the law as 'she' sees it, as it profits her sensibility, and increases her fervour with her western allies. Africa has never been better of in lieu to the U.S. foreign policies. For a closer look, let us examine the U.S. – Africa foreign policies in the epochs of the Ronald Reagan's regime, George H. W. Bush's regime, Bill Clinton's regime, George W. Bush's regime, and Barack Obama's regime.

U.S./Africa Foreign Policy during Ronald Reagan's regime (1981 – 1989):

Figure 3: President Ronald Reagan

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_Ronald_Reagan_administration

The **foreign policy of the Ronald Reagan administration** was the foreign policy of the United States from 1981 to 1989. It was characterized by a strategy of "peace through strength" followed by a warming of relations with the Soviet Union, and resulting in an end to the Cold War when Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power. As part of the policies that became known as the "Reagan Doctrine," the United States also offered financial and logistics support to the anti-communist opposition in central Europe and took an increasingly hard line against socialist and

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communist governments in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua ("Reagan Doctrine" at U.S. Department of State).

Ronald Reagan key foreign policy in Africa could best be summarized as the Ronald Reagan policy of the 'constructive engagement'. Hence, During Ronald Reagan's presidency, South Africa continued to use a non-democratic system of government based on racial discrimination, known as apartheid, in which the minority of white South Africans exerted nearly complete legal control over the lives of the non-white majority of the citizens. In the early 1980s, the issue had moved to the center of international attention as a result of events in the townships and outcry at the death of Stephen Biko. Reagan administration policy called for "constructive engagement" with the apartheid government of South Africa. In opposition to the condemnations issued by the US Congress and public demands for diplomatic or economic sanctions, Reagan made relatively minor criticisms of the regime, which was otherwise internationally isolated, and the US granted recognition to the government. South Africa's military was then engaged in an occupation of Namibia and proxy wars in several neighboring countries, in alliance with Savimbi's UNITA. Reagan administration officials apparently saw the apartheid government as a key anti-communist ally (see http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/embargo/rknight840403.htm). In other words, Ronald Reagan administration's foreign policy in Africa is a foreign policy that is self serving; a protectionist foreign policy that seeks to enhance the America's national interest. This administration, indeed, had very little to do with Africa.

U.S./Africa Foreign Policy during George H.W. Bush's regime (1989 - 1993)

Figure 4: George HW Bush - 41st U.S.A President.

Source: http://www.visitingdc.com/president/george-hw-bush-picture.htm

The U.S. – Africa foreign policy during the George H.W. Bush administration did not consider Africa as a continent with strategic importance for America, hence the apparent apathy towards Africa. Like the U.S. administrations before and after him, President H.W. Bush did not make any significant effort to come to the aid of the embattled Africa nations. Explaining the role played by the Bush administration during the Liberian crisis, Herman Cohen, condemned the America's complacent attitude in the civil carnage. Hence, the veteran American diplomat cautioned African countries to discourage surrogate wars that are imposed by outside powers. He apologized to the people of Liberia for the failure of the United States to intervene in the conflict. According to him,

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> 'I think it was a lot foolish on the part of the administration (*U.S*) to sit by and allow the conflict to rage leading to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. I think this could have been avoided if we had gotten really involved into finding a lasting solution but they did not see it necessary. I however express my deepest apologies to the people of Liberia for the sufferings,' he regretted (http://trcofliberia.org/press_releases/135).

U.S./Africa Foreign Policy during Bill Clinton's regime (1993 - 2001)

Figure 5: Bill Clinton

Source: http://www.digitaltrends.com/entertainment/bill-clinton-to-cameo-in-the-hangover-2/

President Clinton assumed office shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, but nevertheless was forced to confront numerous international conflicts. Shortly after taking office, Clinton had to describe whether the United States, as a world super power, should have a say in the conflicts and violence occurring in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Haiti. The administration endorsed a doctrine of forceful intervention in world affairs, arguing "that the U.S. has the right to use military force to ensure 'uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources,' and must maintain huge military forces 'forward deployed' in Europe and Asia 'in order to shape people's opinions about us' and 'to shape   events   that   will   effect   our   livelihood   and   our   security'"

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(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_Clinton_Administration).

Bill Clinton's African foreign policy has been rated as the worst in the modern century. Responding to the Rwandan 1994 episode, he accepted the failure of his administration to respond to the incidents of genocide in Africa. When Clinton travelled to Africa in 1998, he said that the international community, presumably including the US, must accept responsibility for the failure to respond to the massacres. When speaking about the Rwanda Crisis, Clinton called it his worst failure, admitting "I blew it" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_Clinton_Administration). In a not too similar case, President Clinton proclaimed his Africa policy a great success while speaking to the National Summit on Africa in Washington, which according to him has resulted in many triumphs. Commenting on this claim, Dr Joseph Opala of the James Madison University, Virginia, on April 24, 2000, argued that,

> But Clinton's Africa policy is, ironically, not just bad, but the worst ever, and his high profile Africa tour in 1998 was mere window dressing. Using his gift for political spin, Clinton has managed to project an image of sincere concern for Africa, while actually inflicting terrible damage on both Africa and US interests in Africa (Opala, 2000).

Commenting further, he opined that

> Worse yet, Clinton's spin doctoring cost lives. By making public relations his priority goal in two cases of mass murder, he crossed a deadly line—the line between standing by while mass murderers do their work, and giving actual aid and support to those very murderers. He took US Africa policy to a terrible place it had never been before.

These two cases were in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. In 1994 in Rwanda, President Clinton "deliberately suppressed reports of genocide in that country, not wanting to deal with that volatile issue in an election year. Moreover, his hiding of the facts contributed markedly to the international community's slow response to the crisis and, ultimately, to the deaths of more than 800,000 people. Clinton's strategy in Rwanda was revealed in chilling detail in the PBS documentary, The Triumph of Evil" (Opala, 2000). In a similar development, when Foday Sankoh, a criminal psychopath unleashed mayhem in Sierra Leone, U.S. watched in idle

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curiosity. And when the assistance of the U.S. was sort by the ECOMOG to arrest the situation, America declined giving any meaningful assistance. According to the Opala (2000) report,

> ECOWAS, the 16-nation West African trade organization, established a multi-national peacekeeping force, called ECOMOG. The African peacekeepers launched an offensive against Sankoh's rebels, but were soon taking heavy casualties and spending an estimated $1 million per day. Developing nations that could ill afford such costs pleaded for trucks, fuel, radios, and medicines, not US troops or weapons. But Clinton gave the African peacekeepers only lip-service support and the barest minimum of material assistance—a mere $4 million in 1998, one percent of what the Africans, themselves, were spending.

Hence, acting true to type, the U.S. in 1999 succumbed to the Sankoh's prediction that when America has realized the magnitude of the atrocities committed by the rebel group, they would be put in power to stop further killings. This exactly happened when U.S. forced Kabbah to accept the rebel forces into his cabinet. And so, according to Opala's (2000) report,

> US Ambassador Joseph Melrose openly pressured President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to accept Sankoh into his cabinet and to grant the RUF killers a blanket amnesty. Jesse Jackson, as Clinton's envoy to Africa, traveled to Sierra Leone, as well, to lend his personal support to the so-called peace agreement signed in July. Shocked that Jackson, a hero to most Africans, would support such destructive measures, Sierra Leonean reporters asked him a poignant question: Would you put the Ku Klux Klan in the US cabinet to prevent it from killing people in America? Given US prestige and Sierra Leone's total dependence on outside aid, neither the president nor his people felt they had a choice.

Hence, America's betrayal shocked Sierra Leoneans all the more as the US had only recently backed their country's transition to democracy. Energized by strong US support for elections in 1996, thousands of citizens battled soldiers in the streets to protect their ballot boxes, and when the elections succeeded, cheering crowds gathered spontaneously around the US Embassy to express their thanks. Then, less than 3 years later, the US demanded that the very democratic government it helped usher into power in the first place accept mass murderers into its cabinet in clear violation of its constitution.

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Thus, Bill Clinton took US Africa policy to the lowest level ever. To avoid taking positive action in Sierra Leone, he betrayed America's democratic principles and rewarded mass murderers with political power. By doing so, he also sent a message to terrorist groups all across Africa—if you can kill enough people, if you can make it ugly enough, and if you can get it on CNN, the US will put you in power. The implications for a continent wracked by political instability are almost too frightening to consider. "Mr. Clinton's Africa policy is a torch tossed casually into a barrel of gasoline" (Opala, 2000). And again, Clinton's foreign policy on Africa has also been considered under the auspices of the security concern of United States. Making case for this assertion, Martin (2000) opines that,

> Here we need to examine the second, often unnoticed pillar of Africa policy under Clinton—and one that was absent under previous Republican administrations. For as Clinton cabinet officers repeatedly stated, Africa was important not just for trade and investment, but because it posed a new transnational threat to the United States.

Another area very special to the Clinton's administration foreign policy on Africa is the Africa Growth opportunity Act (AGOA), which was signed into law in May 2000. This being a continuation or a modification of the Reagan's foreign policy of opening the world to U.S. corporate interests, Martin (2000) informs that,

> Here we need to recall Clinton's actions—and not just his rhetorical flourishes and photo-shots with complacent animals and politicians on African safaris. For Clinton's policy was based on two pillars. The first was taken right out of Reagan's house: an acceleration of opening the world to U.S. corporate interests under the free trade banner and structural adjustment. Hence the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act became the central policy initiative of the Clinton presidency.

And so, from every indication, Africa may not be considered to possess any strategic importance to the U.S., if not to serve her national interest and as a tool to achieving other self-serving goals, which in the least benefits Africa, except by accident.

U.S./Africa Policy during George W. Bush's regime (2000 - 2008):
Source: http://www.topnews.in/people/george-w-bush-0

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The George W. Bush policy thrust on Africa is on humanitarian aid and the resolution of the Sudan / Darfur crisis. President Bush has done work to reduce the HIV/AIDS in Africa, stop the spread of malaria, and rebuild broken nations from their genocidal pasts. One of the most notable programs initiated by Bush is the PEPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) Program, which was a commitment of $15 billion over 5 years (2003 – 2008) from the United States to fight the global HIV/AIDS pandemic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_George_W._Bush_administration).

On Sudan/Darfur crisis, Bush on October 14, 2006, signed a law imposing sanctions against people responsible for genocide and war crimes in Sudan. It enabled the Bush administration to deny Sudan's government access to oil revenues. Furthermore to the signing of the law, he signed another executive order that confirms the existing sanctions but eases some on parts of southern Sudan. It also includes exceptions to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid to Darfur. On the other side, the order toughens some sanctions, including a provision that bars any American from engaging in oil-related transactions in Sudan.

On the contrary, according to William G. Martin, Bush will surely not depart from such neo-liberal positions espoused by his predecessor, Bill Clinton. As he responded when asked a second time if Africa fit his definition of strategic interests, he said of course 'No' but then continued, "It fits into my definition of economic interest, and that's why I try to promote free trade". Nor will he depart an inch from Clinton's avowed stance of rejecting any US support for peace-keeping efforts, unilateral or multilateral—even if such wars are waged, as during the Clinton years, by troops trained by the Green berets (Martin, 2000).

In a press release of the *African Action* (2003), a Media Briefing reveals Bush policies antithetical to Africa's interests and that President Bush is misleading the American public with empty promises to Africa. Hence, Speaking about Africa's AIDS crisis, Booker said, the $15 billion commitment President Bush announced this year to fighting AIDS in Africa is a cruel hoax because none of this money is being made available now. Faced with this most deadly global threat, the Bush Administration continues to stall and its empty promises are costing thousands of African lives every day. Similarly, Critiquing U.S. trade relations with Africa, Bill Fletcher Jr., President of TransAfrica Forum, said that U.S. pursues trade policies that are at odds

with Africa's interests; that the Bush Administration is driven more by a cynical preoccupation with securing oil reserves than with matters of promoting genuine economic development.

Another area of interest very conspicuous in the Bush foreign policy on Africa is the insatiable thirst for oil. In the Bush administration, the demand for the african oil assumed a new height of urgency due to the problems in the Middle East. Hence, ever since Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration has sought venues other than the Middle East for getting oil reserves. This is based on the mounting social instability of their puppet regimes, especially Saudi Arabia. And now, with the United States just itching to invade Iraq, home to 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, Washington has once again set its sights on Africa. The aim is not only to get their hands on more oil but to expand their oil-importing markets (see Moorehead, 2002).

Security is another troubled spot in the Bush foreign policy thrust towards Africa. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center may have inform the Bush administration's sensibility that Africa could be a working partner in ensuring the world's security, and a partner in combating terrorism. The establishment of the AFRICOM as an American High Command in combating terrorism was in this line. On the issue of the George Bush Africa policy on security, Emira Woods, Co-Director of Foreign Policy in Focus, spoke about U.S. military relations with Africa, declaring, "The Bush Administration's National Security Strategy and its decision to play global cop is fundamentally a doctrine of reckless endangerment for Africa" (*African Action*, 2003).

Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a U.S. – Africa trade relationship signed into law by the Bill Clinton administration in May 2000, but later ratified by the George Bush administration on July 13, 2004. In May 2000, the U.S. Congress approved legislation known as the **African Growth and Opportunity Act**, or *AGOA (Title I, Trade and Development Act of 2000; P.L. 106–200)*. The purpose of this legislation was to assist the economies of sub-Saharan Africa and to improve economic relations between the United States and the region (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Growth_and_Opportunity_Act). AGOA provides trade preferences for quota and duty-free entry into the United States for certain goods, expanding the benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. Notably, AGOA expanded market access for textile and apparel goods into the United States for eligible countries. This resulted in the growth of an apparel industry in southern Africa, and created hundreds of thousands of jobs. AGOA is not all a success story. According to the Wikipedia,

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AGOA has resulted in limited successes in some countries. In addition to growth in the textile and apparel industry, some AGOA countries have begun to export new products to the United States, such as cut flowers, horticultural products, automotives and steel. While Nigeria and Angola are the largest exporters under AGOA, South Africa's have been the most diverse and unlike the former are not mainly concentrated in the energy sector. To some countries, including Lesotho, Swaziland, Kenya and Madagascar, AGOA remains of critical importance. Agricultural products is a promising area for AGOA trade, however much work needs to be done to assist African countries in meeting U.S. sanitary and phytosanitary   standards (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Growth_and_Opportunity_Act).

Figure 6: President George W. Bush

President George W. Bush signs into law the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Acceleration Act of 2004 in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Executive Office Building Tuesday, July 13, 2004.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:President_Bush_Signs_African_Growth_and_Opportunity_Act.jpg

U.S./Africa Policy during Barack Obama's regime (2009 – 20?):

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Figure 7: Barack Obama

44th President of the United States
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barack_Obama

Barack Hussein Obama II is the 44th and current President of the United States. He is the first African American to hold the office. He was elected as the 44th President of the United States of America on 4 November 2008. His inauguration as the United States president was on 20 January 2009. It is the first time in the history of the United States that African serves as its president. This in itself is the issue of the socio-historical significance not only in the history of the United States internal relations, but also in its relations with the rest of the world particularly Africa. Obama foreign policies towards Africa may differ with his predecessors in approach, but not in content. With a strong conviction, Makgetlaneng (2008) argues that:

> Is it realistic to expect the United States president and his or her administration to contribute towards the resolution of the structural problems in Africa - problems created and sustained by the United States? Obama has already made it clear that his administration will be committed to defend and expand what is referred to as the United States strategic interests in Africa and the rest of the South.

He further argues that

> Those who expect that the Obama administration will substantially deviate from the expansive, moralistic, conservative, militaristic, brutal and ruthless essence of the United States foreign policy will be disappointed. The history of the United States relations with the developing countries in general and Africa in particular has been the history of the struggle for the accumulation and expansion of power and zones of control or spheres of influence (Makgetlaneng, 2008).

On the foreign policy issue, he maintains that the United States and other countries have obligation and self-interest in being full partners with Kenya and Africa. Pointing out that he will play his role to "shape an intelligent foreign policy that promises peace and prosperity and that gives hope and opportunity to the people of this great continent," (Makgetlaneng, 2008).

What will be the Obama administration's form and content of Africa policy? Whitney W. Schneidman, who served as advisor on African affairs to the campaign to elect Obama as the United States president and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Clinton administration set out the administration's fundamental policy objectives for Africa in his remarks to the Constituency for Africa's 2008 Ronald H. Brown African Affairs series at the National Press Club on 24 September 2008. These objectives are to accelerate or intensify Africa's further integration into "the global economy" or international capitalism, "enhance the peace and security of African states" and to "strengthen relations" of the United States with African governments, institutions and civil society organizations committed to deepening democracy, accountability and reducing poverty in Africa." He maintains that Africa Command, the United States military command for Africa, will work with other United States agencies to "promote peace, security, and stability on the continent." Related to this task is that the administration will create "a Shared Security Partnership Program to build the infrastructure to deliver effective counter-terrorism training, and to create a strong foundation for coordinated action against al Qaeda and its affiliates in Africa and elsewhere" (see Schneidman, 2008).

Hence, the Shared Security Partnership Program will "provide assistance with information sharing, training, operations, border security, anti-corruption programs, technology and the targeting of terrorist financing." He maintained that "in the Niger Delta, we should become more engaged with the Nigerian government, the European Union, the African Union, and other stakeholders to stabilize the region." As a response to China's intensified expansion

into Africa to secure access to energy supplies and other resources from Africa and to enhance its "rapidly expanding influence on the continent," he points out that the Obama administration will strive to counter China's "growing presence" on the continent by engaging the Chinese political leadership to "establish the rules of the road and to ensure that we are working at common purpose to enhance economic development on the continent."

And so, what Schneidman is saying is not different from Obama's response to the Presidential Town Hall Meeting Africa Questionnaire in October 2007. Answering the question as to what steps he would take as president to address the issue of China's increased role Africa, he agreed that China is a key international player in Africa competing for contracts, access to resources and political influence. For him, its intensified presence in Africa challenges the United States to improve its policies and programmes in pursuing its interests in Africa and in responding to its role. Tactically, United States policy makers should appear to be striving to "find the common ground on which both the U.S. and China can better contribute to Africa's development." It would be beneficial to Africa and the United States if they "can develop strategies for cooperating with China in critical areas such as poverty alleviation, healthcare and protection of the environment." While his administration will forge cooperation programmes with China to benefit Africa, its establishment of "high-level engagement in Africa" will be "a significant priority." In dealing with China's intensified expansion into Africa, his administration will attempt to answer key questions about the relationship between China's economic influence and political influence in Africa and whether in pursuing its interests in Africa, China is prioritizing economic benefits or gains over governance, democracy and human rights issues and environmental concerns. He articulates the popular position that China's "willingness to sweep important governance and human rights issues aside in making deals with Africa is of grave concerns"(see www.thesullivanfoundation.org/foundation).

2.6 U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa:

Nations have always been guided by the protection of their National Interests in the conducts of International Relations. Nigeria in her foreign policy of 'goodneighbourliness' was informed by the need to secure her borders, maintain goodneighbourliness with her African brothers and sisters, and also to foist the attempt by the French Government of a West African regional hegemony (see Asobie, 1991). So, there is no gainsaying the fact that no nation would

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work against her National Interest in the arena of international politics. To this, the United States of America is not an exception. And so, Aforka (1987) argues that the incentive for intervention include the goal to exploit the people and their resources (Okonkwo, 2000: 32). Hans J. Morgenthau argues that all nations will continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene and their choice of the means of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests (Okonkwo, 2000: 33). Furthermore, Obinna, (1997) explained that from the 1980s, foreign intervention in Africa conflicts assumed the nature of "resource wars" undertaken to gain or maintain control over resources of strategic raw materials. He identified three factors, which account for this situation. First the growing hunger of industrially advanced economies for vital raw materials and their dependence on external sources of supply located mostly in the third world countries (Okonkwo, 2000: 33).

The fact was that the minerals of Africa and the Caribbean especially and the oil of the Caribbean played a role in the victory of the Allies in World War II, that exceeded the level of their economic development. Before the war, Africa produced the following percentages of the world's supply of commodities and minerals.

Asbestos	14.8%	gold	57.8%	palm oil	76.8%
Chrome	17.0%	graphite	7.5%	phosphates	40.9%
cocoa	68.9%	groundnuts	22.4%	platinum	13.0%
copper	22.1%	manganese	12.7%	tin	9.5%
cotton	8.7%	olive oil	11.6%	wool	10.0%

In addition, Africa was a producer of other materials of great strategic importance to the world's Powers: rubber, sisal, hides, bauxite, cobalt, industrial diamonds, Pyrethrum, radium, uranium, vanadium and wolfram (Andre Baptiste,2005). Hence, Africa's importance to the U.S. and the entire universe, no matter how suppressed the truth is, the facts still remain that Africa has been a great force to be reckoned with. And so, in a response to the Africa's strategic importance to the U.S. , William G. Martin (2000) argues that

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> Bush will surely not depart from such neo-liberal positions. As he responded when asked a second time if Africa fit his definition of strategic interests, he said of course No but then continued: It fits into my definition of economic interest, and that's why I try to promote free trade. Nor will he depart an inch from Clinton's avowed stance of rejecting any US support for peace-keeping efforts, unilateral or multilateral—even if such wars are waged, as during the Clinton years, by troops trained by the Green berets.

Economic Interest:

U.S. involvement in the Congo crisis, more than any other thing else is informed by economic interest. According to Ogene (1983), U.S. economic interests in Katanga and south Kasai regions were mainly in trade and investments. He argues that "The two areas were rich in copper, cobalt, tin, industrial diamonds and other minerals. The Congo as a whole produced in 1959 ten per cent of the total world supply of copper, 49 per cent of the cobalt needs of the Western world, 69 per cent of its industrial diamonds and 6.5 per cent of its tin". In the light of these natural endowments and their strategic importance to the industrial West, it became imperative that America should cast its net where it most benefits her national interest. Hence, "U.S. industries which depended on these minerals as raw materials tended to support any political arrangement that would guarantee the security of those sources of supply" (Ogene,1983: 27).

Monica Moorehead, writing in the *Workers World,* disgustingly berated the shameless display of the U.S. thirst for the Africa's natural endowments. According to her, "The following day, the *New York Times* ran a front page article headlined 'In Quietly Courting Africa, U.S. Likes the Dowry'. And what might that dowry be? Oil, oil and more oil" (Moorehead, 2002). This outrageous admission cannot be separated from the growing U.S. military presence in East Africa—which is an integral part of the U.S. military build-up against Iraq, or from Secretary of State, Colin Powell's recent trip to Africa, where he visited Angola and Gabon, two oil-producing countries. Nor could it have been separated from the recent announcement that Bush plans a major visit to Africa.

United States foreign policy demonstrates that the nation's interest lies only in countries that are perceived as having something the United States can appropriate. Other less developed countries do not appear attractive enough, or in other words, lack a stable environment to warrant

consideration. This may account for the shift in the foreign policy strategy that suggests, "trade for aid" as the new direction. What this term implies is that instead of providing foreign aid to Africa, trade is the mechanism used to assist in funding African development. Trade is the oldest of the different areas of economic interaction. Africa accounts for only about 4 per cent of the total value of imports and exports in international trade, but plays a major role in the continent's economy. Trade with Africa--$22.5 billion in 1997—constitutes less than 2% of overall U.S. foreign trade. Petroleum products, mostly from Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon, account for two-thirds of U.S. imports from Africa. With the end of the Cold War, total United States aid (military, economic, and disaster assistance) to Africa has been halved from more than $2 billion in 1985 to just over $1 billion in 1997. Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, and Ghana have become the top recipients of U.S. aid to Sub-Sahara Africa. Food aid and humanitarian assistance has fluctuated in response to specific needs; development assistance to the region declined steadily from $826 million in 1991 to a low of $541 million in 1996. With the exception of a few African countries, South Africa seems to have cornered the market for trade and investments with the United States. After the elimination of apartheid in 1991, the United States renewed its trade with South Africa. This new trade relationship was the focal point of the Clinton administration. An important regional dimension of foreign policy is to ensure that South Africa's economy is "closely knitted" to those of other South African community (SADC) countries, thereby enhancing the rise of regional markets that would be more attractive to U.S. investors. All foreign observers agree that South Africa constitutes the richest future American market. This is the reason that the United States, France, and other great powers have focused their economic sights on South Africa since the beginning of the 1990s. Another interesting facet of this relationship between the United States and South Africa is the use of the U.S. Ambassador as an advocate for trade to enhance the posture of U.S. businesses. Using this approach benefited the targeted country as well as the United States. For example, in 1994, the U.S. Ambassador for South Africa, Howard Jeter, was used in this capacity as advocate in convincing Owens-Corning to open a pipe subsidiary plant in Gaborone, Botswana. The end result was collateral contact with the foreign government and the creation of jobs both in South Africa and the United States. One cannot over look the contributions of South Africa in that it is the most highly industrialized country in Africa. It produces nearly twofifths of the continents manufactured goods. South Africa's factories turn out a wide range of products, including

automobiles, chemicals, clothing, processed foods, iron and steel. It is obvious that much time and energy has been devoted to the development of South Africa but their success has not come without great assistance from the western world. Table 4 shows the percentage of the third world production of strategic metal ores.

Table 4: Percentage Share of Third World in the Production of Strategic Metal Ores

Strategic Ore	Third World Share
Iron	23.0
Antimony	52.0
Bauxite	59.0
Chrome	94.0
Copper	44.0
Manganese	45.0
Cobalt	72.0
Tin	95.0
Lead	25.0
Zinc	22.0
Phosphates	30.0
Crude Oil	52.0

Source: Ebo Hutchful (1983) in UNESCO year book on peace and conflict studies, 1985,p.132 (Okonkwo, 2000:33)

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Table 5: Percentage of World Strategic Minerals Produced in Africa

Mineral	1968	1976	Reserves, 1980
Gold	68.3	68.3	50.0
Gem Diamonds	53.6	62.2	89.0
Industrial Diamonds	64.3	54.4	89.0
Cobalt	56.7	55.9	40.0
Chromium	31.5	32.1	96.0
Vanadium	29.4	31.1	19.0
Platinum	23.4	26.4	71.0
Copper	22.0	23.4	13.0
Uranium	17.0	17.9	14.0
Manganese	14.4	12.8	37.0

Source: The Kinssinger study of Southern Africa as cited in UNESCO press, 1985, p.137 (Okonkwo, 2000: 34).

Critiquing U.S. trade relations with Africa, Bill Fletcher Jr., President of TransAfrica Forum, said that U.S. is pursuing trade policies that are at odds with Africa's interests. The Bush Administration is driven more by a cynical preoccupation with securing oil reserves than with matters of promoting genuine economic development in Africa (*Africa Action,* 2003). In a similar development, *Africa Action (*2003) informs us that:

> During the presidential election campaign, Bush said that Africa doesn't fit into the national strategic interests as far as I can see but there is a firm economic basis for US interest in the continent. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates Africa's total oil reserves as 80bn barrels, 8% of the world's crude reserves. According to National Intelligence Council forecasts, the US could be importing as much as 25% of its oil from central Africa by 2015, compared with 16% at present.

U.S interest in the African supply of oil cannot be over emphasized. If not for any other

reason, it is an established fact that oil is very essential to the modern day industrialization, and so, Africa has it in abundance. Hence, while the United States marshals its forces to attack Iraq, it is also engaged in an equally strategic battle several thousand kilometres away. This calm offensive, as the Nigerian daily, *The Vanguard* calls it, targets oil reserves south of the Sahara and is designed partly to avoid antagonizing its Middle Eastern allies and partly to avoid generating a perception that it cares only about Africa's resources. According to Walter Kansteiner, US Under-Secretary of State for African affairs, African oil has become a national strategic interest. Ed Royce, the influential Republican senator for California and chairman of the Congress African sub-committee, maintains that African oil should be treated as a priority for US national security, post 9-11 (*Le Monde diplomatique*, 2003). As U.S. economic policies towards Africa is becoming increasingly militarized, there is high level of misgiving that what happened between the Soviet Union, U.S and Africa is very likely to repeat again in the current struggle between U.S. and China to control the African resources. Hence,

> As U.S. policy towards Africa becomes increasingly militarized, the U.S. economic agenda and energy concerns follow close behind. During the Cold War, U.S. competition with the Soviet Union led to disastrous policy decisions for the African people; it stunted the development of democracy and undermined economies. U.S.-Africa policy is at risk of repeating this historical mistake as the U.S. and China compete for African resources. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_4_72/ai_n16129797/

Political Interest:

The Cold War superpower rivalry caused many of Africa's conflicts. The Soviet Union and the United States courted newly independent African nations to convince them to support their efforts. The results of U.S. and Soviet courtship, as well as the influence of other nations, created undemocratic authoritarian, corrupt and oppressive governments. The end of the Cold War signaled an end to the superpower rivalry. However, Africa was left to fend for itself. The Cold War ended years of superpower backing politically, financially and militarily.

The United States no longer needed to coddle African leaders for their allegiance. Russia no longer had the means to provide assistance. The nature of politics in many African countries rests in capturing and maintaining that political power. The desire for power is also a key source of conflict across the African continent. Insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of

transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership or lack of respect for human rights all entail strong, and in most cases, dictatorial political control (Musonda, 2002).

The United States, Russia, France and other non-African nations have not been successful in affecting political measures to reduce or eliminate these practices by the leading rulers of sub-regions or major regions. In the 1990s, Africa appeared to undergo a democratic awakening. Between 1990 and 1995, 38 of the then 47 countries of Sub Saharan Africa held competitive, multi-party national elections. Open elections were also conducted in 38 of 47 countries. Twenty-five states have made progress towards democracy and it appears reforms are taking root. However, it may be action in appearance only. The same corruption that marred the political system and its leaders remain in place. The most valid reason for attempting to make the transition to democracy is to continue to receive foreign aid. Within many African nations there is still a high level of mistrust for even the elected officials (Metz, 2000).

Social Importance:

In the Bush National Security Strategy, the following statement proclaims that in Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war and desperate poverty. The National Security Strategy further asserts these conditions in Africa strike at the very "core value" of the United States. This statement of acknowledgement, however, does very little to combat such issues as HIV/AIDS and poverty levels of this vast continent. During the 14th International Aids Conference held in Barcelona, Spain, Cable News Network (CNN) reported an alarming statistic: "the number of people infected with HIV in Russia, India, China, Ethiopia, and Nigeria could more than triple by the year 2010, far exceeding the number in Central and Southern Africa. Between 25 million and 27 million people are infected with HIV in Central and Southern Africa alone" (CNN.Com, 2002).

The significance of this issue is that of the countries listed, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Central and South Africa are strategically significant to the United States. For example, Nigeria is an important source of oil, gas and minerals for the United States. If the intent of the United States is to use these countries or other stable countries as anchors in their regions, the threat of HIV/AIDS poses a great threat to Africa's ability to provide a work force to maintain the infrastructure needed to continue the upward progress of the continent. If the life expectancy rate

is just over thirty years old and there is not a health care system in place capable of providing medical treatment for those affected, then it stands to reason that the work force will be reduced to such levels that Africa will not be capable of competing in any market. Even though HIV/AIDS is a social issue, ultimately it will become an economic issue soon. The response by the United States has been to provide funding to Africa to provide the medical assistance needed to combat the HIV/AIDS problem, more specifically targeting pregnant females infected with the virus. For example, in Fiscal Year 2002, the United States provided $988 million for global HIV/Aids assistance--a 36% increase from Fiscal Year 2001 and for Fiscal Year 2003, President Bush proposed $1.1 billion--a 13% increase in funding from the previous year (Office of the Press Secretary, 2002).

During his State of the Union Address on 28 January 2003, President Bush announced a new initiative aimed at providing more relief to HIV/AIDS ridden countries in Africa and the Caribbean. His initiative, the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, calls for Congress to commit $15 billion dollars over the next five years to help turn the tide in combating the HIV/AIDS epidemic to the most afflicted countries in Africa and the Caribbean. As a precondition of the initiative, the president indicated that he would create a position for a special coordinator at the Department of State to ensure that the funds can be accounted for as a means to measure the effectiveness of the initiative in the future.

Regional Significance:

Each region of Africa is significant to the United States and other nations in many respects as the seemingly endless surplus of minerals and various resources draws to them other nations, which have a great demand for these resources. However, the United States national interests in the continent as a whole are largely economic and geopolitical. The economic priorities include retaining access to certain minerals. The geopolitical priorities are to deter or counter hegemonic intrusions by the Soviets or their surrogates into African countries and regions historically linked to the west, and to cement "special relationships" with governments willing to provide access to ports and other facilities supportive of global U.S. military outreach (Kitchen, 1983).

Although the Soviet Union no longer poses the threat of spreading communism, the United States' interests remain geopolitical and economic. On a much smaller scale we must consider other areas, though less visible, that have significant importance for United States involvement in Africa. A close examination of specific areas such as social, economic, political and global perspectives, reveals that not only do these areas relate back to the intent of the National Security Strategy but also drives the rationale for developing and implementing current foreign policy. Like a puzzle, each area has a connection to the other and without addressing each area as a whole Africa cannot achieve the prominence that it or the United States desires.

Global Importance:

Africa's significance to the free world crosses a spectrum of three areas: geographic, political, and economic. Geographically, Africa plays host to key trade routes that encompass the straits of Gibraltar, Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Aden. For the United States, travel through these routes are critical when providing a naval response to a crisis or saves valuable time for merchants when shipping exports to trade markets in the free world. Denial of access to these routes could prove to be a major obstacle for the United States. Hence, according to Mazrui (1980),

> Politically, access to the continent and its territorial waters assures our allies that the United States maintains a capable presence to support them when needed. Economically, estimates of Africa's resources on the whole are tentative. Not enough prospecting for resources under the ground has taken place, but it is already fair to say that Africa has 96 per cent of the non-communist world's diamonds, 60 per cent of its gold, 42 per cent of its cobalt, 34 per cent of its bauxite and 28 per cent of its uranium (Mazrui,1980).

Since the 1970s, the United States has been importing 98 per cent of its manganese from abroad, nearly half of which has been from Africa. The western world, including the United States' interest in Africa's oil also significantly increased, partly in proportion to the political uncertainties surrounding the Middle Eastern suppliers. For the time being, America's dependence on Nigerian oil continues to be critical. It appears that the market for trade and investment is rich with opportunity for U.S business as well as for Africa. With investment comes the opportunity to reduce Africa's unemployment rates. However rich the continent may be, there still looms the major challenge of the impact of HIV/AIDS on the economy.

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Security and Terrorism:

Owing to the low profile of America's interest in Africa, scholars have proffered varied explanations which are anchored on the nature and the dynamic characteristics of the international system. According to Emerson (1985), the Second World War and the Cold War had underlined the importance of security in Africa's strategic bases: harbours, lines of communication, strategic materials, and the political goodwill for the United States or for her European allies, and of preventing the communist states from gaining access to these resources. Hence, he concludes that, "thus security considerations and deference to the preferences of the allies are seen as important factors which influence the calculations of the United States as to how to ensure continued supply of raw materials" (Ogene, 1983: 3).

Oil is at the center of the intersection between growing militarization and U.S. economic interests in Africa. To many U.S. and African civil society groups, all roads seem to point to Bush's 2006 State of the Union address where he stated his intention to replace 75% of U.S. oil imports from the Middle East by 2025. It is expected that the United States will get 25% of its oil from Africa by 2015. Unfortunately, many Africans in oil-producing countries comment that the black gold can be not only a blessing, but also a curse. Oil wealth often fails to benefit the majority of the population in the country in which it is found. Conflict is easily sparked and not easily resolved in oil rich regions, and the environmental consequences of widespread extraction can be devastating.

In a dangerous replay of the cold war, the U.S. is likely to ignore Africa's priorities, placing military base rights above human rights. The war against AIDS, by far the most important global war effort and an urgent priority especially for Africa, will continue to suffer from a lack of resources. An American war on Iraq would also have a major negative impact on the global economy with dire consequences for African development. In 2003, U.S. unilateralism is likely to be directly at odds with African interests in building multilateral approaches to its greatest challenges from HIV/AIDS to international trade rules and peacekeeping. According to LeMelle (2008), the United States has dramatically ramped up military activity in Africa since 2002. Representative Donald Payne (D-NJ), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health on the House Committee for Foreign Affairs, and many others has described this trend as the "militarization of U.S. aid to Africa." The total amount of U.S. military sales,

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financing and training expenditures for eight African countries considered particularly strategic for the "war on terror" has increased from about $40 million over the five years from 1997 through 2001 to over $130 million between 2002 and 2006.

In a similar development, a Congressional Research Service report released in May of 2007, reported that the United States has recently established military, counter-terrorism and intelligence programs in dozens of African countries. According to this report, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has been using Camp Lemonier in Djibouti as its main U.S. base for counter-terrorist activities offshore and in the region since October 2002. In January 2007, the military announced that Camp Lemonier will expand from its current 97 acres to more than 500 acres (LeMelle, 2008).

The U.S. security interests in Africa are two dimensional. The first aspect of these interests is to counter terrorism, while the other is the protection of her interest in the oil rich deposit in the Gulf of Guinea and other oil rich states of Africa. Gerald LeMelle (2008) informs us that

> Under the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), the Pentagon has provided $500 million to increase border security and counter-terrorism capacity to Mali, Chad, Niger and Mauritania. The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) has provided small arms and training for peacekeeping operations to Benin, Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia.

On the second aspect of the U.S. security interest in Africa, LeMelle (2008) asserts that

> The Gulf of Guinea now features nearly continuous U.S. naval patrols, up from almost no activity in 2004. The Navy currently monitors countries from Guinea to Angola. The Defense Department has also agreed on access to air bases and ports in Africa and "bare-bones" facilities maintained by local security forces in Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.

Imperialism:

U.S. was not part of the mad scramble for Africa, but many current events may have suggested that the United States may have felt cheated in this mad scramble, hence, the imperialistic strategy to recover the lost years in the African colonialism. According to Monica Moorehead (2002),

> Ever since Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration has sought venues other than the Middle East for getting oil reserves. This is based on the mounting social instability of their puppet regimes, especially Saudi Arabia. And now, with the United States just itching to invade Iraq, home to 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, Washington has once again set its sights on Africa. The aim is not only to get their hands on more oil but to expand their oil-importing markets.

U.S. imperialist inclination in Africa has not really escaped the lenses of watchful eyes. In a similar development, Monica Moorehead (2002) noted that the Nigerian civil war was linked with the U.S. interest in the Nigerian oil and imperialistic drives. In her report (Moorehead), "Nigeria is the world's sixth-largest exporter of oil, the fifth-largest supplier of oil to the United States. Imperialism has intervened many times in regime changes in Africa by Balkanization—breaking up bigger countries into weaker, smaller states. During the 1960s the United States provoked a civil war that led to a breakaway of the mineral-rich Biafra region" Monica Moorehead (2002).

In conclusion, Moorehead (2002) opines that, "If we want to show our solidarity with Africa as well as with Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, the Caribbean and elsewhere, we must do everything that we can to defeat imperialism in the belly of the beast—by instilling class consciousness among all sectors of the workers and oppressed, including bringing out as many people as possible on Oct. 26 to stop the war against Iraq! U.S. out of Africa! Cancel the debt! Reparations for the African people!"

2.7 U.S. Foreign Aid and Assistance to Africa:

Almost every African nation depends to some extent on foreign aid. Such aid consists of grants in money, loans, and technical assistance in such areas as agriculture, education, and health. Africa has been the recipient of aid from the United States as well as other countries such as France and Britain. The United States is a leading contributor. Foreign aid has helped African

countries establish industries, improve agricultural productivity, and build houses, roads, and schools. Foreign aid also has provided African countries with food and supplies in times of drought and other natural disasters. Egypt receives more foreign aid than any other country in Africa. Other African countries that receive large amounts of foreign aid include Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Sudan, and Tanzania (World Book Encyclopedia).

American funds have by no means been distributed equally across the continent; certain countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Nigeria, and Ghana have benefited far more than others (Chester, 1974). The United States has shown a propensity for providing aid to Africa since the end of the Cold War, however, the issue is not solely what aid has been provided, but rather how much aid has been and will continue to be provided. Foreign aid has not always been wholly beneficial. Many loans call for high interest payments. As a result, several countries receiving aid are finding it extremely difficult to repay the loans. Currently debt service payments claim 80% of Africa's foreign exchange earnings (Barry et al, 1998).

The militarization of the U.S. aid to Africa has more security undertone for U.S. than as assistance to Africa, and therefore perceived as a social retrogressive. According to an African perspective on the U.S. – Africa relations over the last century,

> The militarization of Africa comes at a time when the continent can least afford it. An Oxfam report on armed conflict in Africa released in October estimates that the cost of conflict at the expense of the continent's development over a 15-year period was nearly $300 billion. According to this study, between 1990 and 2005, 23 African nations were involved in conflict, and on average, this cost African economies $18 billion a year. By these figures, the cost of conflict was equal to the amount of money received in aid during the same period.
>
> The fundamental question for many is whether the U.S. will utilize this increased military presence to support freedom, self determination, growth, prosperity, and accountability on behalf of the majority of the nearly one billion people in Africa or if this new initiative will instead serve to oversee surrogate nations whose leadership is accountable first to U.S. security and economic interests.
> http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_4_72/ai_n16129797/

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CHAPTER THREE

U.S. - AFRICA PEACE MEDIATION

What is Peace? Peace is defined according to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary as 'a situation or a period of time in which there is no war or violence in a country or an area; the state of being calm or quiet; or the state of living in friendship with somebody without arguing'. Hence, peace connotes: 1. The absence of violence, 2. Calm or quietness, and 3. A friendship devoid of arguments. Peace in ordinary parlance is the absence of war or violence. Hence, according to Obasi Igwe (2007),

> peace in international politics is the harmonious coexistence of states; in strategy, the absence or cessation of hostilities; as symbiosis, the intimate living together of two or more political actors for mutual benefit; and in general, the reciprocal toleration and cooperative understanding for the achievement of common aims, whether within or between any groups.

Therefore, peace which is a state of being; an abstract concept, is a relative phenomenon. As a state of being or a concept of the mind, a country might not be engaged in a violent conflict, but yet far from being peaceful. And calmness or friendship without arguments may not be the true indices for peace. Hence, peace is relational to the state of being. And so, "There is no easy walk-over to freedom anywhere, and many of us will have to pass through the valley of shadow again and again before we reach the mountain-tops of our desire"(Jawaharlal Nehru).

Mediation

Mediation is the art of the possible rather than a set of rules. There is immense complexity and variety in brokering an end to a conflict. Every conflict is a special case - simply because it is special to the parties that fight it (Cutler, 1985).

To mediate means to stand in-between; to strike a balance. According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, to mediate in something or between A and B, 'means to try and end a disagreement between two or more people or groups by talking to them and trying to find things that everyone can agree on; to succeed in finding a solution to a disagreement between people or groups; to influence something and/or make it possible for it to happen.' Kuper and

Smith (1969) developed a model called the cultural pluralism framework to explain the endemic conflicts in Africa. This model sees African societies as made up of many ethnic groups of various sizes and influence. These groups are distinct from each other on the bases of language, social organization, and other cultural characteristics. Unlike the cultural groups, which live side by side but separately, ethnic groups share a certain amount of values which derive from a basically common culture and race as well as historical and contemporary experience. This enables people to interact and live together (Okonkwo, 2000). However, because of the differences in interests and the desire to maximize influence in a competitive situation, groups tend to use the resources available to them to assert themselves in relation to other groups.

Using ethnic identity and solidaristic ties as weapon of political bargaining, the elite cadre of the various groups engages in constant struggles for the control of the state power and when they gain political power, they use it to ensure the dominance of members of their own ethnic groups in the civil service and other employment sectors. According to them, this creates a situation of conflict among ethnic groups as the minority groups struggle for recognition and a fair deal in the distribution of the national resources. Thus, "the ethnic pluralism model emphasizes the continuous competition and rivalry among the elite members of African states in the name of their various ethnic groups" (Okonkwo, 2000: 12). As a theory of conflict and ethnic rivalry, the endemic nature of the ethnic rivalry in Africa has made the need for external mediators in the African conflicts a matter of necessity and expediency. Now to the crux of the matter, what is 'Peace Mediation', and what are the U.S. mediatory roles in the African conflicts?

Peace Mediation

As a peace process, peace mediation is a gender sensitivity issue. This is premised on the notion that men in their greed initiate conflicts, whereas women in their innocence suffer the effects of the men's greed. And so on this periscope, the UN Security Council Resolution1325 on Women, Peace and Security, calls for the stronger participation of women in peace-building, the prevention of gender-based violence and protection of the rights and needs of women and girls during and after armed conflicts, and a gender-sensitive approach to peace-building. Hence,

men and women, according to the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, are both actors in Peace Mediation.

International Peace Mediation of armed conflicts has increasingly become popular after the end of the Cold War. Hence, 'mediation has been undertaken by states, non-governmental organizations, regional and international organizations, and even individuals' (Bolger et al, 2010). And so, Peace Mediation is a conscious effort to settle disagreements or misunderstanding between two or more parties. Peace mediation involves basically two parties: the contending parties (the belligerents), and the mediating party or the peace initiator/the mediator. Hence, for peace to be achieved, there should be understanding and agreement between all the parties involved. To achieve successful peace mediation in Africa, so much need to be considered. Hence we pose the question: Who and what are responsible for these conflicts? To this we attempt the following:

- ➢ Tribal politics (Okonkwo, 2000),
- ➢ Greed,
- ➢ Dependency syndrome
- ➢ External influences (e.g. imperialism) etc.

Making a case for the tribal dynamics as the progenitor of wars in Africa, *Africa Today,* in its editorial asserts that, "The prime cause of Katanga's secession was not African tribal dynamics but the mining companies which 'financed, equipped and organized' secession" (*Africa Today,* Feb.1962: 3). What this suggests is that the African conflicts are more often than not instigated and fuelled by the external interests in the local politics for the control of the local resources.

3.1 Instability and Political Crises in Africa:

Instability and Political crises has been the bane of the Africa's development. From the time of the slave trade, down to the colonial era, and to the present time, the divisive mechanisms that pitter one community against another in the African politics, has left the continent divided and disillusioned. Hence, "The political balkanization of Africa by European colonialism of the continent and the failure of the colonial system to achieve a fusion between the colonial state and the African societies left instability as an inheritance for post-colonial Africa" (Lamouse-Smith, 1993: 69).

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Marxists view of the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation, instability and political crises is exemplified in the U.S. involvements in the Kenya's political crises. According to the Africa Policy Outlook (2008),

> It's only February, but the recent turbulence in heretofore-stable Kenya brings U.S. policy toward Africa in 2008 into focus. U.S. interests in Kenya are well documented. Kenya's role as a manufacturing and financial hub for East Africa makes it an appealing partner for Western investments. The country's geographic location, bordering on Somalia, a collapsed state, also appeals to U.S. security interests, particularly given President Mwai Kibaki's history of unswerving support for the Bush Administration's "war on terror." It is therefore not surprising that the United States initially responded to the dubious official election outcome and immediate swearing in of Kibaki for a second term by calling on the Kenyan people to "accept the results…calmly."
>
> U.S. support of favored illegitimate regimes like Zenawi's in Ethiopia and the unhelpful, contradictory U.S. diplomatic response to the botched elections in Kenya risk encouraging leadership around the continent to ignore the will of their citizens when they have international backing (Lemelle, 2008).

The U.S. financing of political conflicts in Africa cannot be over-emphasized. William G. Martin (2000) opines that, 'The current conflict (in Kenya) involves the government of the Congo, led by Laurent Kabila. He has the support of Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe. Pitted against them are a wide range of rebel forces, backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has provided more than $125 million in weaponry and training to six of the seven states with troops involved in the conflict' (Martin, 2000).

Dependency is another fact that militates against the development and the political stability in Africa. Dependency theory is a body of social science theories predicated on the notion that resources flow from a "periphery" of poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. It is a central contention of dependency theory that poor states are impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the "world system." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_theory.

Dependency, according to Onwuzua (2007) has its origin from Latin America. Quoting Caporaso and Dihal (1978), opines that dependency means the process of incorporation of less developed countries into the capitalist system and the structural distortion resulting. Hence, according to Dos Santos (1970), dependency

> is a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, add between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self sustaining while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development (Odoh, 2008: 231).

Dependency, according to Ezeani (2007) impedes the economic development in developing countries that depend upon foreign capital, foreign trade, technology, and expertise, so argued dependency theorists like Baran, Cockrosft, Theotonio Dos Santos,etc. Hence, the Africa's dependency on foreign aids and goods has robbed Africa of indigenous initiatives. Therefore, calling to mind the fact that he who pays the piper dictates the tune, Africa being a consumer community, must have her appetite dictated by the foreign donor nations. In this regard, America comes in handy.

The other great contender in the malaise besieging Africa is greed. Hence, the discourses of the causes of conflict in post-Cold War Africa have been characterized by various perspectives. Of note is what may be described as a "rational choice" or "war economies" school of thought based on an econometric intervention to the 'greed versus grievance' debate over the causes of war. In the 1990s the new political economy of war generated some controversy and vigorous debates. It was based on the position that, "economic considerations and behaviours of parties to a conflict, giving rise to a particular war economy" (http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php). And so, greed on the part of the African leaders and their subjects has in no small measure contributed to the underdevelopment and instability of the continent. So, taking a look at the refugee situation in the continent as a result of political conflicts, the tables below inform us that virtually all the African nations have recorded a great

toll of war refugee at one point or the other, a situation which is a great challenge on stability and development of the continent.

Figure 8: A Refugee Camp

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Table 6: Refugee Situation in Africa, June 1984

Angola	Zambia, Zaire	96,200
Burundi	Rwanda, Zaire	25,600
Djibouti	Ethiopia	21,000
Ethiopia	Sudan	70,400
Lesotho	South Africa	11,500
Rwanda	Uganda	49,000
Somalia	Ethiopia	70,000
Sudan	Ethiopia, Uganda	70,000
Tanzania	Burundi	180,000
Uganda	Rwanda, Zaire	133,000

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Zaire	Angola, Uganda	293,500
Zambia	Angola	103,000

Source: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1993 (Okonkwo, 2000).

Table 7: Refugee Situation in Africa, 1989 – 1993

Country of Asylum	1st Jan. 1989	31st Dec. 1993	Country of Origin of most Refugees
Angola	91,150	10,900	Namibia, South Africa
Burundi	267,500	871,900	Rwanda
Cameroun	51,200	44,000	Chad
Djibouti	93,000	34,000	Ethiopia, Somalia
Ethiopia	615,000	247,600	Mozambique
Kenya	60,000	301,600	Burundi
Malawi	628,150	713,300	Ethiopia
Somalia	2,220	300,000	Chad, Ethiopia
Sudan	50,000	-	Mozambique
Swaziland	395,000	745,200	Somalia, Sudan
Tanzania	28,800	45,500	Burundi
Uganda	265,150	564,500	Rwanda
Zaire	102,000	286,500	Angola
Zambia	340,700	486,800	Angola
Zimbabwe	143,600	141,100	Mozambique
Benin Republic	174,500	237,100	

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Central Africa Rep.	-	156,200	
Congo	-	44,100	
Cote D'Ivoire	-	13,600	
Ghana	-	251,700	
Guinea	-	150,100	
Guinea Bissau	-	577,200	
Liberia	-	15,700	
Mali	-	150,200	
Mauritania	-	15,200	
Senegal	-	46,700	
Sierra Leone	-	7,300	
South Africa	-	15,800	

Source: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1993 and 95 (Okonkwo, 2000).

By definition, a refugee is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country..." *(The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees).* http://www.hrschool.org/doc/mainfile.php/lesson27/65/. According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, a refugee is one who suffers personal persecution for his political or religious beliefs, race, nationality or membership of a particular social group. http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Statistics-of-refugees-in-Asia-%28overview%29-3545.html. And also, refugee is defined by the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary as a person who has been forced to leave their country or home, because there is a war or political, religious or social reasons. Hence, refugee situation is at an alarming rate in Africa owing to the incessant tribal, ethnic and national conflicts, religious and political crises. Africa is a worst hit in this regard,

which is more often than not masterminded and sustained by external influences, whose aim are on the economic and other selfish personal interests.

3.2 The Congo crisis (1960 - 1964):

Map 1: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Cg-map.png.

The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the widest interstate war in modern African history. The DRC became an environment in which numerous foreign players were involved, some within the immediate sub-region, and some from much further afield. That only served to complicate the situation and to make peaceful resolution of the conflict that much more complex. The war, centered mainly in eastern Congo, had involved 9 African nations and directly   affected   the   lives   of   50   million   Congolese (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/congo.htm).

The Congo became independent from the Belgian colonial rule on 1 July, 1960. By February 1961, all the problems that were to haunt the new nation for the next five years had already emerged (Ogene, 1983: 19). These problems could be grouped under the following headings: the inability of the central government in Leopoldville to effectively restore and

maintain law and order in the capital, and in the rest of the country; the secession of Katanga and South Kasai Provinces; and the revival claims of radical and conservative groups in the Congo for control of the central government (Ogene, 1983).

The Congo crisis presented a serious dilemma for the United States government. At the nascent of the crisis, the Congolese government appealed to the government of the United States for assistance, but this request was turned down. The crisis which was initiated by the Congolese army in the capital, Leopoldville, was targeted at the Belgians and other European nationals living in the country. Consequent upon this, in a swift bid to protect the lives and properties of the Belgian nationals in the city, the Belgian government demobilized paratroopers to quell the crisis. This move was given a different interpretation by the Congolese as a ploy on re-colonilization by the Belgian government. This sent a red-alert signal which inadvertently escalated the crisis. There was also an internal strife between the Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, the President, Joseph Kasavubu, and the Parliament, which made the country very ungovernable.

The government of the United States after refusing to grant assistance to the Congolese government was faced with some daunting problems. These problems, according to Ogene (1983), involve the central government's inability to maintain law and order, created a foreign policy issue for three United States presidents: Eisenhower in 1960, Kennedy from 1961 to 1963, and Johnson from 1963 to 1968. Hence, the dilemma was,

> Should the United States help to maintain and increase the authority and power of the central government, or should U.S. avoid involvement in another country's internal affairs? Granted that there was a need to become interested and involved in the Congo, should the U.S adopt unilateral action, through Belgium, its NATO ally, or encourage the involvement of an intergovernmental body, the United Nations Organization?"
> ((Ogene, 1983: 19).

Further more, the crisis in Congo was fuelled by ethnic nationalism and the central unification. In this tussle for power among the contending ethnic nationalists and the central government, the American government was caught in the dilemmatic web of which side to give her utmost support, in view of which of the divide that best serves the American national interest in the struggle. Playing on the America's sentiments, Moise Tshomde seized the ideological sentiment

of the pro-west and the anti-communist sentiments prevailing at moment to court the America's support. To achieve this aim of prevailing on the America's sentiments and sensitivity, Tshombe sent Michael Struelens, a Belgian national to be the Katanga's image maker in America. This duty was performed creditably well that America almost granted recognition to the separatist regime of the Katanga province.

In this perilous and futile struggle, it was evident that America was not interested on how justice is best served, but were America's 'bread is best buttered'. In such a situation, the scenario could be better imagined than experienced. Then, how becomes America the arbiter of peace and the defender of the defenseless? America's involvement in the Congo episode is shrouded in duplicity. At one time, it opposed the Western allies of Belgian, France, Britain, etc who had vested interests in the mineral wealth of the Katanga province in support of the UN Action plan that is working for the national unity; then in other occasion, it was badly criticized for aiding Tshombe in his intransigence. In a strong opposition and condemnation of President Johnson's financial support to Tshombe, Malcom X blamed president Johnson for the killing of the white hostages by the Congolese rebels because, according to him, President Johnson gave financial support to Moise Tshombe's hired killers. Although he felt sad for the white hostages that lost their lives, he equally commented that "the Congolese have been dying for a long time" (Ogene, 1983: 33).

But why would America not allow Africans to live their lives as they wished? Why must the social system be anchored on liberal capitalism, and not communism or socialism? We think that America is creating much more problems than they can handle

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

3.3 The War in Somalia (1991 - 1993):

Map 2: Somalia

Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm

Africa during the Cold War years could be likened to a game of chess, with its players trying to think a step or two ahead of the game. "Somalia was, as I see it, nothing more than a played-out pawn piece between the United States and the Soviet Union" (Volman, 1993).

Since the fragmentation of Somalia by world powers more than 100 years ago, the struggle for the control of the country has persisted with British Somaliland in the north and the Italian administered United Nations Trust territory in the south (Okonkwo, 2000: 35). In January 2007, the United States officially militarily interceded in the country for the first time since the UN deployment of the 1990s by conducting air strikes using AC-130 gunships against Islamist positions in Ras Kamboni, as part of efforts to catch or kill Al Qaeda operatives supposedly embedded within the ICU forces. Unconfirmed reports also stated that US advisors had been on the ground with Somali and Ethiopian forces since the beginning of the war. Naval forces were also deployed offshore to prevent escape by sea, and the border to Kenya was closed (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somali_Civil_War). Below is a table showing the UNOSOM contingent in Somalia.

Table 8: UNOSOM Troops

Country	NO. OF Troops	Present Observers
Ghana	6	-
Italy	-	4
Australia	1	939
Zimbabwe	5	939
Rep. Of Korea	-	3
Nigeria	5	57
Netherlands	1	-
Ireland	-	3
Bangladesh	1	1,176
Egypt	1	-
India	-	4,689
Malaysia	-	1,135
Pakistan	-	5,988
Indonesia	-	6
Philippines	Nil	0
Nepal	-	2
TOTAL	20	14,941

Source: White G.A. (1996) U.S. and peacekeeping. New York: Alfren Knof (Okonkwo, 2000).

In an article, "The Oil Factor In Somalia: Four American Petroleum Giants Had Agreements With The African Nation Before Its Civil War Began. They Could Reap Big Rewards If Peace Is Restored", Kalif Date (2001) maintains that the driving interest in the U.S. intervention in the Somali civil war was to protect the U.S. investments in the country's oil industry. According to him,

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> Far beneath the surface of the tragic drama of Somalia, four major U.S. oil companies are quietly sitting on a prospective fortune in exclusive concessions to explore and exploit tens of millions of acres of the Somali countryside. That land, in the opinion of geologists and industry sources, could yield significant amounts of oil and natural gas if the U.S.-led military mission can restore peace to the impoverished East African nation.

Further on the U.S. interests in Somalia, Date (2001) informs us that according to documents obtained by *The Times*, nearly two-thirds of Somalia was allocated to the American oil giants Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips in the final years before Somalia's pro-U.S. President Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown and the nation plunged into chaos in January, 1991. Industry sources said the companies holding the rights to the most promising concessions are hoping that the Bush Administration's decision to send U.S. troops to safeguard aid shipments to Somalia will also help protect their multimillion-dollar investments there.

3.4 The War in Angola (1975 - 2002):

Map 3: Map of Angola

Source: http://mapelevationpic.co.cc/

4°

CONGO   14°   Brazzaville   18°   Kasai   22°

ANGOLA

Kinshasa

CABINDA

Cabinda

Zaire

DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO

Kikwit

Kwango

Kwilu

Loange

ANGOLA

ANGOLA

Nóqui

Soyo   M'banza Congo

ZAIRE

Damba   Quimbele

UÍGE

Mbridge

Bembe

Bungo

N'zeto

Uíge

Cuango

Wamba

Kwenge

Kasai

Dundo

Luangue

Chicapa

Ambriz

8°

Negage

Caxito   Dande   Camabatela   Marimba

CUANZA
NORTE

Luanda

LUANDA

N'dalatando

BENGO

Cabo Ledo
Cabo de São Bráz

Dondo   Lucala   Malanje

Cuanza

Luando

Cacala

Uamba

Luremo

Cuango

Quela

Lubalo

Xa-Muteba

MALANJE

Cangandala

LUNDA
NORTE

Cuilo

Andráda
Lucapa

Saurimo

LUNDA
SUL

Cacolo

Cuilo

Cassai

DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO

Lulua

Porto Amboim

ATLANTIC

Sumbe

OCEAN

12°

Quibala

Gabela   SUL

Cuvo ou Queve

Uaco
Cungo

Cassongue   Bimbe

HUAMBO

Mussende

Cunza

Longa

Cutato

Andulo

Nharea

Quirima

Quimbango

Luando

Camacupa

Cuembo

Chicala

Muconda

Cassai   Luau

Luena

Luatamba

Lumeje

Cazombo

Zambeze

Lobito   Balombo

Benguela   BENGUELA   Huambo

Cubal

Ponta das Salinas

Caporolo

Cabo de
Santa Maria

Cabo de
Santa Marta

Ganda   Cuima   Sambo   BIÉ

Kuito

Cuemba

Lungué-Bungo

MOXICO

Lucusse

Lumbala
N'guimbo

Lumbala

Zambezi

Lungwebungu

Chitembo

Caconda

Quilengues

NAMIBE   HUÍLA

Bibala   Matala

Cubango

Cuchi   Menongue

Cuito

Cubango

Cuando

Quembo

Chiume

Luiana

ZAMBIA

Lubango
Namibe   Chibia

Virei

Techamutete

Cuito
Cuanavale

Mavinga

Utembo

Cunene

Chiange   Cuvelai

16°

Tombua

Curoca

Cunene

Chitado

Cahama

Xangongo

CUNENE

Ondjiva

Santa Clara

CUANDO
CUBANGO

Savate

Cuito

Cuangar

Cubango

Mucusso

Zambezi

Luiana

BOTSWANA

20°

International boundary
Province boundary
National capital
Province capital
Town, village
Road
Track
Railroad
Airport

NAMIBIA

0   50   100   150   200 km

0   50   100   150 mi

The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply
official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

14°   18°   22°

The Angolan Civil War (1975-2002) began immediately after Angola became independent from Portugal in November 1975. Prior to this, a decolonization conflict had taken place in 1974-75, following the Angolan War of Independence of 1961-74. The Civil War was primarily a struggle for power between two former liberation movements, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

By the time the MPLA finally achieved victory in 2002, an estimated 500,000 people had been killed, over one million had fled from rural to urban areas, massive damage had been done to Angola's infrastructure, and the nation's public administration, economic enterprises and even religious institutions were in many places in shambles (Madsen, 2002). The Angolan Civil War reached such dimensions due to the combination of Angola's violent internal dynamics and massive foreign intervention. Both the Soviet Union and the United States considered it critical to the global balance of power and to the outcome of the Cold War, and they and some of their allies put significant effort into making it a proxy war between their two power blocs. The Angolan Civil War ultimately became one of the bloodiest, longest, and most prominent armed conflicts of the Cold War. Moreover, the Angolan conflict became entangled with the Second Congo War in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as with the Namibian War of Independence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Civil_War).

In Angola, the United States was involved in the war that developed following the withdrawal of Portugal. The U.S actively supported for many years Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. This was done without regard of extensive violations of human right and the insincerity of its professed commitments to democracy. (Okonkwo, 2000). The Angolan civil war is directly traceable to the nature of the Portuguese colonial regime. By refusing to consider the legitimacy of African self-determination and independence, Portugal made it inevitable that military force would be the principal instrument to establish independent Angolan State (Drachman et al, 1997: 187).

Three major independent movements based on three distinct regions of Angola waged low-level guerilla warfare against Portuguese control until the 1974 coup, namely: MPLA,

UNITA, and FNLA. in 1974, the CIA began to get indirectly involved in the incipient struggle for control of postcolonial Angola by providing funds to Roberto with the approval of the '40 Committee' (Drachman et al, 1997: 187).

U.S. national interest in the Angolan crisis could be said to be for economic and geo-political reasons. According to Okonkwo (2000), Angola is considered economically as one of the wealthiest African states in terms of its per annum production of various mineral resources. As a matter of fact, Angola has deposits of such minerals as iron-ore (with very high iron content), manganese, chrome, copper, lead, and crude oil in Cabinda province; an estimated deposit off 100 million tons of manganese, and an annual production of 1,500 carats of diamond. Hence, Angola's economic potentialities manifested in 1959, when huge deposits of crude petroleum and iron ore were discovered. Following these discovering of Angola's mineral resources as a matter of annual increase in production exposed her potential wealth to the western imperialists, as a result, Angola became highly attractive to U.S. and its several multinational corporations. Secondly, geo-strategically, Angola has an important sea port located in the south African region with the largest coast line and harbours for large ocean-lining vessels. According to Okonkwo (2000),

> the geo-political importance of Angola as perceived by the United States could be seen from the viewpoint of the cold war on one hand and between the East and the West on the other hand. With these merits of Angolan coastal regions, one may have the impression that whoever controls the Angolan government, could to a greater extent influence the actions of most of the countries in the southern Africa region (Okonkwo, 2000: 87 – 88).

The Angolan civil war has significant implications for U.S. foreign policy. The Marxist – oriented MPLA was receiving political and military support from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other communist countries. By middle of 1975, it appeared that the MPLA was on the verge of defeating its rivals and was gaining momentum to formally take control of the country from the Portuguese colonial regime on November 11, 1975. From the perspective of the Cold War, this would be regarded as a "gain" for the Soviet Union and its allies and a setback for the United States and the West. In July 1975, President Ford Authorized the CIA to secretly intervene against the MPLA and supports its opponents (Drachman et al, 1997: 181).The U.S. involvements in the Angolan crisis cannot be over-emphasized. It runs a corollary that the

Angolan crisis is American's making. In Angola, America created an albatross in the person of Jonas Savimbi which was represented by the UNITA, and of course, the civic unrest in Angola. Hence, according to Ann Talbot (2002),

> In claiming that the Angolan war was the result of super-power rivalry, the US press is echoing the words of Henry Kissinger. As Secretary of State he repeatedly claimed that the US was forced to intervene in Angola because the Soviet Union was already providing military aid to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the form of Cuban troops. Recently released documents demonstrate that this was untrue and that Kissinger lied to Congress in order to justify US intervention (http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/apr2002/ango-a13.shtml).

A lie is always covered by another lie, and so on and so forth. Evil likewise! In a bid to cover an evil imperialist agenda in Africa, America has instigated, supported and sponsored ethnic and civic conflicts that have reduced the continent to a crawling giant, all in the name of the world's unchallenged super-power.

3.6 The Rwanda Crisis (1993 - 1996):

Map 4: The Map of Rwanda

Source: http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1007.html#children

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

The **Rwandan Genocide** was the 1994 mass murder of an estimated 800,000 people in the small East African nation of Rwanda. Over the course of approximately 100 days from the assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana on April 6 through mid-July, over 500,000 people were killed. According to Edmund Burke, "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing". Indeed, the story of Rwanda for the U.S. is that the officials knew so much, but decided to do nothing positive as taking action or leading other nations to prevent or stop the genocide. Despite Rwanda's low ranking in importance to U.S. interests, Clinton Administration officials had tremendous capacity to be informed--and were informed--about the slaughter there. As noted by author Samantha Power: "any failure to fully appreciate the genocide stemmed from political, moral, and imaginative weaknesses, not informational ones"(Power, 2001:104).

America is not without blame in the Rwanda civil war. Prior to the war, the U.S. government had aligned itself with Tutsi interests, in turn raising Hutu concerns about potential U.S. support to the opposition. Paul Kagame, a Tutsi officer in exile in Uganda who had co-founded the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1986 and was in open conflict with the incumbent Rwandan government, was invited to receive military training at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, home of the Command and General Staff College. In October 1990, while Kagame was at Fort Leavenworth, the RPF started an invasion of Rwanda (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwandan_Genocide).

Apathy is the nearest word to describe the United States' response to the genocide in Rwanda. Reporting on the state of affairs in the American government as the genocide goes on in Rwanda, William Ferroggiaro (2004) informs that:

> Departments, agencies and military organizations of the U.S. government provided necessary information up to policymakers for their discussions and decisions during the Rwanda crisis. Although stated policy was that Rwanda did not affect traditional vital or national interests before or even during the genocide, considerable resources were nevertheless available and employed to ensure that policymakers had real-time information for any decision they would make. In sum, the routine - let alone crisis-performance of diplomats, intelligence officers and systems, and military and defense personnel yielded enough information for

policy recommendations and decisions. That the Clinton Administration decided against intervention at any level was not for lack of knowledge of what was happening in Rwanda.

In summary of the U.S. involvements in the Rwandan civil war, William Ferroggiaro (2001) has this to say:

1. The U.S. lobbied the U.N. for a total withdrawal of U.N. (UNAMIR) forces in Rwanda in April 1994;
2. Secretary of State Warren Christopher did not authorize officials to use the term "genocide" until May 21, and even then, U.S. officials waited another three weeks before using the term in public;
3. Bureaucratic infighting slowed the U.S. response to the genocide in general;
4. The U.S. refused to jam extremist radio broadcasts inciting the killing, citing costs and concern with international law;
5. U.S. officials knew exactly who was leading the genocide, and actually spoke with those leaders to urge an end to the violence but did not follow up with concrete action.

Figure 9: Bill Clinton and "Our Kind of Guy", Paul Kagame. Back in 1995.

Source: https://deeppoliticsforum.com/forums/showthread.php?3585-The-US-was-behind-the-Rwandan-Genocide

Figure 10: Barack Obama and Paul Kagame

There is great continuity in U.S. policy in the Third World, and it is not pleasant. Thus a Bill Clinton official could find the mass killer Suharto "*our kind of guy*" in 1995, and Suharto received steady U.S. support for 33 years, through the administrations of Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, until his downfall during the Asian currency crisis in 1998. In a more recent time frame, extending from 1990 to today, Paul Kagame, an even more ferocious mass killer, has gotten support from the first George Bush, Bill Clinton, the second George Bush, and now Barack Obama (whose Deputy Secretary of State hadn't gotten around to looking at the draft UN Report on Kagame's mass killings in the DRC). It is interesting, also, to see the media treat this latest "*our kind of guy*" so kindly, with the liberal New Yorker's Philip Gourevitch even comparing Kagame to Abe Lincoln (in his 1998 book *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families*), and Stephen Kinzer publishing a hagiography of this deadly agent of U.S. power (*A Thousand Hills: Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It* [2008]).

This leaked UN report and the negative publicity generated by Kagame's sham election in August 2010 may open up the mainstream a bit to a more honest examination of this U.S.-supported mass killer. But that is no sure thing, given the value of his service to U.S. power in Africa, and given the U.S. establishment's deep commitment to a narrative that for many years has protected and even sanctified the "man who dreamed" (https://deeppoliticsforum.com/forums/showthread.php?3585-The-US-was-behind-the-Rwandan-Genocide).

Table 9: UNAMIR Composition

Country	Troops	Military Observer	Civilian Police
Brazil	68	13	4
Ghana	500	34	12
Poland	33	16	5
Zambia	172	40	Nil

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

Senegal	311	18	2
Nigeria	812	57	15
Pakistan	241	27	1
India	196	16	7
Congo	178	18	1
Zimbabwe	220	19	9
Malaysia	230	33	2
U.S.A	168	33	16
Ireland	12	28	1
Netherlands	37	12	3
France	26	28	8
Canada	70	16	Nil
Norway	35	20	1
Denmark	57	18	Nil
Ethiopia	316	22	12
Tanzania	438	17	8
Italy	Nil	27	4
TOTAL	5000	520	120

Source: UNHCR, 1993 (Okonkwo, 2000).

In this composition of the UNAMIR, the statistics show that the greater percentage of the troops are from the African States, which invariably shows the lack of commitment to the African cause by the West.

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

3.8 The War in Sudan (1983 - 2005):

Map 5: Map of Sudan

Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm

The Second Sudanese Civil War started in 1983, although it was largely a continuation of the First Sudanese Civil War of 1955 to 1972, it originated in southern Sudan. In September 2001, former U.S. former Senator John Danforth was designated Presidential Envoy for Peace in the Sudan. His role is to explore the prospects that the U.S. could play a catalytic role in the search for a just end to the civil war, and enhance humanitarian services delivery that can help reduce the suffering of the Sudanese people stemming from war related effects.

Following an internal outcry, the Sadiq al-Mahdi government in March 1989 agreed with the United Nations and donor nations (including the U.S.) on a plan called Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), under which some 100,000 tons of food was moved into both government and SPLA-held areas of the Sudan, and widespread starvation was averted. Phase 11 of OLS to cover 1990 was approved by both the government and the SPLA in March 1990. 1991, Sudan faced a 2-year drought and food shortage across the entire country. The US, UN, and other donors attempted to mount a coordinated international relief effort in both north and south Sudan to prevent a catastrophe. However, due to Sudan's human rights abuses and its pro-Iraqi stance during the Gulf War, many donors cut much of their aid to the Sudan. In a similar drought in 2001-01, there international community again responded to avert mass starvation in the Sudan.

International donors continue to provide large amounts of humanitarian aid to all parts of the Sudan.

The US government's Sudan Peace Act of 21 October 2002 accused Sudan of genocide for killing more than 2 million civilians in the south during the civil war since 1983. Peace talks between the southern rebels and the government made substantial progress in 2003 and early 2004, although skirmishes in parts of the south have repeatedly continued. The two sides have agreed that, following a peace treaty, southern Sudan will enjoy autonomy for six years, and after the expiration of that period, the people of southern Sudan will be able to vote in a referendum on independence. Furthermore, oil revenues will be divided equally between the government and rebels during the six year interim period. The ability or willingness of the government to fulfill these promises has been questioned by some observers, however, and some status of three central and eastern provinces was a point of contention in the negotiations. Some observers wondered whether hard line elements in the north would allow the treaty to proceed (http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Second_Sudanese_Civil_War).

On January 15, 2010, Sudan and Chad signed an accord in N'Djamena, Chad, to secure their joint border and remove the threat posed to one another by cross-border rebel proxies operating on Sudanese and Chadian territory. The U.S. supported the signing of this agreement, which, if fully implemented, could help to improve the security situation on the ground in Darfur. The African Union, with the support of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the U.S., and the rest of the international community, began deploying a larger monitoring and observer force in October 2004. The UNSC had passed three resolutions (1556, 1564, and 1574), all intended to compel the Government of Sudan to rein in the Janjaweed, protect the civilian population and humanitarian participants, seek avenues toward a political settlement to the humanitarian and political crisis, and recognize the need for the rapid deployment of an expanded African Union mission in Darfur. The U.S. has been a leader in pressing for strong international action by the United Nations and its agencies (see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm).

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

CHAPTER FOUR

U.S. AND THE NIGERIA-BIAFRA CIVIL WAR (1967- 1970)

Map 6: *Biafra*

Source: http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/biafra.htm

The Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Nigerian-Biafran War, 6 July 1967–15 January 1970, was a political conflict caused by the attempted secession of the Southeastern provinces of Nigeria as the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra. The conflict was the result of economic, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions among the various peoples of Nigeria (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War).

The Nigeria civil war was a war waged between the Eastern region of Nigeria known as Biafra, and the remaining parts of Nigeria, namely: the Northern region (Hausas) and the Western region (the Yorubas). It was a fierce war for a forced unity for a one Nigeria. This war was fought from 6 July 1967, to 12 January 1970, for a total of 30 months of fierce hostilities. The Nigeria – Biafra War was an inevitable child of circumstance. Hence, at independence in 1960, the seed of disunity had passed the germinating stage; and like a time bomb, waiting for explosion, it finally exploded leading to millions of death and untold hardship. This has become a legacy, a birthday present given to Nigeria on independence. Hence, according to Harold Smith,

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

> On 1 October 1960, the day Nigeria became independent, the British Government had reason to be proud. Years of election rigging and gerrymandering had culminated in an alliance between the North and the East under the leadership of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Sir James Robertson had pleaded necessity as an excuse for this. Cicero had experienced it long ago: 'There are no acts of treachery more deeply concealed than those which lie under the pretence of duty or under some profession of necessity.' And Livy adds, 'Treachery, though at first very cautious, in the end betrays itself' (Harold Smith, 2005).

At the end, when the battle was lost by the Biafrans and was won by the Nigerian side, unity was achieved in principle but was never in practice, because, the embers of the war hostilities have not died down even after forty years of the end of hostilities. The war is still on! Some still believe.

The Nigeria civil war, just like the Congo crisis was characterized by the colonial administrative structure of forcing incompatible nationalities into one nation: "Both crises arose partly from the colonial legacy of forcing different and often incompatible nationalities to live under a single government. In both crises, secession and civil war resulted. Foreign military intervention also characterized both situations" (Ogene, 1983: 62). The U.S. involvement in the Nigerian conflict was in two perspectives: the humanitarian relief, and the political perspective. The political dimension of the U.S. involvement borders on whether to support the separatist group to achieve independence, or to stick to the one Nigeria slogan of the Nigeria government. According to Ogene (1983), "The political issue concerned the problem of whether the U.S. should support Biafra's independence from Nigeria or accept Nigeria's preference for a united Nigeria". The humanitarian issue bordered on a clear distinction between the political and the relief issues, using starvation as a legitimate means of warfare.

It should be recalled that America, through its embassy in Nigeria had been behind the Nigerian Government all the way. According to Ogene (1983),

> …the British High Commissioner in Nigeria, Sir Francis Cummiing-Bruce, together with the U.S. Ambassador, Elbert Mathews, persuaded Gowon at the last minute to strike out from his speech the actual words announcing the dissolution of the federation. Again, after the Aburi meeting of the Nigerian military leaders, the U.S. Ambassador played a part in persuading Gowon

that the Aburi agreement amounted to a loose confederation and offered American support if he decided not to implement the essential conditions of the agreement. At the same time, Ojukwu in the East was warned by the embassy that the U.S. would not stand behind him if he refused to co-operate with Gowon's interpretation of the agreement (Ogene, 1983: 82).

4.1 Hostilities commence:

Figure 11: USSR MiG-17Fs Fighter-Bombers

Kano – Mallam Aminu IAP, Nigeria, August 1967; the first eight MiG-17s (NAF603 thru NAF610) and two MiG-15UTIs (NAF601 and NAF 602) supplied to Nigeria came all from Egypt, being flown to Kano IAP aboard several Aeroflot An-12 transports. They entered service with the 1st Fighter-Bomber Squadron, and were relatively easy to distinguish by the remnants of the white identification strip around the rear fuselage and crude national markings, consisting only of the green colour (white fields were left in bare metal).

Source:Civil War in Nigeria (Biafra), 1967-1970. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_351.shtml

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

Enugu, Nigeria, November 1968: "NAF619" was one of the MiG-17Fs supplied as a part of the third batch to Nigeria, between 12 October and 4 November 1968. It entered service with the 2nd Fighter-Bomber Squadron, operating from Benin, Enugu, and Port Harcourt, and is known to have been flown by one British mercenaries contracted for a pay of GBP 1.000 a month. The first six MiG-17Fs supplied from the USSR arrived aboard Aeroflot An-12 transports. Subsequently additional examples were shipped to Lagos.

Source:Civil War in Nigeria (Biafra), 1967-1970. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_351.shtml

Port Harcourt, Nigeria, 1969; NAF612 belonged to the second batch (NAF611 thru NAF614) supplied to Nigeria in April 1968 to form the 2nd Fighter-Bomber Squadron. could have been one of the MiG-17Fs supplied later during the Nigerian Civil war, directly from the USSR, via Poland. This aircraft was originally seen still in bare metal overall, but already wearing a crudely applied serial on the rear fuselage. The serial was apparently left in such condition when this MiG was overpainted with dark green, in order to better conceal it from Biafrans, which used to suddenly strike against a number of NAF airfields.

Source: Civil War in Nigeria (Biafra), 1967-1970. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_351.shtml

Lagos, 24 November 1969: between 13 and 18 October 1969 eight Soviet An-12s delivered one MiG-17 each to Kano IAP. The aircraft in question were so-called "MiG-17 Glatt", supplied from East Germany that was retiring its MiG-17As from service at the time. The nickname "glatt" came from "gloss pipe" in German, which was marking these aircraft as those not equipped with afterburner. These MiGs were serialled NAF631 thru NAF638 and entered service with the 2nd Fighter-Bomber Squadron, being camouflaged immediately upon arrival at Lagos IAP. Note the application of the national markings without the white field.

Source: Civil War in Nigeria (Biafra), 1967-1970. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_351.shtml

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The total disregard and the non-implementation of the Aburi Accord by the Nigeria Supreme commander, Lt Col. Yakubu Gowon, technically sealed the Biafra's fate, and destroyed all efforts at peace negotiations between the two belligerent sides. Hence, by launching a "police action" to retake the secessionist territory the war began on 6 July 1967 when Nigerian Federal troops advanced in two columns into Biafra. The Nigerian army offensive was through the north of Biafra led by Colonel Shuwa and the local military units were formed as the 1st Infantry Division. The division was led mostly by northern officers. After facing unexpectedly fierce resistance and high casualties, the right-hand Nigerian column advanced on the town of Nsukka which fell on 14 July, while the left-hand column made for Garkem, which was captured on 12 July. At this stage of the war, the other regions of Nigeria (the West and Mid-West) still considered the war as a confrontation between the North (mainly Hausas) against the East (mainly Igbos). But the Biafrans responded with an offensive of their own when, on 9 August, the Biafran forces moved west into the Mid-Western Nigerian region across the Niger river, passing through Benin City, until they were stopped at Ore on 21 August, just 130 miles east of the Nigerian capital of Lagos.

4.2 The foreign interventions:

> It goes without saying that now in cold war days as in former colonial days, the underlying motivation behind the attitude of the bigger powers towards Africa and African problems – that is the attitude of the governments of these countries as distinct from that of their populations, whose reactions and sympathy generally emanate from humanitarian considerations – is their own self interest. It is against this background that foreign intervention in Nigeria must be seen (Uwechue, 1971: 90).

Britain:

Neither hatred for the Ibos nor a sacred attachment to the principle of preserving one Nigeria dictated Britain's present position and commitment, expediency did! Says Raph Uwechue (1971). Britain's involvement in the Nigeria – Biafra crisis was a mission in face-saving and desperate move to remain relevance in the Nigeria's politics and economy. In the event of the Soviet Union's massive support to the Federal Government in the war campaign against the East, Britain saw it very imperative to be involved in the war militarily, morally, and

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otherwise. It was a very unfortunate scenario that a mother of two would sacrifice one for the happiness of the other. This was the British intervention in the Nigeria – Biafra war.

Russia:

The Russian involvement in the Nigeria – Biafra war was on the invitation of the Federal Government. At the inception of the civil conflict with Biafra, the Nigerian Government had sort for assistance from the British Government, but this request was turned down. Left with no other viable option, the Nigerian Government turned towards the Soviet Union for the war assistance. Hence, the Russian involvement in the Nigeria – Biafra war, according to Uwechue (1971) was to secure a foothold in Africa. According Uwechue, Russia's interests in today's cold war conflicts are primarily political and only remotely economic.

Germany:

The Dutch Government on June 8, 1968, announced that it would no longer permit its arms to be sent to Lagos, the Nigerian capital. Sequel to this, in the last two months, Czechoslovakia and Italy which were before now supplying Nigeria arms also made the same decision, leaving Britain and the Soviet Union as the remaining arms supplies to the Nigerian Government in its efforts to defeat Biafra.

France:

The French Government on July 31, 1968, gave her support to the Biafran course. According to the statement, "The human tragedy taking place in Biafra preoccupies and moves the French Government". Hence, "Faithful to this principle, the French Government Believes that, as a result, the present conflict should be resolved 'on the basis of the right of the people to self-determination and implies the undertaking of appropriate international procedures" (Aneke, 2007: 264). On August 9, 1968, in a new development, France states that it has no plans to recognize Biafra. It says that it will take no single-handed action to help Biafra. Taken to task on the purported backing of Biafra, it says that "France had no plan to recognize Biafra, to lift her embargo on arms to the opposing forces in Biafra's civil war with Nigeria, or to take the initiative in the United Nations" (Aneke, 2007: 277).

The British and Soviet Union supported (especially militarily) the Nigerian government while Canada and France helped the Biafrans. The United States seemed to be neutral but helped the Biafrans through the Red Cross. On August 21, 1967, U.S. criticized the Soviet Union for aiding the Nigerian Government with military consumables. A U.S. spokesman, Joseph Y. Resnick said that the "Soviet Union was furnishing aircraft, arms, ammunition and technicians to Nigeria on an outright grant basis" (Aneke, 2007: 152).

OAU:

A team of OAU Heads of State arrived Nigeria on November 22, 1967 on a fact-finding mission. They were Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Lieut. Gen. Joseph A. Ankrah of Ghana, Presidents Hamman Diori of Niger, and Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon. On November 23, 1967, Lieut. Gen. Joseph A. Ankrah of Ghana was named to represent the Organization of African Unity in talks with the Biafran leader, Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu. In a welcome address to this delegates, Gen. Gowon charges that: "The most valuable contribution the mission can make in the present circumstances is to call on the rebel leader to abandon secession" (Aneke, 2007: 191). And further charged them that their mission was not to mediate, but to compel Ojukwu to unconditional submission.

"A private business that develops into a public nuisance ceases to be a private affair". Raph Uwechue (1971) was not mincing words in his condemnation of the attitudinal posture of the O.A.U in the Nigeria – Biafra war. As commented by Gowon to the four African Heads of State who came to Nigeria on a mediatory role that they should bear in mind that their mission is 'consultative and not mediatory', because, according him, Ojukwu should be prevaileed upon to surrender unconditionally (Aneke, 2007). Uwechue further asserts that,

> It is indeed time for the O.A.U to abandon its present posture which gives it the occasional and misleading appearance of being the affair of heads of states – preoccupied almost to the point of obsession with the idea of not hurting one another's feelings – as distinct from the affairs of the masses of African peoples themselves (Uwechue, 1971: 87).

Six leaders of the OAU on July 16, 1968, invited Ojukwu to Niamey for a possible end to the Nigeria-Biafra hostilities. In his displeasure over the recognition accorded to Biafra by four African States (Tanzania, Gabon, ivory Coast, and Zambia), Gowon maintains that the Union

should prevail on those States to rescind on their recognition of the rebel State. According to him, that was a blatant violation of the Unions charter.

4.3 The America Intervention:

U.S. relations with Nigeria during the civil war was more on humanitarian aid and relief materials, than on military intervention. This could be the resultant effect of what Llyod N. Cutler(1985) called "THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE". Which according to him,

> We face many foreign policy decisions—how to respond to the fighting in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Salvador, Angola, Kampuchea, the Philippines and soon, perhaps, South Africa—that involve the legality of intervening in a civil war. The international law journals are full of scholarly discussions on this subject. They are hard for non-scholars to follow. They disagree sharply, as scholars are wont to do, in their argumentation and conclusions. For readers who are not scholars of international law, this article tries to explain how the rules have evolved, where they now stand, and how they might be clarified to relieve the rising tension between the principle of nonintervention and the human rights of self-determination and open democratic elections.

He further argues that,

> Does it matter whether our military interventions in civil wars, or those of the Soviet bloc, violate international law? Only the U.N. Security Council has the legal power to enforce international law, and it in fact has no such power against the Soviet Union or the United States if either chooses to exercise its right of veto (Cutler, 1985).

The second premise on which America's relationship with Nigeria during the civil war hinged was on what could be viewed as 'economic interest protectionism'. In this, what we mean is that America was compelled to get involved in the conflict to protect her investments in the oil industries in the Biafran enclave. According to Ezeani (2007),

> Between 1967 – 1970 which was the period of Nigeria – Biafra war, Nigeria – U.S. relation deteriorated. General Gowon in charge of the Nigeria Federal Government had requested weapons from the U.S. to prosecute the war. The United States refused to honor the request, probably because the super power was not sure how the war would end, bearing in mind her interest in the oil rich Biafra. The United States instead of obliging to this request gave humanitarian assistance to Biafra in form of relief materials. Thus,

from 1966 to 1970, the United States provided more than $600 million financial aids to provide relief materials to Biafra, eradication of small pox and control of measles in Nigeria (Howard Cincott, 1985).

On October 4, 1967, three members of the United States Commission for Biafran Refugees, returning after a two weeks visit to Biafra pleaded for an immediate end to the civil hostilities, this according to them is to forestall an eventual liquidation of the Igbo race. The U.S intervention in the Nigeria – Biafra was a half-hearted effort. On the political plane, it stood for one Nigeria; then on the aid relief, owing to pressure from some concerned congressmen, U.S. was able to make some relief contributions.

U.S. involvement in the Nigeria – Biafra war, according to Ogene (1983) is divided into two phases. The first phase was the period from 1966 – 1968. The period in America's war policy towards Africa was characterized by high-handedness of the U.S State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, on its relation with the war situation in Nigeria. At this period it disregarded every directive coming from the White House, coupled with the free hand that was given to it by the President. Its pro-Nigeria posture was flagrantly displayed. At this period, the issue of political and economic gains were placed above moral and humanitarian assistance to the war devastated area – Biafra. The second phase of the U.S. involvement in the civil war was the period from 1968 – 1970. This period was characterized by the triumph of moral and humanitarian issues over the political and economic gains. At this period in the U.S foreign policy, African initiative was mainly in the hands of the President, the White House staff, and the Congress. This was the period of conscious American involvement in the Nigerian – Biafran impasse.

Ojukwu believed, and was quite optimistic that it was only the U.S. had the military might to call for a cease-fire in the Nigeria – Biafra war. According to him, if the United States called for a cease-fire, she will find herself in rapport with France on this issue and three fourths of Africa will join in the call, and added, 'Britain then would be isolated'. And if United States, Britain and France could agree on a common call for an end of hostilities, you'd get all of Africa, baring 2, 3 or at most 4 states to support the action. And in that event, he continued, "Nigeria would find it difficult to continue the war backed only by the Soviet Union, her major supplier" (Aneke, 2007).

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On February 22, 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon named Clarence C. Ferguson Jr. as the special coordinator for relief to the civilian victims of the Nigeria civil war. President Nixon administration made a paradigm shift in U.S. – Nigeria relation during the civil war period. As earlier noted, the U.S. Nigerian Embassy and the State Department were no longer in full charge of the U.S. – Nigeria foreign policy articulation as it was before this period. Hence, this period recorded a decentralized approach to helping the war victims, hence, hunger was no longer seen and used as a legitimate instrument of warfare. In effort to understudy the conflict situation in Nigeria and Biafra, Clarence C. Ferguson Jr. visited Nigeria on March 15, 1968. His journey was scheduled to visit both sides of the conflict. Before this visit, according to Aneke (2007), the Biafran leader had expressed hope that President Nixon would come to his rescue. But Mr Ferguson, according to Aneke (2007) "made it plain from the outset that he intended to do nothing to undercut the long standing American commitment to the Nigerian Government". This by implication may mean that no tangible progress would be made from this visit. Because as America has indicated her stand, Ojukwu may not yet be ready to shift his grounds.

The U.S. President, Richard Nixon, on July 18, 1968 appealed to officials and relief agencies involved in the Nigeria civil war and urged a resumption of food and other shipments to Biafra. In a White House official release, the President has sent five letters as part of a new initiative intended to break the impasse on relief shipments (Aneke, 2007). On July 20, 1968, after official reviewing of the U.S. policy on the Nigeria – Biafra war, it reverted back to the Johnson' administration policy thrust of non-direct involvement in the humanitarian exercises.

The U.S. Congress:

House International Relations Committee Chairman Zablocki has said, "congress is too responsive to the lobbies of ethnic and special interests in the U.S. to be able to take lead in foreign policy-making without endangering the national interest" (Franck et al, 1979: 165). Correlating to this, James Reston commented that "the 'goodness' of the American people is overwhelmed by the special interest lobbies" (Franck et al, 1979: 165). The Congress, according to Ogene (1983) was divided on the political and humanitarian issue of the Nigeria – Biafra war. According to him, the debate was on "those who believed that moral considerations should be given priority over political considerations, and those who believed that political considerations were more important. The one set of consideration tended to lead to support for 'one Nigeria'

while the other tended to underplay political unity" (Ogene, 1983: 72). The group which had political considerations over the moral question on the war assistance did not press their case too far in congress because they discovered that their views tallied with the State Department policy preference on the Nigeria civil war. Hence, with their strong influence in the Senate and the House, they ensured that funds were made available and approved by the Congress to assist Nigeria throughout the duration of the civil war (Ogene, 1983).

The Congress participated in the Nigeria civil war with strong believe and conviction that Nigeria was fighting a just war. According to Senator Edward M. Brooke, "the Nigerian Government was fighting for a laudable and justifiable cause and the crisis itself was the outcome of Ibo domination, clannishness, nepotism, and unlimited political ambition together with Ojukwu's recklessness" (Ogene, 1983: 73). How correct was he? And on the relief materials issue, the congress was of the opinion that U.S. should give relief aid in the manner that it rather facilitates the end of the war than impedes it. And also that U.S. should first look at the political situation in Nigeria before considering the issue of starvation. Hence, tacitly, U.S. approved the instrument of hunger as a war weapon or strategy, even where civilian lives were involved! How then could America claim to be the world's police? How are they the arbiter of justice? Nobody can give what he or she does not have, except if such a one is a thief. Africa is still deep down in crisis, while those who claimed to be civilizers of the world are not themselves civilized, but barbarians. If not so, could it be justified that a man equated a human life with a litre of petrol? Undoubtedly, this is purely the case of the black pot (which sees more fire) calling the kettle (less used) black. This is the irony of our life. America has no peace and so, Africa should not expect peace from her because, she has none to give, not even for her own needs. This is our observation.

To be fair on America, the group with moral considerations on the Nigeria civil war was vocal on the Biafran case. But what could the leg do when the head was bad? Their still voices were swallowed up in the loud noise of economic opportunists who equate the human life with the notes of dollars they can easily withdraw from their pockets. In this fight of moral justification over economic 'accumulationism', McCarthy remonstrated the U.S. Government for blindly following British policy in supporting the Federal Military Government, knowing fully well that Britain had special interests in the Nigerian affair, interests which border on economy

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and the British colonial experiments in Africa. On another instance, Senator Kennedy opines that,

> The time is long overdue for the United States to assume some leadership in this area. Some will say the United States should leave such problems alone – haven't we learned from Vietnam that we cannot police the world? But I submit that the choice in Nigeria is not between military intervention and isolation. Rather it is an active determination to simply pursue our objectives for a peaceful world and the well-being of our fellow man through political means (Ogene, 1983: 75).

The State Department:

The State Department is where foreign policy is formulated, adopted and implemented. Palmer was the first American ambassador in Nigeria in the early 1960s. He had been described as 'a determined, personable career diplomat'. He had from his first acquaintance with Nigeria regarded in the country as a bastion of democracy. In the face of the coups and massacres of 1966, Palmer's reaction was defensive and apologetic. His attitudes to Biafra's secession in 1967 also followed his preconceptions. To him, as well as to his State Department allies, Biafra's independence would mean a weak if not a disintegrated Nigeria. Such an outcome would argue against everything Palmer had stood for (Ogene, 1983)

We have seen how the selfish personal interest of one man has determined the survival of a whole nation. Nigeria civil war, according to all those who believed in the saneness of it did so on the premise of the unity and development of the nation. Now that the project of the forced unity has been achieved, could such people still hold their heads high and say that Nigeria is a united nation? Can such people still say that Nigeria has achieved development after fifty years of independence? Can the nationalities that make up Nigeria seat together on one table without some high level of carefulness and a disturbing feeling of insecurity and uncertainty? If not, why keep two people together who are avowed enemies of each other? Our submission here is that America has failed millions of people in Africa; the unborn, born and dead. America neglected the part of justice to 'speculative immunism'. America really blundered.

In trying to capture the feeling and the policy thrust in the State Department, Ogene (1983) informs that, "The gist of the State Department's attitude was that, in the formulation of

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the U.S. policy on the Nigeria – Biafra war, respect for the preferences and sensitivities of the British and Nigerian Governments on the matter should be given priority over the need for relief. This meant that the U.S. should support the positions taken by Britain and Nigeria" (Ogene, 1983: 77). Another suspected reason towards the State Department's apathy and indifference on the level of starvation going on in Biafra was attributable to racial prejudice, where the State Department does not care if Biafrans starve to death. Expressing her anger over this development, Elizabeth B. Drew opines that,

> …..related to this, unpleasant as it is to say, was a form of racism: according to several witnesses, a kind of bureaucratic detachment about tragedy in Africa, and an assumption that Africans do not share our value for human life. It is fair to ask if our relief policies would have been the same if the Biafrans were Belgians (Ogene, 1983: 78 – 79).

The American Embassy in Lagos, between 1966 to 1968 under the leadership of Matthews, was regarded as a distinct extension of the State Department. Mathew was given the task of ensuring speedy conclusion of the war in favour of the Nigerian government. Hence, he was to use every power within his reach to achieve this. He was to use superior military force and starvation to force Biafra into unconditional surrender. In achieving this set goal, he endorsed the British position on politics and relief; he sent several report to Washington pleading for arms sale to the Nigerian Government; and he grossly rendered inaccurate the situation report in Nigeria. He became so recalcitrant that at a point, Washington stopped taking his reports, rather, they relied on the Canadian High Commission in Lagos for information. When he was relieved of his duty in 1969, his successor continued in his footsteps.

The Presidency of Richard Nixon took a new and difference policy approach to the Nigerian war from that of the State Department. Earlier in his campaign promises, he promised to get directly involved in the Nigerian problem, and so,

> He criticized the Nigerian Government for trying 'to pursue total and unconditional victory' and accepted as valid 'the fear of the Ibo people that surrender means whole-sale atrocities and genocide. But genocide is what is taking place right now – and starvation is the grim reaper', he added. 'This is not the time to

stand on ceremony or to go through channels, or to observe diplomatic niceties' (Ogene ,1983: 79).

Was this promise followed to the letter? Ogene (1983) posited that instead of more relief to Biafra and an early negotiated end to the conflict, most bureaucrats advocated a 'quick kill' of the Biafran forces. This was what happened. So, Nigeria/Biafra war was indeed a muddled affair. The instrument of evil from the United States of America was more than its benign counterpart. Hence, unforgettable and avoidable evils were inflicted on the people.

The group influences:

The Nigeria – Biafra war did not become a big issue among American groups until the spring and summer of 1968, that is, almost one year after hostilities had erupted (Ogene, 1983).

What is a group?

A group could be defined as a "certain portion of the men of a society, taken, however, not as a physical mass cut off from other masses of men, but as a mass (of) activity, which does not preclude men who participate in it from participating likewise in many other group activities" (Verma, 1975:238). Bentley looks at interest as an overriding factor in the group theory, hence, he asserts that, 'interest is a shared attitude concerning a claim or claims to be made by one group upon certain other groups in a social group' (Verma, 1975). He concludes that it is the interest which leads to the organization of groups. This may not be entirely true owing to the inexorable law of social integration. Man is by nature a social being, hence, he always tilts towards one form of association or another; may be in search of identity, or pleasure.

Group interests in the Nigerian crisis existed both within the American government and among the public. The most significant non-governmental groups included businesses with investments in Nigeria; church groups, voluntary agencies, and black American groups (Ogene, 1983). Hence,

> The interests of public opinion, relief groups, the congress, and the White House can be described as symbolic only in the sense that these groups were motivated not by tangible advantages to themselves and the U.S. but the material well-being of others. Their primary consideration was humanitarian and moral. By contrast, the business groups, the State Departments, and the

Embassy were motivated largely by calculations of tangible self and national interest. They desired to safeguard the lives and investments of Americans in Nigeria (Ogene, 1983: 93)

The other pressure or awareness groups found within the American environment were: the British Embassy, the Nigeria Embassy and information agents, the office of the Biafran representative in the U.S, the Biafra Association in the Americas, the American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive, the Biafra Relief Services Foundation, etc. All these groups played one roll or other in the execution of the war. Hence, for the purpose of this study, we shall limit our studies to: business companies, religious groups, and the black Americans.

The Business Companies:

The U.S. business interests in Nigeria, more than any other factor, defined the nature and the direction of the Nigeria – Biafra civil war. According to Ogene (1983), "In 1964, three years before the outbreak of hostilities in Nigeria, there were at least 85 American firms of different sizes with business interests in Nigeria" (Ogene, 1983: 65). He goes on to argue that,

Many foreign businesses at the beginning of the crisis were neutral. This stance changed as the war dragged on. American companies listened to the assurances of the Nigerian and British Governments and of the U.S. Department of Commerce that the Nigerian side would win with ease and that there would be enormous opportunities for business expansion thereafter (Ogene, 1983: 65).

And so, the U.S. role in the civil war execution was chiefly defined by economic gains, which were ably assured by the Federal Government of Nigeria and the United States' State Department Office. Hence, "But even before the companies began to use pressure, both the State Department and the Embassy were already defining U.S. interests in the civil war in terms of economic advantages. Even in the Congress and the White House, there was a tacit assumption that economic advantages must enter into any assessment of U.S. national interests" (Ogene, 1983: 95).

American firms in Nigeria not only subscribed to the principle of a united Nigeria but also aided Nigeria's war efforts both politically and materially (Ogene, 1983: 66). The Nigeria's war efforts received great boost from the U.S multinational companies operating in Nigeria. They saw to it to their capability that they prevailed on the U.S. State Department to maintain the

policy of one Nigeria, and of no interference. No doubt, the majority of these U.S. multinationals operating in Nigeria were located in the Eastern region. One wonders why unlike in the case of the Congo crisis where the multinationals supported the Katanga war efforts, the region where they are doing their businesses. But here in the Biafran case, the reverse was the case. The answer to these could not be too far-fetched because, the West would very easily subscribe to a stooge government that is easily pliable to a government that is more credible and forceful. Hence, the deep-seated problem of the African nations, where the West would rather prefer weak governments to the highly competent ones so that their continued relevance will never be questioned. There is no gain-saying the obvious that by conniving with weak and corrupt governments in Africa, the West has continued to perpetuate the long forgotten evils of the slave trade era, and the colonial regimes.

The Religious Groups:

The American Christian congregations were not left out in the bid to restore peace, and to stem the tide of human carnage in the Nigeria – Biafra struggle. Under the auspices of the World Council of Church (WCC), a plea for the immediate cessation of hostilities was made to the Nigerian and the Biafran Governments. In the joint statement issued by the WCC,

> The statement called for an immediate cessation of armed hostilities and for the establishment of lasting peace by honourable negotiations. It urged respect for the sacredness of human life and for an end to 'all atrocities, general massacre, mass hatred and vindictiveness'. It urged all men, especially African Chiefs of State for mediation of the conflict and for an embargo on external military assistance, and urged to close co-operation between international relief agencies and the extension by both sides of facilities to them (Ogene, 1983: 67).

The statement produced great results among the Christian faithful in the U.S. One is that it incited in them the desire to give relief materials to the starving and suffering civilian victims. On the other hand, they directed a substantial effort to influencing the American government to increase its humanitarian effort, and to urge for a cease-fire. To be commended is the actions of these American bodies. While they were desirous of seeing immediate end to the war and the human sufferings occasioned by the war, the Nigerian Government was more intent on winning the war by all means available, even at the extermination of the whole Biafran enclave. If this is

not so, how could the Nigerian Government have accepted to used hunger as an instrument of the war, and also have opposed relief materials to the starving and dying civilians in Biafra. Even in the face of opposition, the relief agencies risked their lives to deliver their relief materials to the dying civilians.

The American Press:

The U.S media played vital roles in the prosecution of the Nigeria civil war. On July 4, 1967, the Association of Biafran students criticized the *New York Times* for taking sides with the Nigerian Government. In a letter to the editor, the irate students expressed their displeasure in unmistakable terms, saying:

> We were appalled by your editorial of June 18 in which you advised General Gowon, Military Governor of Nigeria, to continue his futile economic blockade of Biafra. In your fond hope that the sanctions will force the people of Biafra to their knees, you have completely misjudged their psychological make-up. The more they suffer, the more they will be prepared to suffer in order to uphold their inalienable right to survival" (Aneke, 2007: 119).

The media reports were responsible for the public disposition of the America's populace towards the Nigeria civil war.

4.4 THE END OF THE WAR :

Figure 12: A child suffering the effects of severe hunger and malnutrition as a result of the blockade. Pictures of the famine caused by Nigerian blockade garnered sympathy for the Biafrans worldwide.

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Source: Nigerian Civil War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War).

Anything that has a beginning, says a holy writ, has an end. The 30 months civil strife between the Nigerian government and the separatist government of the Biafra which began on 6 July 1967, came to an end on 13ᵗʰ January, 1970, by an act of surrender to the Federal Government, by General Philip Effiong, the second in command to General Ojukwu, the leader of the Biafran government. Hence, with increased British support, the Nigerian federal forces launched their final offensive against the Biafrans once again on 23 December 1969 with a major thrust by the 3rd Marine Commando Division which succeeded in splitting the Biafran enclave into two by the end of the year. The final Nigerian offensive, named "Operation Tail-Wind", was launched on 7 January 1970 with the 3rd Marine Commando Division attacking, and supported by the 1st Infantry division to the north and the 2nd Infantry division to the south. The Biafran town of Owerri fell on 9 January, and Uli fell on 11 January. Only a few days earlier, Ojukwu fled into exile by flying by plane to the republic of Côte d'Ivoire, leaving his deputy Philip Effiong to handle the details of the surrender to Yakubu Gowon of the federal army on January 13, 1970. The war finally ended a few days later with the Nigerian forces advancing in the remaining Biafran held territories (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War).

4.5 THE LESSONS:

"There were other motives certainly. Some of the governments that were supporting the separations had eyes on the oil fields. Others had other motivations. There was meddling to try and break up Nigeria" (BBC, 2000). This is a part of an interview granted to BBC *Timewatch,* by one of the American volunteer pilots who worked with the ICRC to flown in relief materials for the war ravaged civilians in Biafra, Count Carl Gustav Von Rosen. In this expedition, every one of the humanitarian relief workers in Biafra took risks, for a cause they came to believe in, just to save lives. In this circle of committed humanitarian service aid workers were the French doctors, the Doctors Without Borders, who sacrificed everything to save the lives of the Biafrans. They were the heroes and the success story of the Nigeria civil war. Here, a case of selfless service without attachments was exemplified, while others were busy counting the millions they will reap in when the massacre was completed. We are alive, thanks to them!

War is an effort in futility. He who lives to talk about it becomes the war hero. Hence, the

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dead are oblivious of all that is happening around them. Why then should a man choose to live in misery for fighting a war? War is a retrogressive effort. But then, if one must fight, let him fight to be alive; let him fight a just course. Nigeria was all bent at winning the war by all means, either by fair or by foul means. To starve a stubborn child to submission is to sign his death warrant, and Nigeria meant to do that! Submission is not conquest.

Presumption is a harbinger of surprises. Don't under-estimate anybody. If the Nigerian Government was told in a dream that Biafra would withstand her with nothing, and perhaps secure victories if external helps were to be debarred, they would have called that a serious symptom of malaria, hallucination. But it almost happened. That is to say, to presume is to be surprised, nothing is to be taken for granted.

Know your enemies and also know your friends. No one fights all his enemies at one time and wins all the battles at the swoop. Fight the most important and leave others for another battle. Biafra fought too many battles at one time with nothing! Our friends were in our enemies' camp, and our enemies made friends with our friends, hence, we need to know our self and our friends so as to understand our enemies. America was our friend, and she was also our enemy. It was a game for the survival of the fittest.

Americans do not move if they are not self motivated, hence, they always have an interest to protect. It is purely business, no compromise. It is to be borne in mind that America "had learned from experience and habit to follow the British lead on issues pertaining to its former colonies in Africa" (Ogene, 1983: 80).

The U.S. Embassy in Nigeria and the State Department frustrated every effort by the U.S. Government to render assistance to Biafra. Hence, one could attribute this development to the alleged refusal of Ojukwu dancing to the tune of the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, Elbert G. Mathews, on accepting without questioning the Gowon's interpretation of the Aburi Accord. In this case, it could be suggested that when the stakes are too high and the enemies formidable, one should learn to 'make haste slowly'. The best form of attack is to win your enemy's enemies and friends to your side. That to attack an overwhelming force is to be overwhelmed in the process. Undoubtedly, the Biafrans had a good course, whether one likes it or not, but the negative forces against this noble course was overwhelmingly formidable. And so, it is good to remember that

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most of the time, most things in life are not always fair and just; at times, fairness assumes foulness and foulness fairness. How then do we reconcile this? Patience and trust in God! He who starts fighting before the war is declared often gets himself worn-out before the actual war is fought. America would not like Africa to be her competitor.

Symbiosis is the immutable law of equal interchanges. But where an interchange is not symbiotic, unequal interchanges become the rule other than the exception. And so, whatever Africa does with America, Africa should know that as soon as the America's interest is served, Africa would be discarded like a bundle of used rags. Hence, interest has been observed as a fore-player in the game of international relations and politics; therefore, Africa should know where her interests are served, and so protect it.

Henry John, Palmerston (1784 – 1865), a one time British Prime Minister, ones said, "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow" (Lord Palmerston remarks in the House of Commons defending his foreign policy, March 1, 1848 – Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol.97, col. 122). To live meaningfully is to desire to enjoy living, not as a phenomenal accident, but a duty. Life has no other formula but what we make out of it; the definition we give it. And so, has Africa defined her continental interests and fine–tuned the strategies towards their attainment? Your heart, the holy writ enjoins, is where your treasure is. Africa needs to have a clear definition of what she wants in the comity of nations. It is a task; a mission that must be pursued!

Figure 13: The harsh realities of the Nigeria – Biafra war

Source: http://www.google.com.ng/search?q=biafra&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a

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CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Nigeria – Biafra war was a fruitless effort, just like every other war: "A tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing" (Shakespeare).

Africa could be better off without America and the West, hence, the Africa's losses could as well be summarized as the America's and its allies (the West) gains. And so, U.S. peace mediation in Africa is an exercise which creates more problems for Africa than it purports to solve. The U.S. meddling in the African affairs is the root cause of the intractable nature of the African conflicts. There is no known African conflict that does not have the America's involvement, either covertly or overtly, and the overriding influence has always been the pursuit of the America's national interests (undoubtedly defined by the interests of the ruling class) and the nation's strategic importance to America. Hence, in the words of Makgetlaneng (2008),

> The imperialist domination of Africa under the leadership of the
> United States is the strategic objective that constitutes the focus of
> its policy makers. This is an integral part of the United States
> position not only on its enemies and opponents, but also its allies
> and friends regarding the defense and expansion of its leadership
> of the world.

The U.S. – Africa relation could historically be traced to the era of the Trans-Atlantic Slave trade. This was the era in the African history when her able-bodied men and women were ferried across the Atlantic Ocean to render forced labour in the West Indian plantations. This era marked the de-population of the African continent; a period marked by tribal wars that captured slaves that were sold in the slave markets to be taken to Europe. This is no doubt a dark moment in the history of mankind – the height of man's inhumanity to his fellow man. This period was succeeded by the colonial era; an era which continued the human subjugation of the Africans by Europe; a period similar to the era of the slave trade in concept, but different in approach. At the era of the slave trade, Africans were captured and taken to Europe and America to render forced labour, but at the era of colonilization, Africans were made slaves in their land, inside their very bedrooms! When would this madness stop? Hence, the U.S. – Africa relations has yielded

nothing to the Africa but wars and continued strives, hence Africa's strategic importance to America.

The John's Gospel (Jn 14:27) tells us that there are two kinds of peace: the worldly peace and the peace of Christ. America as the world's only superpower promises the world peace, what peace is she promising the world? An American peace, a worldly peace, a jealous peace. No doubt, Jesus may have had this present world situation in mind; a world where a nation could not guarantee its citizens of peace, but claims to be the world' arbiter of peace. The Bible minces no words when it says that no man gives what he does not have. In the course of this study, it has been made abundantly clear that America does not run a Father Christmas show; that America always seeks to serve her national interests. And so, America comes first before any other considerations. How then could such a situation guarantee the world peace? "Peace is what I leave with you; it is my own peace that I give you. I do not give it as the world does. Do not be worried and upset; do not be afraid" (Jn 14:27). What an assuring words! Africa has wrongly placed their peace on the wrong hands, sorry, she may never achieve this peace, because, the world seeks first for its comfort before thinking of another, and when it does think of another, it thinks for its own gains.

Instability and Political crises in Africa has been of the African government. This factor has been found to have its leanings on dependency, which in turn traces it root in the western imperialism. Despite the fact that the United States has so clearly supported undemocratic regimes when it has served a military, economic or other political interest, the United States claims to be aggressively working for "democracy" in Zimbabwe. Although some in the Bush Administration seem to be realizing that overt U.S. engagement in Zimbabwe has been counter-productive, the United States has been intensifying sanctions and increased funding of opposition groups. This economic pressure for regime change not only strengthens Robert Mugabe's hand when blaming outside forces for the current economic crisis but it has the potential to undermine the opposition's legitimacy both now and if they were to gain power.

The United States ought to cease and desist from this antagonistic unilateral engagement and instead step back to work with other elements of the international community to develop a multilateral engagement. U.S. policies should facilitate bringing together regional actors like

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Southern African Development Community and the African Union with international agencies in order to promote the democratic process, a national and popular constitutional reform process, economic justice and human rights (see http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_4_72/ai_n16129797/).

Of worthy of note is the fact that since the Europeans came to Africa, Africa has never again known peace, and in their grudging departure, they made sure that they departed with whatever traces of peace that may have been left hidden in the corners. All the wars in the post-colonial Africa had had roots in colonial imbalances created in the colonies, of which Nigeria is a shining example. What about Congo? Ogene (1983) informs us that:

> The Congo became independent from the Belgian colonial rule on 1 July, 1960. By February 1961, all the problems that were to haunt the new nation for the next five years had already emerged (Ogene, 1983: 19).

What are these time-bombs programmed to explode in their due seasons? They include: structural imbalance, tribal rivalries, the enthronement of the mediocre and stooge/puppet governments, political and economic alienation of the elites, fostering secessionist appetite, etc. Africa till tomorrow suffers from these colonial vampires which have been sustained by illiteracy, poverty and diseases.

Nigeria and other African countries need civilian governments that will deliver services to their people; independent judiciaries that respect and enforce the rule of law; professional security forces that respect human rights; strong and effective legislative institutions; a free and responsible press; and a dynamic civil society. All of these are needed for a stable and prosperous Africa. All of these are needed to secure Africa's future.

U.S. support of favored illegitimate regimes like Zenawi's in Ethiopia and the unhelpful, contradictory U.S. diplomatic response to the botched elections in Kenya risk encouraging leadership around the continent to ignore the will of their citizens when they have international backing. Do these two instances foreshadow the standard of AFRICOM response to contested elections in Africa? Africa is not a terrorist nation, and so have no business in fighting terrorists. Therefore the philosophy behind the establishment of the AFRICOM is a false philosophy. What Africa needs most is not military establishments but food security, good and stable government, technological breakthroughs, improved medical services, job creation, etc. That Africans are

trained to be combat ready on an empty stomach and in an unstable environment would do no body any good. And so, AFRICOM is an American misplaced priority in Africa.

Though very commendable is AGOA, but then we need to ask ourselves pertinent questions. The number one question is: who moderates this AGOA program? We don't need to question the objectives and the aims of the program, nor who initiated it, because the answers are very obvious. AGOA is an American program with an American aims and objectives. AGOA without mincing words is an imperialist program to tie the African economy to the American economy. It is the American version of the trade liberalization and globalization. In this instance, America does not want to compete with anybody, not even with the African economy because America decides which goods and materials are included in the AGOA list of tradable goods. Hence in the areas where America has comparative advantage, such areas were excluded. What then is the purpose? You compel me to throw wide open the gate of my market economy in a deal that only restricts me to the trades that are way beyond my reach? How can one compete favourably in what he is ill equipped for? And you called that the Africa growth opportunity act? Now the second question is: how long is the program supposed to last? May be cutting off the program in the middle of the road when, perhaps, Africans have gotten their acts together and are warming up to exploit the opportunity? This as far as we know best, is not nothing short of a Greek gift, which leaves you far worst than when you we received it. America has never thought well of Africa, and so, cannot just wake up and start singing the African praises without some ulterior reasons.

It should be understood that this apathy towards Africa is not entirely an American thing, but the "American National Interest" which could be defined as the personal and selfish interests of thee ruling class. In the case of the Rwanda genocide, the American government was properly informed of the atrocities going on, but the government chose to do nothing. In this regard, according to Ferroggiaro (2004) "UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire understood the power of the news media; despite his other responsibilities, he devoted considerable effort and resources so that a few journalists could get the story to the outside world, which led to pressure for intervention at least in France'

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In summary of the America's strategic and exploitative interest in Africa, William G. Martin (2000) concludes by saying:

> Indeed new oil fields off Africa's coast will surely be drilled by U.S. firms and be protected by U.S.-trained troops or private security corporations. Similarly, recent U.S. initiatives to train and secure influence over African, especially South African, police and military forces through building new US-dominated war colleges and security police academies are likely to continue. Securing US economic interests is thus likely to mean enhanced, low-intensity commitments in resource rich parts of the continent—not to end conflict and protect and secure African lives, but rather to protect narrow U.S. investments and interests.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

If it could be possible, Africa should detach itself from the Western patronage. This is a Greek gift that demands more than it is willing to give; a gift in itself which is a trap. We know that it will be a difficult decision to take, but then, no slave is a free servant. Dependency is the bedrock of the African woes. Yes, the West comes to us in one way but leaves us in many ways.

Africa problem demands an African solution. Since no other continent will develop Africa, but Africa itself, Africans should see themselves as one, and so, work together for the development of the continent. It is by greed and working against one another that we give chance for external interventions.

U.S. is a nation that respects its Western allies and has ingrained national interests to protect in her foreign dealings, so, it will be suicidal that she will neglect her Western allies or subjugate her national interests when Africa is the question. What this means is that Africans should learn how to be African, and then ones good neighbor. America would not like Africa to be her competitor, but since America is not the God of Africa, Africa should devise a home made development that would be devoid of Western interference.

Africa should, as a matter of expediency, find out what makes America thick. Every success has a secret formula, and until such a formula is situationally appropriated, one would be left with the option of doing the old things over and over again, in the old way and with the old

results. Hence, our submission here is that America has a workable formula which Africa need to appropriate in her peculiar situation. But then, we should not forget that America is America, and Africa is Africa, hence, to be limited by another's shadow is to play the second best. Africa could be a world power by believing in herself and appropriating tested and workable success formula. So, there is no crime in imitating successes, but then, one should not be limited by imitations.

Suggestions for future readings:

➢ What could be the cause of the internecine wars in Africa? It naturally follows that if there is no war or civic unrest, there would be no need for mediation. Hence, more academic studies should be directed towards unearthing the causes of the Africa's conflicts and what could be done to arrest this ugly situation.

➢ The study on the U.S. – Africa relations is barely scratched on the surface, it could not be fully treated in a single study, and so, the need for future studies in this area. Secondly, foreign relations or relations in general is a dynamic phenomenon, hence the need for a regular updating. Thirdly, Africa needs to reposition and re-strategize to be relevant in the comity of the nations. The beggar's approach of the African nations towards the West should be de-emphasized; Africa should learn to hold on her own. How could this be achieved? Future researches in this area should be encouraged; we need to know how to escape this humdrum.

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Appendix 1

U.S.-Africa Relations Chronology

The United States established diplomatic relations with Liberia in 1862 to begin a 146-year commitment and relationship with the people and nations of Africa. President Bush's February 15-21, 2008, visit to five African nations continues that long tradition.

February 15-21, 2008

President Bush makes his second trip to Africa when he visits Benin, Ghana, Liberia, Rwanda and Tanzania.

January 23, 2008

Secretary of state delivers keynote address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, and notes American assistance to Africa has quadrupled since 2001.

February 6, 2007

U.S. Department of Defense announces the creation of a new U.S. Africa Command headquarters, to be known as AFRICOM, to coordinate all U.S. military and security interests throughout the continent.

March 2006

U.S. Commerce Department releases U.S.-Africa trade figures for 2005, showing that American imports from African countries under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) increased 44 percent from 2004, to $38.1 billion.

July 2005

Leaders of the world's leading industrialized countries (the G8) pledge to step up development aid by $50 billion by 2010, with half of the increase going to Africa.

June 2005

President Bush announces the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI).

June 2005

President Bush announces approximately $55 million to support women's justice and empowerment in Africa.

June 2004

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

President Bush leads his G8 partners in a meeting with African leaders from Algeria, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. Their discussion focuses on the challenges faced by Africa, including promoting private-sector-led growth, combating HIV/AIDS and poverty.

2004

President Bush establishes the Millennium Challenge Corporation to reduce global poverty through the promotion of sustainable economic growth. Thirty-two African countries are on the list of 63 countries eligible to submit proposals for funding.

August 2003

Liberian President Charles Taylor goes into exile under pressure from the United States and other nations, and a small American force joins Nigerian peacekeepers in an effort to bring stability to the war-torn country.

July 8-12, 2003

President Bush visits five nations (Botswana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda) in sub-Saharan Africa.

February 2003

President Bush announces an important new effort to combat famine and hunger worldwide, recognizing that 30 million people in Africa are at risk of starvation or are facing severe food shortages, including 14 million people in Ethiopia alone.

January 2003

President Bush announces the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).

July 2001

President Bush introduces the Africa Education Initiative to strengthen basic education in Africa.

July 2000

The United States agrees with Botswana to establish an International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) for southern Africa.

1999

Congress passes the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), aimed at spurring exports from Africa to the United States.

August 7, 1998

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania are bombed; attacks later linked to al-Qaida.

March 23-April 2, 1998

Bill Clinton pays the first visit to sub-Saharan Africa by a U.S. president in 20 years.

June 1996

Leland Initiative begins to help bring the benefits of the information revolution to the people of Africa.

1995

United States backs special international war crime tribunals for Rwanda following widespread massacres in 1994.

1993

President Clinton withdraws U.S. troops from Somalia.

December 9, 1992

U.S. forces enter Somalia at the beginning of Operation Restore Hope, a joint U.N.-U.S. effort to provide food relief to starving victims of Somalia's civil war.

October 27, 1986

U.S. Congress passes the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.

July 13, 1985

African famine victims are aided by $70 million from all-day rock concerts in 152 countries. After a July 5 U.N. report of a food crisis in Africa, "Live Aid" becomes the publicity title for two rock concerts in Philadelphia and London. Seven other concerts, broadcast by intercontinental satellite communications, reach an audience of 1.5 billion people. Sales of a recording titled "We Are the World," by American musicians, raise $45 million. Sales of "Do They Know It's Christmas," by the British Band Aid Group, raise $11 million.

March 31-April 3, 1978

First state visit by a president of the United States to sub-Saharan Africa when President Jimmy Carter meets with President Olusegun Obasanjo in Lagos, Nigeria, and President William Tolbert in Monrovia, Liberia.

1974

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

The United States and more than 100 other nations at the World Food Conference in Rome pledge that within a decade no child will go hungry.

June 4, 1961

The first American Peace Corps volunteers go to Ghana.

1961

By executive order, President John F. Kennedy creates the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist the developing world.

September 1958

U.S. Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs is established.

January 26-27, 1943

President Franklin D. Roosevelt has informal visit with President Barclay in Monrovia, Liberia.

Source: http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-
English/2008/February/20080206163314dmslahrellek0.9545404.html

Appendix 2

U.S.-Africa Relations Chronology

Sep 26, 2008 — Half a century of official ties, four and a half centuries of engagement

1565
St. Augustine, Florida, is founded. The oldest permanent European settlement in what would later become the United States, it counts among its first settlers several colonists of African descent -both freemen and slaves.

1619
The first African "bondsmen" arrive in the English colony of Jamestown, Virginia.

1777
Morocco becomes first country to recognize United States.

1798-1808
Approximately 200,000 African slaves are brought to the United States during the decade of greatest slave importation in the United States. While the United States officially outlawed the slave trade in 1808, the law was not enforced.

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1801-1805
In the years following the creation of the United States of America, a newly formed U.S. Navy has numerous encounters with Barbary pirates on the North African coast while attempting to protect American merchants.

1816
American Colonization Society, which espoused the return of African Americans to Africa, is established; it later contributes to the founding of Liberia.

1819
Congress passes an "Act in addition to the acts prohibiting the Slave Trade," which authorizes the president to send a naval squadron to African waters to apprehend illegal slave traders. It also appropriates $100,000 to resettle recaptured slaves in Africa, finally enforcing the 1808 ban on the slave trade.

1820
On May 15, Congress enacts a law which equates slave trading with piracy, making it punishable by death.

1820-23
Naval units raid the slave traffic off African coasts, pursuant to the 1819 act of Congress.

1822
The first African-American settlement is founded in Liberia.

1825
The *Antelope* Case: The U.S. revenue cutter *Dallas* seizes a slave ship, the *Antelope*, sailing under a Venezuelan flag. The *Antelope* is carrying a cargo of 281 Africans, claimed by Portuguese and Spanish owners, in international waters. The U.S. Supreme Court hears five days of arguments before packed courtrooms.

On March 16, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall delivers a unanimous opinion declaring the slave trade a violation of natural law. However, he asserts that the United States still must respect the right of other nations to create their own laws regarding the slave trade.

1837-39
The *Amistad* Case: African slaves seize control of a Spanish slave ship and win their freedom in a U.S. Supreme Court decision.

1843
Four United States naval vessels patrol Africa's coast and deploy landing parties to discourage piracy and the slave trade along the Ivory Coast and punish attacks by the natives on American seamen and shipping.

1847

That the young might know wisdom and learn prudence; war is an unnecessary evil!

Liberia declares independence July 26.

1862
The United States establishes diplomatic relations with Liberia.

1865
Slavery is abolished in the United States by the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

1871
Carrying an American flag before him, U.S. citizen Henry Morton Stanley "finds" British explorer and missionary David Livingstone in Ujiji, Tanganyika. Stanley's expedition was financed by the *New York Herald*, which subsequently publishes exclusive reports and illustrations that dramatize Stanley and Africa to the American public. Stanley's books are best-sellers in the United States and heavily influence the image of Africa as "the dark continent" for decades to come.

1884-1885
The Berlin Conference: Hosted by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the event marks the beginning of European colonization in Africa. The United States sends a representative, but is not considered a major entity in the talks. Henry Morton Stanley, made famous by his *New York Herald>*financed African expedition, subsequently collaborates with Belgian King Leopold to establish the "Congo Free State."

1896
Plessy v. Ferguson: U.S. Supreme Court decision that upholds the constitutionality of racial segregation under the principle of "separate but equal." It climaxes a campaign in the South to reinstate white supremacy, and parallels European imperialism in Africa.

1899-1902
The Boer War, also known as the South African War or the Anglo-Boer War: Extensive press coverage in the United States tends to favor the Boers as anti-imperialist yeomen freedom fighters. As a result, the American public internalizes an enduring image of South Africa as a white man's country on the edge of a "dark" continent.

1914
Jamaica-born Marcus Garvey founds the Universal Negro Improvement Association as a means of uniting all people of African ancestry. In the 1920s, he would start the "Liberia Project," to encourage development of Liberia.

1915
The Birth of a Nation: Based on the Thomas Dixon novel and play *The Clansman,* a silent film adaptation by D.W. Griffith makes cinematic history as the first Hollywood blockbuster. The story glorifies the role of the Ku Klux Klan, a terrorist secret society of white supremacists, in the years following the American Civil War and the abolition of slavery, and negatively stereotypes African Americans in ways that reflect racial attitudes among white Americans during the era. Even President Woodrow Wilson enjoys a private White House showing. The

film's success stimulates the rebirth of the Klan during the 1920s as a national movement. In the years ahead, African-American communities, particularly in America's poor, rural South, will face growing threats of violence in addition to the pervasive atmosphere of discrimination and segregation they experience under the era's discriminatory "Jim Crow" laws.

1918
***Tarzan of the Apes*:** The first of 88 Tarzan films released, as well as subsequent radio and television programs. Based on the fantasy novels of Chicago-born author Edgar Rice Burroughs, Tarzan inadvertently popularizes a false image among Western audiences of Africans as primitive and brutal. Tarzan's whiteness not only makes it easy for the majority American public to relate to the character, but also reflects and reinforces the negative racial stereotypes of the era.

1936
Jesse Owens captures four gold meals at the Olympics held in Berlin, Germany, challenging before the world Adolph Hitler's ideology of racial superiority. The news of Owens' accomplishment is spread by radio, wire and newsreel around the world, including Africa, communicating a message of African-American success in the United States.

1936
African-American scholar Ralph Bunche publishes *A World View of Race,* which links European imperialism in Africa with segregation in the United States. Bunche would become a top U.S. diplomat, a leading architect in creating the United Nations, where he worked for peace in the Congo, Yemen, Kashmir and Cyprus, and would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating the 1949 Israeli-Palestinian armistice agreement.

1941
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston L.S. Churchill sign the Atlantic Charter, calling for the freedom of nations. Africans would interpret the charter as a call to end colonialism. The United States is now seen as the champion of liberation movements around the world, including Africa.

1942
Operation Torch: An Anglo-American army under the command of General and future President Dwight David Eisenhower invades Vichy French Morocco, Algeria and eventually Tunisia, driving Axis forces out of Africa.

1943
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt becomes the first sitting U.S. president to visit Africa when he flies to Morocco and The Gambia for the January 14424 Casablanca Conference with Churchill and Free French General Charles de Gaulle. Roosevelt visits informally with Liberian President Edwin Barclay following the conference.

1944
Swedish scholar Gunnar Myrdal publishes *An American Dilemma*. The Carnegie Endowment funded study of American race relations, which includes contributions from African-American

scholar and diplomat Ralph Bunche, questions fundamental attitudes, assumptions and public policy toward African Americans in the United States.

1948
***Shelley v. Kraemer*:** A landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision rules racially restrictive housing covenants unconstitutional. The U.S. Department of Justice files a friend-of-the-court brief that uses foreign policy arguments provided by the State Department. The brief asserts that legally sanctioned segregation weakened America's international influence by contradicting its most powerful human rights principle: equality before the law.

1948
African-American scholar and diplomat Ralph Bunche rejects President Harry S Truman's offer to serve as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian and African affairs over objections to a continuing climate of racism within the State Department at the time, as well as housing discrimination against African Americans seeking homes in Washington.

1954
***Brown v. Topeka Board of Education*:** Landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision bans racially segregated public schools and overrules the principle of "separate but equal" facilities practiced widely in the United States at the time. The State Department provides language in a friend-of-the-court brief that argues that legally sanctioned racial discrimination damages the nation's national security by reducing its moral authority overseas. The decision is applauded universally, especially in Africa.

1955
Martin Luther King Jr. leads a successful campaign against racial discrimination on public buses in Montgomery, Alabama, beginning his career as a world-renowned civil rights leader.

1956
The Suez Crisis: A British, French and Israeli attack on Egypt ends disastrously when President Eisenhower forcefully rebukes his NATO allies. The powerful image of America standing against the two great European colonial nations bolsters U.S. prestige in Africa as a leader in decolonization. African-American scholar and U.N. diplomat Ralph Bunche joins Canadian diplomat and future Prime Minister Lester Pearson to organize a U.N. peacekeeping force for the Suez region.

1957
President Dwight D. Eisenhower sends Vice President Richard Milhous Nixon to Africa for a visit that leads to establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs at the U.S. State Department.

Ghana, under the leadership of pan-Africanist and U.S.-educated Kwame Nkrumah, becomes the first nation in sub-Saharan colonial Africa to achieve independence in a ceremony attended by U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon, U.N. Under Secretary Ralph Bunche and Martin Luther King Jr.

1957

President Eisenhower deploys U.S. Army soldiers to provide security for African-American students integrating a previously white-only school in Little Rock, Arkansas - a powerful message to several U.S. states that sought to resist the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v. Topeka Board of Education*. The crisis receives extensive international coverage, notably in Africa.

1958
The U.S. State Department creates the Bureau of African Affairs. Joseph Satterthwaite, the first assistant secretary of state for African affairs, is sworn in September 2.

1958-61
Cases arise of African diplomats serving in the United States facing discrimination while seeking housing in the Washington region. In **1961** the Kennedy administration establishes the Special Protocol Service Section within the Department of State to work with local and state governments to resolve and prevent cases of discrimination against Africans. It represents the connection of foreign policy to local politics.

1960
Congo Crisis: As Congo gains independence from Belgium, the United States refuses to support Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba because the Eisenhower administration believes he is a communist. Instead, the United States backs Belgium and retention of a U.N. peacekeeping force as the best alternative to a pro-Soviet Congo. As Congo slides into chaos, much of Africa perceives the U.S. position as favoring NATO ally Belgium's economic interests in Katanga and opposing a strong, united Congo. Suspicions of U.S. complicity in Lumumba's death would taint the U.S. image in Africa for many years.

1961
Newly elected President John F. Kennedy establishes the Peace Corps on March 1; the first American Peace Corps volunteers depart for the African nations of Ghana and Tanzania August 28. On November 3, Kennedy establishes the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to administer economic foreign assistance programs.

1962
June 25: The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) is founded in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Its leader, until his assassination in 1969, is Eduardo Mondlane, a product of Presbyterian mission schooling who went on to graduate from Oberlin College in Ohio, earn a doctoral degree from Northwestern University, and teach at Syracuse University before returning to Africa. The woman he married, from a small town in Illinois -- Janet Rae Johnson -- still lives in Maputo, Mozambique.

1963
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is formed May 25.

1964
Civil Rights Act of 1964: Landmark American law bans racial discrimination in public accommodations, effectively ending legalized racial discrimination in the United States.

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1965

Immigration Reform Act of 1965: By ending a quota system that heavily favored European countries, the law launches an era of large-scale legal immigration from African and Asian countries into the United States.

1966

U.S. Senator Robert Kennedy makes a historic June 449 visit to South Africa -- arguably the most important visit made by an American to South Africa. Kennedy arrives during the darkest years of the apartheid era, when Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, the architect of the apartheid system, is Prime Minister. Nelson Mandela, Chief Albert Luthuli and other opposition leaders are in prison on Robben Island or in exile. Kennedy is invited by the anti-apartheid National Union of South African Students to deliver its Annual Day of Affirmation speech at the University of Cape Town. The visit emphasizes the connections between the fight against racism and for civil rights in both the United States and South Africa.

1974

Portugal's "Carnation Revolution": An April 25 military officers' revolt leads to independence of Portugal's African territories. Fear of Soviet-backed leftist liberation movements leads the Nixon and Ford administrations to place Angola and Mozambique at the top of U.S. concerns in Africa.

September:

Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie is overthrown by the Derg, a secretive group of military officers, whose brutally repressive Marxist regime would prompt thousands to leave the country over the next decade. Many Ethiopian families would settle in the United States, whose vibrant Ethiopian-American community can be traced to this period.

October:

World heavyweight boxing champion George Foreman loses to challenger and former heavyweight champion Muhammad Ali in Kinshasa, Zaire, in a match billed as "The Rumble in the Jungle." Ali's win cements his image as the most popular and perhaps most recognized American in Africa and provides evidence of a tolerant, pluralist America with the success of a black and Muslim American.

November:

Cuban forces reach Angola via Soviet air transports in time to help MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) halt a South African incursion from the south and a U.S.- and Zairean-backed assault from the north. MPLA declares Angolan independence November 11.

1975

On July 18, President Gerald Ford approves $6 million in covert aid for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), two allied factions who opposed the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the Angolan civil war.

1976
Congress passes the Clark Amendment, prohibiting U.S. assistance to Angolan rebel movements.

1977
Roots: Alex Haley's fictionalized African-American family history is made into a hugely popular television miniseries that airs over eight consecutive nights in January 1977. The series garners enormous ratings and becomes an overnight sensation as approximately 130 million Americans tune in at some time during the eight broadcasts, galvanizing African-American interest in Africa.

1978
President Jimmy Carter makes the first official state visit by a U.S. president to sub-Saharan Africa March 31 - April 3, meeting with President Olusegun Obasanjo in Lagos, Nigeria, and with President William Tolbert in Monrovia, Liberia.

1980
Zimbabwe achieves independence April 18, ending the era of white-minority rule; Robert Mugabe wins election to head first government.

1981-90
Anti-Apartheid Movement: The anti-apartheid movement gains momentum in the United States -- a grassroots campaign built among a coalition of African-American groups, student activists, political groups and churches that came together to pressure U.S. businesses and state and local governments to oppose the white-minority government's apartheid policies by withdrawing investments in South Africa.

1984
Guinean President Ahmed Sekou Toure dies at the Cleveland Clinic in Cleveland, Ohio, after undergoing heart surgery. Toure had ruled Guinea since its independence in 1958 and often had been at loggerheads with the United States. He invited civil rights activist Stokely Carmichael to live in Guinea. Carmichael and his then-wife, South African singer and activist Miriam Makeba, moved to Conakry in 1969, where he lived until his death in 1998.

Cuban troop strength in Angola reaches at least 40,000. Their presence fuels Reagan administration hostility to MPLA and support of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (supported by South Africa) in what much of Africa views as a U.S.-USSR proxy war. Meanwhile, U.S.-owned and -operated Gulf Oil pumps oil in MPLA-controlled Cabinda province. Gulf eventually becomes ChevronTexaco, currently the foreign company with the most extensive holdings in Angola.

1986
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act: U.S. anti-apartheid activists score a major victory when Congress passes a new law imposing U.S. sanctions on South Africa until it releases Nelson Mandela and establishes a timetable for the end of apartheid, among other conditions.

1988
The New York Accords: After 24 months of negotiations chaired by Assistant Secretary for

African Affairs Chester A. Crocker, Angola, Cuba and South Africa formally agree to a December 22 cease-fire. These accords also grant Namibian independence and provide for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

1990
South African anti-apartheid leader Nelson Mandela is released from prison February 11 after serving 27 years.

1992
The Rome General Peace Accords are signed in October, ending the 17-year-long civil war in Mozambique.
December: U.S. forces enter Somalia at the beginning of Operation Restore Hope, a joint U.N.-U.S. effort to provide food relief to starving victims of Somalia's civil war.

1993
Eighteen U.S. troops are killed in an October raid in Mogadishu, Somalia. Soon after, President Clinton withdraws troops from Somalia. The incident enters into the American popular imagination with the movie *Black Hawk Down*.

1994
The genocide in Rwanda begins after the Rwandan President, Juvenal Habyarimana, is killed when his plane is shot down April 6. By July 18, more than 800,000 Rwandans are killed in the conflict as the international community fails to agree on taking action.

April:
In South Africa's first fully democratic elections, Nelson Mandela is elected as the first black president in the nation's history, signaling an end to apartheid and white-minority rule.

1995
The United States backs a February 2 U.N. resolution to establish a special international war crimes tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, for perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide.

1996
A U.S. military program is launched to train troops in Mali, Ghana, Uganda and Nigeria.

1998
Bill Clinton pays the first visit by a U.S. president to sub-Saharan Africa in 20 years, March 23 - April 2.

August:
Two massive car bombs are detonated at the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya August 7, killing more than 220 people and injuring more than 4,000, mostly area residents and passers-by. Both attacks are later linked to al-Qaida.

1999
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): The Clinton administration introduces an

initiative to create new economic opportunities by increasing African exports to the United States.

2001
*The Africa Education Initiative***:** An effort to strengthen basic education in Africa is created in July.

2002
UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi is killed in Angola February 22. Six weeks later, a cease-fire is reached, bringing the 27-year Angolan civil war to an end.

July:
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) merges with the African Economic Community (EAC) to form the African Union (AU) July 9.

November:
Camp Lemonnier, a former French military base in Djibouti, becomes site of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), an extension of the Central Command and operated by the U.S. Navy. The 1,500 military and civilian personnel based there would become the first permanent U.S. base in modern Africa.

2003
President George W. Bush announces the launch of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in his January 28 State of the Union address.

February:
President Bush announces an important new effort to combat famine and hunger worldwide, recognizing that 30 million people in Africa are at risk of starvation or are facing severe food shortages, including 14 million people in Ethiopia alone.

July:
President Bush visits Botswana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda in his first visit to sub-Saharan Africa July 8-12.

August:
Liberian President Charles Taylor goes into exile under pressure from the United States and other nations, and a small American force joins Nigerian peacekeepers in an effort to bring stability to war-torn Liberia.

2004
President Bush establishes the Millennium Challenge Corporation to reduce global poverty through the promotion of sustainable economic growth. Thirty-two African countries are on the list of 63 countries eligible to submit proposals for funding.

June:
President Bush leads his G8 partners in a meeting with African leaders from Algeria, Ghana,

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Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. Their discussion focuses on the challenges faced by Africa, including promoting private-sector-led growth, combating HIV/AIDS and poverty.

2005
The January 9 Nairobi Comprehensive Peace Agreement ends the civil war in southern Sudan.

June:
President Bush announces the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI).

2007
The U.S. Department of Defense announces the creation of a new Africa Command (AFRICOM) to coordinate U.S. military and security interests throughout the continent, promote security partnerships in the region and support humanitarian aid efforts. The February 6 announcement generates controversy across the continent. In October, AFRICOM establishes its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, as a unified subcommand of the European Command (EUCOM).

2008
President Bush makes his second trip to Africa, visiting Benin, Ghana, Liberia, Rwanda and Tanzania February 15-21.

August:
Barack Obama, whose father was from Kenya, becomes the first African-American presidential nominee of a major political party. The campaign is watched closely around the world as a sign of a major change in U.S. racial attitudes. Africans especially follow the campaign, which tends to reinforce already strong pro-American opinions in the region.

Source: www.America.gov

Appendix 3

Estimated population and distribution

Continent or region	Country population	Afro-descendants	Black and black-mixed population
Caribbean	**39,148,115**	**73.2%**	**22,715,518**
Haiti	8,924,553	90%	8,000,439
Dominican Republic	9,650,054	84%	8,106,054
Cuba	11,451,652	34.9%	3,999,626
Jamaica	2,804,332	97.4%	2,731,419
Trinidad and Tobago	1,047,366	58.0%	607,472
Puerto Rico	3,958,128	11.3%	447,268*
The Bahamas	307,451	85.0%	209,000

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Barbados	281,968	90.0%	253,771
Netherlands Antilles	225,369	85.0%	191,564
Saint Lucia	172,884	82.5%	142,629
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	118,432	85.0%	100,667
Virgin Islands	108,210	79.7%	86,243
Grenada	110,000	91.0%	101,309
Antigua and Barbuda	78,000	94.9%	63,000
Bermuda	66,536	61.2%	40,720
Saint Kitts and Nevis	39,619	98.0%	38,827
Cayman Islands	47,862	60.0%	28,717
British Virgin Islands	24,004	83.0%	19,923
Turks and Caicos islands	26,000	> 90.0%	18,000
South America	**384,580,326**	**26.6%**	**102,563,597**
Colombia	45,013,674	26.0%	11,703,555
Venezuela	26,414,815	Between 10 – 26.5%	2,641,481 – 6,999,926*
Guyana	770,794	36.0%	277,486
Suriname	475,996	47.0%	223,718
French Guiana	199,509	66.0%	131,676
Brazil	191,908,598	44.7%	85,783,143
Ecuador	13,927,650	4.9%	680,000
Peru	29,180,899	1.5%	437,317
Bolivia	9,247,816	1.1%	108,000
Chile	16,454,143	< 0.1%	0*
Paraguay	6,831,306	< 0.1%	0*
Argentina	40,677,348	< 0.1%	0*
Uruguay	3,477,778	5.9%	200,000
North America	**481,527,697**	**8.4%**	**40,897,007**
United States	298,444,215	12.9%	38,499,304
Canada	33,098,932	2.7%	783,795
Mexico	108,700,891	< 0.1%	103,000
Belize	301,270	31.0%	93,394
Guatemala	13,002,206	< 1.0%	100,000
El Salvador	7,066,403	< 0.1%	0*
Honduras	7,639,327	2.0%	152,787
Nicaragua	5,785,846	9.0%	520,726
Costa Rica	4,195,914	3.0%	125,877
Panama	3,292,693	14.0%	460,977

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Europe	738,856,462.00	1.2%	9,300,999
France	62,752,136	5% (inc. overseas territories)	3,000,000
Italy	60,020,805	0.5%	300,000
United Kingdom	60,609,153	3.3% (inc. partial)	2,015,400
Netherlands	16,491,461	3.1%	507,000
Spain	40,397,842	?%	?
Germany	82,000,000	0.6%	500,000
Russia	141,594,000	0.0%	40,000
Portugal	10,605,870	2.0%	201,200
Norway	4,858,199	1.4%	67,000
Sweden	9,263,872	0.8%	> 70,000
Belgium	10,666,866	0.4%	45,000
Republic of Ireland	4,339,000	1.1%	45,000
Switzerland	7,790,000	0.5%	> 40,000
Austria	8,356,707	?%	?
Finland	5,340,783	?%	20,000
Poland	38,082,000	0.0%	?
Hungary	10,198,325	0.0%	321
Asia	3,879,000,000	0.0%	?
Turkey	73,914,000	?%	? no sources
Israel	7,411,000	2.8%	200,000
Japan	127,756,815	0.0%	10,000 –
India	1,132,446,000	0.0%	40,000
Pakistan	172,900,000	0.0%	10,000
China	1,321,851,888	0.0%	8,000+
Oceania			
Australia	21,000,000	?%	?

Source: African diaspora, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_diaspora

Appendix 4

Top 15 African diaspora populations

	Population	Rank
🇧🇷 Brazil	85,783,143	1
🇺🇸 United States	38,499,304	2

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Colombia	9,452,872	3
Haiti	8,701,439	4
Dominican Republic	7,985,991	5
France	4,200,000	6
Jamaica	2,731,419	7
Venezuela	2,641,481 – 6,999,926	8
United Kingdom	2,080,000	9
Cuba	1,126,894	10
Italy	931,000	11
Peru	875,427	12
Canada	783,795	13
Ecuador	680,000	14
Trinidad and Tobago	610,000	15
Nicaragua	520,786	16

Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_diaspora

Appendix 5

Map of Africa

Source: http://www.jhsph.edu/humanrights/locations/africa/

Appendix 6

USA States and Capital Map

Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/usa/usa-state-and-capital-map.html

Appendix 7: The Regions of Africa

Name of region and territory	Area (km²)	Population (2009) except where noted	Density (per km²)	Capital

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Eastern Africa				
Burundi	27,830	8,988,091	322.9	Bujumbura
Comoros	2,170	752,438	346.7	Moroni
Djibouti	23,000	516,055	22.4	Djibouti
Eritrea	121,320	5,647,168	46.5	Asmara
Ethiopia	1,127,127	85,237,338	75.6	Addis Ababa
Kenya	582,650	39,002,772	66.0	Nairobi
Madagascar	587,040	20,653,556	35.1	Antananarivo
Malawi	118,480	14,268,711	120.4	Lilongwe
Mauritius	2,040	1,284,264	629.5	Port Louis
Mayotte (France)	374	223,765	489.7	Mamoudzou
Mozambique	801,590	21,669,278	27.0	Maputo
Réunion (France)	2,512	743,981(2002)	296.2	Saint-Denis
Rwanda	26,338	10,473,282	397.6	Kigali
Seychelles	455	87,476	192.2	Victoria
Somalia	637,657	9,832,017	15.4	Mogadishu
Tanzania	945,087	41,048,532	43.3	Dodoma
Uganda	236,040	32,369,558	137.1	Kampala
Zambia	752,614	11,862,740	15.7	Lusaka

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Middle Africa				
Angola	1,246,700	12,799,293	10.3	Luanda
Cameroon	475,440	18,879,301	39.7	Yaoundé
Central African Republic	622,984	4,511,488	7.2	Bangui
Chad	1,284,000	10,329,208	8.0	N'Djamena
Congo	342,000	4,012,809	11.7	Brazzaville
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2,345,410	68,692,542	29.2	Kinshasa
Equatorial Guinea	28,051	633,441	22.6	Malabo
Gabon	267,667	1,514,993	5.6	Libreville
São Tomé and Príncipe	1,001	212,679	212.4	São Tomé
Northern Africa				
Algeria	2,381,740	34,178,188	14.3	Algiers
Egypt	1,001,450	83,082,869 total, Asia 1.4m	82.9	Cairo
Libya	1,759,540	6,310,434	3.6	Tripoli
Morocco	446,550	34,859,364	78.0	Rabat
Sudan	2,505,810	41,087,825	16.4	Khartoum
Tunisia	163,610	10,486,339	64.1	Tunis
Sahrawi Arab	266,000	405,210	1.5	El Aaiún

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Democratic Republic				
Spanish and Portuguese territories in Northern Africa:				
Canary Islands (Spain)	7,492	1,694,477(2001)	226.2	Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Santa Cruz de Tenerife
Ceuta (Spain)	20	71,505(2001)	3,575.2	—
Madeira Islands (Portugal)	797	245,000(2001)	307.4	Funchal
Melilla (Spain)	12	66,411(2001)	5,534.2	—
Southern Africa				
Botswana	600,370	1,990,876	3.3	Gaborone
Lesotho	30,355	2,130,819	70.2	Maseru
Zimbabwe	390,580	11,392,629	29.1	Harare
Namibia	825,418	2,108,665	2.6	Windhoek
South Africa	1,219,912	49,052,489	40.2	Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Pretoria[101]
Swaziland	17,363	1,123,913	64.7	Mbabane
Western Africa				
Benin	112,620	8,791,832	78.0	Porto-Novo
Burkina Faso	274,200	15,746,232	57.4	Ouagadougou
Cape Verde	4,033	429,474	107.3	Praia

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Côte d'Ivoire	322,460	20,617,068	63.9	Abidjan, Yamoussoukro
Gambia	11,300	1,782,893	157.7	Banjul
Ghana	239,460	23,832,495	99.5	Accra
Guinea	245,857	10,057,975	40.9	Conakry
Guinea-Bissau	36,120	1,533,964	42.5	Bissau
Liberia	111,370	3,441,790	30.9	Monrovia
Mali	1,240,000	12,666,987	10.2	Bamako
Mauritania	1,030,700	3,129,486	3.0	Nouakchott
Niger	1,267,000	15,306,252	12.1	Niamey
Nigeria	923,768	158,259,000	161.5	Abuja
Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha (UK)	410	7,637	14.4	Jamestown
Senegal	196,190	13,711,597	69.9	Dakar
Sierra Leone	71,740	6,440,053	89.9	Freetown
Togo	56,785	6,019,877	106.0	Lomé
Africa Total	30,368,609	1,001,320,281	33.0	

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Africa

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