

**FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND ECONOMIC SECURITY IN
DJIBOUTI**

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TITLE PAGE

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In memory of P.N. Ezeh

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

AFDB:	African Development Bank
AFRICOM:	US Africa Command
AMEC:	Afro-Middle East Centre.
AU:	African Union
BBC:	British Broadcasting Corporation
BRI:	Belt and Road Initiative
CJTF-HOA:	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.
COMESA:	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DPW:	Dubai Ports World.
ECA:	Economic Commission for Africa
ECFR:	European Council on Foreign Relations
EU:	European Union
FDI:	Foreign Direct Investment.
FMB:	Foreign Military Base
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GWOT:	Global War on Terror
IGAD:	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
ILO:	International Labour Organization
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
IMO:	International Maritime Organization
IRIN:	Integrated Regional Information Networks
ISS:	Institute for Security Studies
MOOTW:	Military Operations Other Than War
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PLAN:	People's Liberation Army Navy
PRC FM:	Portable Radio Communication Frequency Module
RITIMO:	Réseaud'information et de Documentation
SCMP:	South China Morning Post
SIPRI:	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UAE:	United Arab Emirates
UNAMID:	United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA:	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEF:	World Economic Forum
WPC:	World Peace Council

ABSTRACT

The importance of military bases for the economy and security of nations cannot be overemphasized. Thus, this study evaluates the impact of foreign military bases and economic security in Djibouti. This small country in the Horn of Africa was chosen because of its geostrategic location and because it currently hosts five foreign military bases in its small land mass. The specific objectives of the study are (i): to determine whether the geostrategic locations of the five military bases in Djibouti are driven by economic/national interests of the foreign countries, and (ii) to ascertain whether the rent/premium on the five bases have any significant impact on the economic development of Djibouti. The theoretical framework used in this study is the realist theory, while the method of data collection is through secondary sources. The data collected were analyzed using qualitative descriptive method of data analysis that involves the explanation and description of the secondary sources of data. From this study, we inferred that the geostrategic position of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa that hosts these foreign military bases drives its economy from premium and rent. Consequently, major findings include the locations of five military bases (US, France, Japan, China and Italy) on the country's land mass which are driven by economic/national interests beyond counter terrorist motives. Premiums/rents paid on the military bases has not significantly increased the economic development of Djibouti. The study therefore, recommends that Djibouti should review her terms (such as lease of land and ownership, reduction in the number of military bases she hosts not minding the incentives, premium/rent, agreement on such military installations) and to effectively make use of its geostrategic location less from hosting military bases to tourism, regional economic routes for the Horn of African countries like import/export through transshipment of goods and services.

Keywords: Foreign Military bases, Economic Security, geostrategic location, Premium, rent.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.4.BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

In order to understand the significance of foreign military bases in global politics, it is necessary to understand what they mean, and this will be done through historical deployment on one hand, and the politics of national interests of various countries of the world in international politics, on the other. By definition, a military base is an installation created to serve as support for military operations and logistics (Glebov, 2009). Consequently, these facilities can play different roles as it is related to several types of bases, such as navy, land or air bases. There are many functions that these settlements can exert such as test of new weapons of war, intelligence operations, platforms for military operations, weaponry stock or even as host for military corps. In another perspective, Havarky (1989) avers that the presence of foreign troops on the soil of sovereign nations is unusual and an uncomfortable reality as can be observed back in Ancient Greece and its city-states. In the same vein, Santo and Simao (2014) observed that the first written sources related to military bases can be found in the writings of Thucydides, which was about the Peloponnesian War of the Fifth Century BC. He wrote about how the Athenian empire established the Delian League, a military alliance which built Athens' navy and therefore, its power and importance throughout territorial issues (cited in Sealey, 1974). Coming to the issue of national interests which is often used to back up the establishment of these bases, the definition of the concept is problematic. e.g. Hitler and his justification of expansionism as German national interest. The building up of a strong nuclear base at Diego Garcia was justified by the USA in the meeting the challenge posed by erstwhile USSR as well as for protecting US interests in the Indian Ocean. Similarly, during the period, 1979-1989, the defunct USSR justified its intervention in Afghanistan in the name of Soviet national interests.

From the foregoing, the issue of establishment of foreign military bases in a foreign soil becomes an issue of international politics when it is associated with national interest and its historical deployment. Still in reference to its historical usage, the results of the two great wars of 1st and 2nd World War saw the ascension of the United States of America (USA) and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) as superpowers, hence the establishment of oversea military bases assumed its present dimension. Similarly, Cadler (2007) observed that it is from the late 1930s that oversea military bases in other sovereign nations gradually become a more acceptable reality for both Americans and other states. After World War II, American policymakers claimed more than 3,000 distinct military installations all over the world (Glebov and Rodrigues 2009). A synergy to the World War II as regards to the expansion of influence and alliances in global politics is the cold war (1975-1985) which was not a war of armaments but on ideologies. According to Santo & Simao (2014), the Cold War period is characterized by the dispute between two poles, where Disarmament and International Security Committee was viewed as the use of military bases abroad to deepen the importance of alliances and to enhance the balance of power in a bipolar system. According to Lachowski (2007), the postwar conflict between the USA and the USSR showed that:

The period of East–West confrontation that started in the late 1940s was exceptional. It led to the unprecedented consolidation of two alliances and to rivalry between two superpowers (...) for global supremacy, containment, control of satellite states and access to sources of energy. (Lachowski 2007:2).

In extension, Dufour (2007), observed that in an attempt to justify their military interventions in different parts of the World, US conceptualized “the Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) of which their major elements include: the control of the world economy and its financial markets and the taking over of all natural resources (primary resources and non-renewable sources of energy (Dufour 2007. *Global research* 1 July).

Therefore, from the above historical analogy, the issue of establishment of foreign military bases on a sovereign state brought in new dimensions in the aspects of global security (fighting a Far enemy), economy (expansion of markets), and issues of national/ economic interests.

On the regional level and after the establishment of African Union (AU) in May 2001, issues of human security and counter terrorism were globally and continentally addressed referring to the conflicts in Sierra Leone and the Great Lakes region of Africa. Shortly after the creation of AU, the September 2001 World Trade Centre bombings in New York took place, forcing and making it imperative for AU to practicably adopt measures of counter terrorism to ensure adequate human security. Coordination on counter terrorism has thus been marked with direct deployment of troops from foreign powers – especially the US and France. Consequently, one of the military strategies which involves ‘reducing the tyranny of distance’, gave rise to establishment of bases for deployment of both troops and equipment, for quicker response, and shortening of distance. A good example of this is the US base in Diego Garcia that played a key role in the 2003 Iraqi invasion, with minimal flythrough/docking rights required from other countries (Turse 2003). At present, foreign military bases/compounds, port facilities and fuel bunkers are in thirty-four African countries of some of which are the US Chadelley base in Djibouti, UAE bases in Somaliland, French base in Niger, Kenya, Ethiopia and Algeria. Similarly, the ‘global war on terror’, coupled with the rise of China, has seen global powers seeking to re-enter or strengthen their presence on the continent, with negative consequences. Under the guise of fighting terrorism, they often have other interests, such as France’s bases in Niger, which are more an attempt to protect French interests around Niger’s vast uranium resources.

Among the long-term challenges facing Africa is the proliferation of military bases established by foreign powers. Its consequences are not far from threats on national and

continental sovereignty, international conflict on the continent, jeopardizing the bilateral/multilateral relations of the host African country (of the foreign military base) to her international alliance as an accomplice in hosting the base for instruments of surveillance and reconnaissance as well as fighting a far enemy. Similarly, there are implications of these military bases on the economic security of Africa such as issues on rent/lease, terms of agreement on leasehold, the strategic location of these bases (nearness to ports/ sea, nearness to the place of raw materials), the land mass occupied by the bases, the raw materials exploited and taken off the coast of Africa, trade routes created through importation and exportation, Piracy on the Gulf of Aden amongst others.

In the year 2017, China completed the construction of a base in Djibouti. France, and even Japan (whose base was constructed in 2011, and for which there are plans for extension) were maintaining bases in the small country (Reuters, 2017). Again, Eritrea's Assab Port was being used by both Iran and the UAE to operate bases from, while Turkey in 2017 was upgrading the Suakin Island in Sudan under the guise of preserving ancient Turkish relics. Significantly, the Horn of Africa is adjacent to the Bab Al-Mandab and Hormuz straits, through which over twenty per cent of world trade traverses, and it is militarily strategic as it allows control over much of the Indian Ocean (Afro-Middle East Centre (AMEC), 2017).

Djibouti gained independence from France in 1977. The French army provided its government's core finance, and guaranteed external defense in exchange for military bases and extensive training facilities (Bezabeh 2011). Djibouti's profile is enhanced by the fact that it hosts the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional body linking all of the greater Horn of Africa states. Change in Djibouti's strategic options since 1998 has been driven by four factors: the Ethiopian-Eritrean war of 1998–2000, the rapid economic transformation in Ethiopia, shifts in US strategy in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula since 9/11, and the upsurge in piracy along the Gulf of Aden and Somali coasts

(Styan 2013; Karthala 2012). Among the socio-economic activities that go on include the handling of Transshipments of containers across the Gulf of Aden and the horn of Africa. Djibouti's ports are key to its geo-strategic importance in military and economic terms. They are a conduit for Ethiopian trade and a platform for the transshipment of goods. This involves the decanting of transoceanic container and bulk cargo from larger vessels to be redistributed to East Africa and Arabian ports. The volume of trade has grown significantly as demand and port facilities have expanded. In 2009 the ports handled 11 million tons of goods, double the volume of just five years earlier (Economist Intelligence Unit, *Djibouti, Country Profile*, various issues. 2013).

At this juncture, it becomes pertinent to explain the concept of Economic security which is the dependent variable of this study. Worthy of note in the concept of economic security is that it is an excerpt of human security as it has to do with socio-economic and political activities of mankind. Economic security is not a new concept for governments for it associated with socio-economic activities of man as well as states and their economic policies (Kahler, 2005). Apart from the traditional concept of economic security to defense economics and other perspectives on the concept, there is need to explore why Economic security is essential to national security and economic development (Kolodziej, 1992). In lieu to the above, Buzan (1991a) states that economic security is related to the access to resources, finance and markets which are needed to support acceptable wealth and power levels in the state. Furthermore, Tsereteli (2008), with a similar approach, points out that the concept of economic security refers to long-term security of the access to economic opportunities in markets and resources such as people (human capital), capital, energy, water, technology and education. This concept is critical for individuals and nations. Consequently, economic security is composed of basic social security, defined by access to basic needs infrastructure

pertaining to health, education, dwelling, information, and social protection, as well as work-related security.

Inferring from the above, economic security is essential aspect of a national security. In Djibouti, the setting of five military bases in a small country of that nature though creates employment indirectly and also generates revenue to the country through rent on lease but what of the impact on the economic security of such nation like testing of new weapons, flying of drones, nearness of such bases to the nation's port and such bases serving other logistics like supplies, imports, exports and gaining control over the transshipments of goods and services along Gulf Aden and Suez Canal Trade route. With the above mentioned and other issues relating to the establishment of such military bases, there is need to examine its impact on the economic development of Djibouti. According to US economic development Association (2016), economic development is the expansion of capacities that contribute to the advancement of society through the realization of individual, firm and community potential. The relationship of Military bases and economic security can be observed in their various strategic locations and the driving motives that prompted their establishment. On the other hand, the economic security of Djibouti is affected positively through the premiums and rents paid to the Djibouti government and negatively through threats from such bases to the socio-economic environment e.g., testing of weapons, flying of drones, scuffles that may arise among the foreign countries owning such bases amongst others.

Geographically, the Republic of Djibouti is surrounded by larger states, either of concern to US policy (Somalia, Sudan, Yemen) or US allies (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya), which have played – and will continue to play – critical roles in US-led antiterrorist strategies in the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf region. The Lemonier base has become a strategic US military facility which now serves as a substitute for an African-based headquarters for the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) created in 2008 (Schmitt, 2014). As Styan (2013) rightly

pointed out that in a largely unplanned and incremental manner, Djibouti has become a laboratory for new forms of military and naval cooperation among and beyond NATO and EU forces. Sequel to this international deployment, Djibouti, a small, impoverished country, can now count on assured long-term revenues that will guarantee some modicum of stability. Located in the horn of Africa with a land mass of approximately 23,000 square kilometers, Djibouti is ranked amongst the least developed economies in the world. With a population under 900,000, the country's most important asset is its geostrategic location. Blessed with a deep natural harbor, its strategic location gives it access to the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Arabia, significant economic routes through which 20 per cent of global exports and 10 per cent of total oil export transits annually.

China has important economic interests in Africa and the Middle East. A significant percentage of China's trade with the European Union, valued at over US\$ one billion a day, passes through the Gulf of Aden and 40 per cent of China's total oil import passes through the Indian Ocean. Additionally, Beijing's Maritime Silk Road initiative aimed at enhancing regional connectivity between China, the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean Sea, requires security infrastructure to shield it at critical points on the trade routes (CSS Commentary 2016). A corollary to the China/Djibouti relationship on trade could be culled from Mr. Mhamoud Ali the PRC foreign ministry spokesman, who said that: "China and Djibouti are friendly countries. We are consulting with each other on the building of logistical facilities in Djibouti, which will better guarantee Chinese troops to carry out international peacekeeping operations, escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali waters, humanitarian relief, and other tasks"(Transcript of PRC FM Spokesman, News conference. November 26, 2015.www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1318725.shtml). From the foregoing, one can infer that the establishment of military bases have economic motivations which are driven by national interests and are beyond counter-terrorist motives

which are often portrayed by the media as the reason for the establishment of foreign military bases in Africa and Djibouti in Particular.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

A lot has been done on the establishment of military bases around the globe. This is because in contemporary times of interplay of political, economic and military power by super powers in pursuit of their national interests, which is always summed up in the “tyranny of distance” of far enemy, global war on terrorism and national/human security, draws attention to this global phenomenon. For the developed countries of the world, it is a way of ensuring military alliance, quick response to counterterrorism, ensuring effective peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance in the periods of conflict, war and natural disaster. Another inclusive reason under which a foreign military base is established is military intelligence sharing and cooperation. In Africa, this has become a socio-economic and political phenomenon which needs urgent attention and evaluation beyond the auspices of counter terrorism, human security, peacekeeping/humanitarian assistance to its implication on the continent’s sovereignty and economic security. Beyond the counter terrorism issue, there are implications of these establishments on the economy of the host African state.

However, media presentation of the establishment of these bases in Africa do not thoroughly assess its significant consequences either in long-term or in short-term to the Host African country. Accordingly, Moore and Walker (2016) stated that the US military base is located adjacent to Djibouti City’s main commercial runway in full cognizance of the civilian planes taking off and landing. This Base houses above 4 000 American soldiers including a fleet of Predator drones for fighting conflict in Somalia and Yemen as well as keeping the Red Sea pirates at bay. Alison (2018) also observed the location of these bases when he enumerated thus; “Next to the Americans are the French, who operate an additional naval

base a few miles away, on the Heron peninsula. Across the runway are the Japanese, whose Self Defence Force is there to self-defend the Japanese ships that make up 16% of the world's cargo fleet. And a few hundred metres from there, Italy runs a military facility that can accommodate 300 soldiers, although the usual complement is only about 80" (*Mail & Guardian, Djibouti: greatest threat may come from within retrieved 22/3/2018*). In the same vein Fei, (2017) observed that China as the latest superpower to build a base in Djibouti. China is building a series of military and commercial facilities designed to guarantee its maritime security interests. Alison (2018), called it 'a strange pearl across the Indian Ocean', to complement its plans to create a 21st-century maritime Silk Road. According to Fei (2017), "the basic purpose of this military facility is for logistics supporting Chinese humanitarian and anti-piracy operations in this region including anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and the evacuation of Chinese and foreign nationals from Yemen, among others."

A pictorial view on the summary of these bases in Djibouti and their economic lease/rent can be found in the diagram below:




Fig. 1.2a(Source: *Mail & Guardian: Djibouti's threat may come from within; SimonAllison 2018*)

Consequently, Djibouti's strategic location at the horn of Africa has made it a hub of many military bases of the superpowers. The economic impact of these bases comes to bear on the location of such facilities, the economic rent paid and its effect on the socio-economic growth and development of a country of 900,000 inhabitants, and the effects of this phenomena on Djibouti establishing/owning and taking sole control of indigenous ports at the shores for transship containers to dock without succumbing to the rent economy of hosting foreign military bases.

This study primarily involves identifying the problems associated with the establishment of foreign military bases in Djibouti and how it relates to the country's economic security. It is against this backdrop that the following research questions were formulated:

- Are the geostrategic locations of military bases in Djibouti driven by economic /national interests of foreign countries?
- Does the rent on the bases have any significant increase in the economic growth and development of Djibouti?

1.5.Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study have been categorized into broad and specific. The broad objective is to investigate how foreign military bases affect the economic security of African countries with special reference to Djibouti. Specifically, objectives are to:

- Determine whether the geostrategic locations of military bases in Djibouti are driven by economic/national interest of foreign countries.
- Ascertain whether the rent on the bases have any significant increase in the economic growth and development of Djibouti.

1.6. Significance of the Study

Foreign military bases and economic security are among the contending issues of discourse in Africa especially in issues that concerns political sovereignty of the host nation, the geostrategic location of these bases around the ports of Djibouti and also across the Gulf of Aden creating trade routes for transshipment of Goods and other maritime socio-economic activities. Consequently, these activities of these bases are beyond the mere counter terrorism activities of fighting a far enemy.

The relevance of this study is both practical and theoretical. Theoretically, the study intends to add to the existing literature on economic expansion through the use of military power under the guise of establishing military bases and also emphasize that these bases are beyond the Global War on Terror (counter terrorism) as they are located at geostrategic locations of African continent especially at the sea ports and maritime corridors.

Practically, the study will be relevant to regional, sub-regional and national governments of African Union (AU) countries in Horn of Africa and Djibouti in understanding the implications of these bases on the economy of the continent. On the aspect of the individuals, it will help to emphasize that there is need to understand the interplay of politics in the location of military bases in Africa as such is always driven by motivation of economic and national interest.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Many authors have written and researched on the issues surrounding the establishment of military bases on a foreign soil and Africa inclusive. However, the issue of military bases on a sovereign nation came to limelight after World War II and the Cold War (Dufour 2007; PettyJohn 2013). This literature intends to reflect the views of scholars on this topic, how it affects Africa and Djibouti in particular in relation to the economic security in Africa using Djibouti as a case study. Glebov (2009) defined a military base as an installation created to serve as support for military operations and logistics. For him, these facilities play different roles, as they are related to navy, land or air bases. Other functions associated with this settlement includes; test-ranges for new weaponry, posts of intelligence operations, platforms for military operations, weaponry stock or even as host for military corps. However, he was concerned about its establishment in foreign states' territory as a common phenomenon associated with global distribution of power in spheres of influence. It was in this context that (Jackson 2003) observed that such practice questions the sovereign nature of an independent state (the host nation) as observed by the Westphalia treaty of 1648. Normally, one nation allows another states' foreign presence in its territory if they are allies or if they share the same perception of a common threat (PettyJohn 2013). However, the long-term presence of a country in a host state can result in political, environmental and social problems. The establishment of overseas bases can bring political instability to the region in question like the recent diplomatic uproar between Somalia and the UAE base situated in their country (Aljazeera 29th April, 2018).

Down to Africa and Djibouti in particular, foreign military bases have taken another dimension this is because, for Americans it is the aftermath of the 9/11 attack that prompted such establishment in 2003. For the French, it is also a way of maintaining military presence

in one of her colonies after Djibouti's 1977 independence and while for the Chinese it is for market penetration and economic expansion in African continent. The Global War on Terror after the 9/11 attack on US soil made the country to adopt 'the tyranny of distance' in fighting terrorism in their national interest. This made them to seek for a neutral ground and alliance for such motives. The America's camp lemonier serves as a watch dog to act of terrorisms in Somalia, Yemen and other countries which are threat to them. Although different from US is the French Military base which ensures the presence of France in Djibouti as one of her Former colonies before 1977. The Chinese base which Later came in the year 2017 shows the influence of China in Africa through the use of Economic motives like trade and aid to permeate the continent.

Consequently, for easy comprehension, this study reviewed the relevant literatures associated with the establishment of foreign military bases in Djibouti thematically as follows:

2. Geostrategic locations of military bases and economic/national interests of USA, France and China.
3. Premium/rent on the military bases and socio-economic development in Djibouti.

3.1. Geostrategic Locations of Military Bases in Djibouti and Economic/National Interests of USA, France and China

Although there are five military bases currently situated in Djibouti of Which Italy and Japan are among. However, amongst these military bases the ones that their economic/national interests are imminent are USA, France and China owing to its capacity and the military personnel involved. In Djibouti, America's Camp Lemonnier is the hub for their Global War on Terror campaign in the Horn of Africa. Such campaigns like counter-terrorism missions in Yemen, Somalia and other troubled neighboring countries have been launched from Djibouti including American drone strikes against militants in Yemen. (West, 2005, United States' Institute for Peace Report 2017). Similarly, US military deployment in

Djibouti in the past two decades has been driven mostly by geopolitical considerations such as: ensuring logistical support for wars in the Gulf; securing the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a strategic maritime corridor and one of the most trafficked waterways in the world; maintaining stability in the Horn of Africa; humanitarian intervention, and anti-piracy measures; guaranteeing the flow of oil and the protection of energy investments; facilitating cooperation with some African allies; and conducting public diplomacy (The State of the Horn: Clark University, 2016). These and some other unmentioned vested interests are the internal dynamics that have prompted the United States to build a military base in Djibouti. Obviously, the Djiboutian government's decision to welcome US military deployment derives from different considerations: Djibouti's own geopolitical concerns; its geo-economic calculations; and, its fears of radical Islamism, which runs counter to the country's adherence to the traditional Islam practiced by 95 per cent of the population.

In order to meet up these interests, in 2002, US established the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at a former French Foreign Legion post in Djibouti. In 2008 CJTF-HOA was integrated into the newly created US Africa Command (AFRICOM) (Styan, 2013; Jamieson, 2009). The stated mission of US permanent military base in Djibouti is to collect intelligence, strengthened the region's internal security capabilities and civic programmes, and to disrupt and defeat international terrorist groups posing threat to the United States, its allies and their interests in the region (Nicoll, 2007; Styan, 2013). However, beyond these altruistic reasons lies the national/economic interest.

First, the US military deployment in Djibouti, falls under US national interest in the region which is Multifarious-Geopolitical, geo-economic and security. One of US strategic interest is ensuring US energy security by protecting access to oil and gas reserves. Thus, due to its proximity to the source of Middle Eastern oil in the Gulf and even African oil endowed regions, the Horn found cost-effective for US in protecting oil source by military facilities

and bases in the region (Styan, 2013; Jamieson, 2009). Second Nicoll (2007) summarized the American interests in that region thus; US military base in the Horn is part of the strategy of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The spread of Islamic extremism in the region is a threat to US and its regional allies because terrorist groups may control oil areas and thus maritime security and oil fields might be at risk. In this regard, the region is vulnerable for terrorism since the region is close to Middle East and Arab. Moreover, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen are either the home for Al-Shabaab–Al-Qaeda affiliated group or supporter of terrorist groups. Thus, US military presence in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti, is to neutralize terrorist groups from Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. Third, US another interest in the region is to protect its Middle East important ally, Israel. Seven of the nine states that line the Red Sea identify themselves with the Arab-Islamic world (Kimani, 1993). Thus, preventing the Red Sea from becoming an Arab lake is another issue. One of age-old Arabs dream is creating a strong Arab and Islam based unity. This has long-term effect on the very existence of the State of Israel and even Ethiopia - both of which are non-Arab and Islam countries of the region. Thus, using tactics of countering the establishment of a strong and rich Arab union is in the interest of US. Hence, Djibouti is a platform for attainment of these pursuits.

Djibouti's acceptance of establishment of foreign military bases are not far from among other reasons that she is surrounded by violent extremists like Somalia and Yemen. On another note, regarding Djibouti's geo-economic goals, as a small state (in terms of population) in sub-Saharan Africa, Djibouti has limited economic power, so striving for economic aid has been the government's principal reason for permitting the deployment of US (and other foreign) troops for peace keeping and humanitarian intervention. Similarly, its geostrategic could also serve as a rent economy in terms of lease. On the other hand, France has variegated security commitments on the African continent which made her mount major

operations in Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of the Congo from its base there in Djibouti.

The other Western country which has military presence and uncompromised interest in the Horn is France. France's interest in the Horn can be traced back to 1939 and even after the independent of Djibouti in 1977 (Liebl, 2008 &Styan, 2013). France has economic and security interest in the region. Liebl (2008, p.3) describe the significance of French military base as follows: ... French presence not only ensures that France has a secure military platform to maintain its position in East Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean, but more importantly enables France to monitor the safety and security of maritime traffic (both military and commercial) through the Babel Mandeb into the Red Sea. Historically, France has deployed military bases over four continents—from the Caribbean Sea to South America, from Indochina to Oceania, and from the Pacific to the African continent. These bases enable the troops perform various functions such as peacekeeping missions within the UN framework, example in Lebanon; the second are for peacekeeping and military operations within the framework of NATO or the EU, such those in Afghanistan; and, the third, are stationed in foreign military bases, such as in Djibouti and Gabon. The first and second are under the frame work of international institutions, while France exercises full leadership over the third one (Sun, 2011).

French businesses have longstanding operations in Africa. The continent accounts for 5 percent of France's exports. Though France has diversified its sources of raw materials, Africa remains an important supplier of oil and metals. French officials also stress the importance of encouraging regional stability and development, support of democratic governments, and the protection of the 240,000 French nationals living in Africa. "The African continent is our neighbor, and when it's shaken by conflict, we're shaken as well," said André Dulait, a French parliamentarian during a debate on Africa. But not everyone is

convinced African affairs should be of primary importance to French foreign policy. François Roche, editor of the French version of *Foreign Policy*, argues that resources spent on Africa would be better placed in Asia and South America, where France's future economic and geopolitical interests are likely to be (*New York Times*, Retrieved 3rd July 2018). Therefore, France's Military base in Djibouti serves as a platform to import and export of goods and services as well as other French interest in Africa and in the Horn particular.

With regards to China, the much-debated notion of 'String of Pearls' that was coined by Booz-Allen (2005) in their report on 'Energy Future of Asia' is related to the Sino-African relation with Asia (China in particular). It adheres to the projection of Chinese military power from the South China Sea to Indian Ocean to Africa and the Middle East. Chinese facility in Djibouti is intended to help in counter-terrorism, anti-piracy, intelligence collection, peacekeeping missions and non-combat evacuation operations (Downs, Becker & de Gategno 2017). China's military base in Djibouti represents both a culmination of years of expanding economic and maritime security interests, and a prelude to deeper levels of strategic engagement in Africa and the Indian Ocean region as part of Beijing's Maritime Silk Road. To better understand the purpose and uses of the Djibouti base, it is helpful to examine three features of China's broader foreign policy: migration of Chinese citizens to Africa and Beijing's growing diplomatic engagement on the continent; a growing emphasis on maritime military power and safeguarding citizens abroad, and; the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China's base in Djibouti helps to support Chinese diplomatic efforts in Africa and provides an outpost to assist growing numbers of Chinese citizens in Africa. Over the years, China's economic growth imperative has evolved alongside its global diplomatic ambitions and security needs (Fei, 2017). Increased Chinese economic engagement in Africa has been accompanied by enhanced diplomatic efforts—consisting of foreign aid—and over 2,000 Chinese soldiers serving as United Nations peacekeepers in Africa (ECFR, June 2016,

McKinsey June, 2017). China intends the base to serve as a support and logistics facility for peacekeepers, and also as a naval facility to support anti-piracy operations.

The Djibouti base reflects a growing emphasis on maritime military interests and national interests abroad as put by former Chinese president Hu Jintao's term declaring the protection of Chinese overseas interests to be a foreign policy priority" (ECFR, June 2016). In the same vein, current President Xi Jinping who assumed power at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, has focused on strengthening China's role as a maritime power (Xinhua, July 31, 2013). Again, China's 2015 Defense White Paper noted that China must protect its maritime rights and interests (*China Brief*, June 19, 2015). The Djibouti base is an important station along the Belt and Road Initiative's "belt," which is also referred to as the Maritime Silk Road. China's BRI is undertaken to foster greater regional cooperation and economic development across the Eurasian landmass and connect China and Southeast Asia with the northern Indian Ocean littoral, Africa, and the Mediterranean.

In Africa and Djibouti China has invested exceedingly example is the railway linking Ethiopia with Djibouti, and has plans to construct a natural gas pipeline between the two countries as well (*China Brief*, November 10; SCMP, November 21 2016). The Chinese government has trumpeted BRI as a peaceful endeavor that will spread economic prosperity, but analysts outside of China view it as a way for Beijing to create new influence spheres of at best, and as a gradual way to increase its military influence at worst (Brewster, 2016). Therefore, in reference to China's increasing equities in Africa, a rising emphasis on maritime power, and BRI, the Djibouti base will provide re-supply and other support to facilitate the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN's) anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, and the PLA's peacekeeping operations in Africa (Xinhua, July 11, 2015; Ministry of Defense of China, July 11, 2015). The facility should also provide a hub for the PLAN's naval diplomacy in the region, could assist in future counterterrorism operations, and help

with intelligence gathering (ECFR, June 2016). Additionally, it will help expedite evacuations of Chinese nationals in the region. On balance, its primary purpose in the near term will be to support China's economic interests along the Maritime Silk Road, and assist in military operations other than war (MOOTW) (Ji, 2016). With regards to Chinese overseas military base in Africa, Guangdong (2017 cited in Xinhua.net), observed that the establishment of Chinese overseas military base in Djibouti on 11th July 2017 is a strategic step by the Chinese government to increase its foot print in Africa. The base is seen as a move pushing China's own limits to its foreign policy, and underscores its growing security profile in Africa. The ministry of defence of Peoples' Republic of China in 2017 referred to it as a "logistics support base". This new facility in Djibouti is designed to carry out cooperation and provide assistance to Djibouti in the areas of international peacekeeping, personnel training, medical service, equipment maintenance, and emergency rescue and disaster relief. In relation to economic security, *The Global Times* (2017), has highlighted other benefits derived from the base, such as rent money and jobs for Djiboutian, protection for China's plans under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), provision of food supplies to ships, and an insurance against disruption by the local population. This new military foray in Africa, as explained by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at a press conference in 2016, was part of China's willingness to "play a constructive role in the political settlement of international and regional issues, so as to create a more secure and stable environment for China's development overseas", and to "take on more international security responsibilities." but that does not emphasize in particular the economic implications of this military base in Djibouti. China is rapidly expanding its military base in Djibouti, a small African country on the Red Sea, according to a recent analysis by a retired Indian Army officer published in *The Print*, an Indian news outlet. According to the (*Print report Sept,2015*), satellite images reveal that the Chinese military base, which is located just miles from the United States' Camp

Lemmonier military base, has been visited by several LPD (landing platform docks) naval ships, which are capable of “embarking, transporting, and landing expeditionary forces along with requisite equipment.” These ships have “blue-water capability,” which means the ability to operate far from a home port and in open water. This is the latest evidence that China is camping up its military presence in Djibouti, a country located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, the southern gateway to the Suez Canal.

Nevertheless, when we take a closer look at China’s official defence strategy, it views the logistics base in Djibouti is part of Chinese strategic imperative move in Africa. In the year 2015, the Chinese government published a white paper on national defence that introduced a two-tiered maritime strategy of “offshore waters defence and open seas protection”—marking the first time that Chinese interests in the “far seas” were elevated to the level of national security—and clearly stated Chinese ambitions of building a blue-water navy (Campbell 2015 & Cheng in Straitimes May 27, 2015). Taking both Chinese investments in resource-less Djibouti and the 10th Chinese defence white paper into account, it becomes clear that commercial projects through the BRI in East Africa paved the way for realizing PLAN aspirations in the far seas (Wang in CFR 2018). The BRI extended the maritime Silk Road through the Indian Ocean onto the African continent, thereby justifying the presence of a Chinese security enterprise to protect economic interests and maintain open commercial channels. At the same time, a more secure environment, especially with the military base in Djibouti, will conceivably attract more commercial entities to both land and sea (CFR April 13, 2018). Djibouti has been an experiment. And now, the mixing of commercial and military interests that made Djibouti a possibility has become a model that China will replicate again, and soon. However, another critical dimension for the understanding of Chinese economic foot prints in Africa are issues on Trade and Aid and the oil factor. One can gauge Sino-African relations

(i.e. the historical, political, economic, military, social and cultural connections between China and the African continent) by observing the upward trend in aid and trade since the 1990s. From just US\$1 billion in 1992, the value of trade between China and Africa was recorded at a huge US\$220 billion in 2014, and by 2020, it is expected to grow further to US\$400 billion (Pant, 2017, p.47). The first major Chinese oil investment in Africa was made in Sudan, in 1996. China expanded to Angola in 2004: it gave the country a grant of US\$2 billion in aid to build schools and roads, invested in Angolan telecommunication training, and laid a fibre-optic network. In turn, China obtained a major stake in Angola's future oil production (Al Jazeera, 23 October, 2016). In present, Chinese oil companies have stakes in Ghana, Egypt, Niger, Gabon, Ethiopia, Namibia, Republic of Congo, and more recently, Chad and Kenya. The Sino-African equation reveals that Africa is resource-rich and pocket-poor, whereas China lacks natural and mineral resources but has tremendous wealth—*the yin and yang of a 'win-win' partnership*. Certainly, aid and business from China have translated to economic support not only for African nations, but for China itself (Pant, 2017).

In the security dimension of it, instability in some parts of Africa had prompted China to carry out several evacuations of its citizens amidst civil conflicts. In 2008, for instance, over 200 Chinese nationals were evacuated from Chad after heavy fighting broke out between rebel forces and the government (Xinhua.net 2008). The most prominent of these operations was carried out in Libya, an energy partner of China's, following the outbreak of anti-Gaddafi protests in February 2011. On 25th February that year, China deployed a frigate to evacuate its citizens from the region; the deployment of Xuzhou, a modern navy "warship, marked the first time China pressed into service its military to protect citizens abroad, (Collins, Gabe and Erickson 2011).

In Africa, the vast majority of China's peacekeeping troops fall within the category of enabling units. China's contribution to United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and

also a similar pattern in Liberia where China's 530 peacekeeping troops consist of engineering, transportation, and medical staff. Of the approximately 200 Chinese peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 175 were engineers and 40 medical personnel who provided applauded medical support in Central Africa. While these various enabling units are tasked mainly with supporting the mission and its peacekeepers' needs, records show that in the process, many facilities, items of infrastructure, and services that benefit local populations are also being constructed and rehabilitated (Levy 2009 & Harland 2004). In this aspect of peacekeeping, the soft security portion of nation building and reconstruction, the greatest opportunity lies for using soft power to promote China's wider national interests. Significantly, China's largest peacekeeping contributions in Africa are also where it has made large investments in natural resources, and where good government-to-government relations will ultimately resound to its economic interest.

From the foregoing, military bases in Djibouti are established to cash in on the geostrategic location of the Country which will grant access to the foreign military bases to project, protect and promote their national/economic interests in the region such as transshipment of goods and services which are beyond the counter terrorism motive.

3.2. Premium on the Foreign Military Bases and Socio-economic development in Djibouti.

In this theme, this study reviews the relevant literatures on the concepts of premium and rent as regards to the establishment of foreign military bases in Djibouti. While premium has to do with remunerations for the risks (money paid for risks) associated with the establishment of military base like environmental shocks e.g. noise from drones, tests of military armaments etc. the rent aspect of it has to do with money paid on land or the lease of lands used in construction of these bases. Worthy to note at this juncture is that, premiums and rents are paid directly to the Djiboutian government but are always in terms of agreement

and bilateral relations with any of the countries that own such bases (Oladipo, 2015). For this Study, Premiums and rents were used interchangeably to indicate money paid for the establishment of Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti.

Although premium in the economic aspect of it has to do with the money paid by the insured to the insurer for covering or bearing the risks involved in insurance. However, in this context premium has to do or refers to the rent of lease paid by the foreign countries for the establishment of their military base in Djibouti which is the host country that bears the risk. These premiums are paid annually to the government of Djibouti and in tandem with the bilateral agreement covering the establishment of such base (Allison, 2017). No doubt the economy of Djibouti is heavily reliant on and benefits from its geostrategic location in East Africa, at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden on the Indian Ocean coast. This location presents opportunities and challenges for economic growth and development. The vast coastline must be secured and the maritime route protected. The regional center for maritime training of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), with membership and participation of a number of African and other countries, is headquartered in Djibouti, as is the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with a membership of eight countries of East Africa. Its ports are indispensable to its existence and a key feature of its trading activities (UNECA, 2016). According to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the country receives \$63 million and \$100 million from the United States and China, respectively, for the military bases (Oladipo, 2015). The table below displays the rent/premium of some of the established foreign military bases in Djibouti.

Table 2.2a

Foreign military bases	Rent on lease/premium
Us camp lemonier	\$63m
China	\$20m
France	\$36m
Italy	\$2.6m

Adapted from (Allison ,2017 & Oladipo 2015) and compiled by the author 2018

On another note from a socio-economic point of view, the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which was only temporarily ended by the Algiers Agreements in December 2000, has led to a situation of “*neither peace nor war*” between the two countries. Sequel to this development and in view that such conflict may re-occur in future, Ethiopia turned to Djibouti for its imports and exports. Currently, 85% of Ethiopian trade goes through the port of Djibouti (e.g. the Dolareh Port). Since the summit of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), hosted in 2006, Djibouti displayed its desire to become the entry point of trade for member states of COMESA (Ferras, 2015). Estimates show 70% of the population as living in poverty and 50% of the youth as unemployed. The economy is dominated by the public and service sectors. Transit business and associated logistic services as well as banking and telecommunications are the key pillars of the economy, while economic sectors such as fisheries, tourism, and mineral resources have yet to be optimally exploited. The industrial sector is backward and constrained by availability of raw materials and production costs. The primary sector remains marginal in contribution to the GDP due to the dry climate, lack of water resources, little arable land and weak fishery and irrigation (Africa Economic outlook 2012). Consequently, the country is viewed as economically dependent, politically fragile and victim of influence from its former colonizer France. The country is poor and aid dependent yet experiencing high economic growth.

Sequel to this, Djibouti generates income induced from its geo-strategic location and resultant infrastructure expansions. The country has derived benefits from its position as a gateway to the Red Sea between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea and as a trade route for landlocked Ethiopia. Around 86% of government revenue comes primarily from its International Port serving Ethiopian trade. Likewise, Djibouti possesses military strategic significance due to its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula. Djibouti earns US\$30-36 million per annum from the US and French military bases (Brass, 2012).

2.2.2 Social Developments in Djibouti

In reference to the African social development index that was developed by ECA in quest for an African-specific indicator of exclusion, the Index is built on the premise that economic growth should result in the improvement of human conditions of all. Adopting a life-cycle approach, the index focuses on six key dimensions of well-being: survival, health, education, employment, means of subsistence and decent life.

Djibouti has one of the highest per capita GDP in Africa. Its per capita GDP for 2015 stands at \$2,006, higher than both Kenya (\$1,423) and neighbouring Ethiopia (\$635) (African Development Bank, African Union and ECA, 2016). However, poverty levels, especially in rural areas, point to high disparities. The headcount poverty ratio was estimated to be 22.5 per cent in 2013, compared with 18.5 per cent in 2012 and 20.6 per cent in 2002 (World Bank, 2014). According to UNDP, extreme poverty affects 42 per cent of the population (UNDP, 2015). In addition, the Gini Index reveals a relatively high degree of income inequality. The Gini index was 40.0 in 2002 and increased to 44.1 in 2013. Although there has been concerted capital investment in the ports and transportation sector, it is important to diversify the economy away from the ports. More than 6,000 jobs were created in 2015 (Djibouti, 2016). Unemployment however, remains a challenge, with 62 per cent of the working age population being classified as “inactive”. According to IMF, many of the jobs created have been taken by expatriates because of a low domestic skills base (IMF, 2015a). This challenge, however, is not unique to Djibouti. As the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Agenda Council on employment has noted, skills are not necessarily in line with market demands across Africa (WEF, 2014).

The economy of Djibouti makes an interesting case study. It contrasts sharply with most other African economies in that agriculture comprises a very low share of its GDP, it is a middle-income country and highly urbanized, and yet its size, market share and low human

development hamper the pace of structural transformation. The country needs to institute policies and implement strategies focusing on the development of its human capital. The African Development Bank has called for the emphasis in the development strategies of African countries to be placed on tertiary education. It recognizes that “higher technical and vocational skills enhance the competitiveness of economies and contribute to social inclusion, decent employment and poverty reduction. They can open doors to economically and socially rewarding jobs and support the development of informal businesses” (African Development Bank, 2011).

Countries in the region with income per capita lower than that of Djibouti, such as Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, continue to fare better than Djibouti on the human development index score, owing to better educational outcomes. In order to sustain growth rates and compete regionally and globally, Djibouti needs to respond to the skills needs in its transport and services sector. A targeted approach would be beneficial for those sectors. *Soniet al* recognize that good quality education complemented by relevant vocational training and the development of skills prepare generations for productive lives (Soni et al, 2014).

Djibouti continues to experience low capacity development, which has limited its economic growth. Development in economic sectors that demand human capital, for example manufacturing, has been slow, and this has led to a low rate of industry-driven economic transformation. If it is to achieve sustained structural transformation, Djibouti needs to keep monitoring its strategies for skill development. As *Soniet al* note, “as countries in Africa readjust their growth models to consolidate their positions in a globalized economy, availability of a highly skilled and technically qualified human resource base will be a crucial determinant of success” (*Soniet al*, 2014).

Despite the expansion of port infrastructure, there is still a lack of specialized skills in Djibouti, and only 2.5 per cent of the labour force have received tertiary education. With a view to filling the gap, the University of Djibouti introduced degree programmes in engineering, personnel and related courses (UNECA 2016: *Country profile of Djibouti*). It will also be necessary to develop programmes that focus on those skills for which there is a high demand, for example skills in the areas of logistics and insurance. More technical, vocational education and training programmes would also help bridge the human capital gap. One such initiative is the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Centre in the free zone, which is managed by the Ports Authority. The country has also decided to integrate English into the school curriculum to help bridge the language barrier, particularly in view of the surge of foreign visitors, including the occupants of military bases of the United States and China. Despite the fact that, unlike its neighbours, Djibouti is not endowed with natural resources, it has great potential as a logistics hub and entry way into East Africa. As international transit points, Djibouti ports, especially Doraleh, play an important role on the East Africa route.

2.3. Gap in the Literature

From the foregoing, an expose of literatures on the establishment of foreign military bases in another sovereign state like Havarky (2007), Glebov and Rodrigues (2009), Santo and Simao (2014), Havarky (1989), Woodward (2006), Styan (2013), Al-Yadoomi (1991), Cadler (2007), Peterson (2009), Shin (2008), Lachowski (2007), Morgenthau (1948), Kimani (1993), Hansen (2007), Liebl (2008), Nicoll (2007), Downs, Becker & deGategno (2017), Dufour (2007) amongst others are not short of explaining or establishing a positive or an inverse relationship between foreign military bases and economic interests. Though emphasis were made on Global Security, Global War on Terror (GWOT), fighting a far enemy, counter

terrorism and counter insurgency operations as reasons for the establishment of foreign military base in Africa. However, these extant literatures were not exhaustive on whether the geostrategic locations of the five foreign military bases in Djibouti were driven by economic/national interests. Again, views of different scholars of these literatures were focused on Djibouti hosting international powers and not on what endears such establishment in a small country of less than a million people.

Secondly, the relevant literatures reviewed as regards to premium/rents on these military bases and socio-economic development in Djibouti such as; Yokob (2004), Alem (2007), Brass (2008), Chuka (2011), Bizualem (2015), Yewondwossen (2014), Abera (2013), Igbinoba (2016), Beng (2016), Turse (2016), Oladipo (2015), Allison (2017), Schmitt (2014), Downs *et al* (2017), Soniet *al* (2014), Wholsetter (1951), Whitlock, Craig & Miller (2013) have contributed in the economic benefits such as rents/premium resulting from the establishment of military bases in a foreign soil. Apparently, it is obvious that attempts have been made to establish the relationship inherent in establishing a foreign military base in another sovereign state and the economic implications to the host nation. However little has been done on whether such rents or premiums have had significant increase in the socio-economic development of Djibouti which hosts five military bases presently.

Inferring from the reviewed scholars, beyond global war on terror and counter terrorism are the elements of economic interests as can be observed in China's economic footprints in Africa that comes in the form of 'aid and trade'. China also has sought commercial ties with Djibouti, chiefly through financing infrastructure projects in the country, including the Doraleh Multipurpose Port, and establishing a free-trade zone. According to Gen. Thomas Waldhauser (2017) the top U.S. military commander overseeing troops in Africa, he compared this with Sri Lanka when the government of Sri Lanka announced that it was unable to repay its loans from China and would instead convert the \$1.4 billion debt into equity: a 99-

year lease that handed over ownership to China. Though still ongoing, Djibouti prematurely ended a contract with Dubai's port operator DP World, to run the Doraleh Container Terminal. This bilateral rift may lead to handing over control of the terminal to China—to which the African nation owes a significant debt (Wu, 2018). More still, the location of these bases near to raw materials and coasts implies economic expedition. Still in the same vein, the situation of these bases at the geostrategic locations of the horn of African countries like Djibouti gives such military base access to marine time corridors and watch dog over the transshipment of containers and goods through the Gulf of Aden, Suez Canal and then the Arabian Peninsula of the Mediterranean Sea which are all beyond the anti-piracy venture. More than 80 percent of the country's foreign debt is owed to China according to a March report by the U.S. think tank Center for Global Development. Meanwhile, the country's crippling public debt is valued at about 88 percent of the country's overall \$1.72 billion GDP. Waldhauser observed that if the Chinese were to seize control of the port and place restrictions on its use, it could affect resupplying of the U.S. base in Djibouti and the ability of Navy ships to refuel there (Reuters March 6, 2018). This amongst others are the issues arising from the establishment of Military bases in Djibouti. Consequently, Military bases in Africa is often viewed as security response to counterterrorism while beyond it underlies economic interests, and implications on Socio-economic growth and development of the host nation and Africa at large. Worthy of note in Djibouti is that its geostrategic position has been converted to a rent economy which affects the indigenous tendency of owning ports at these locations as the rents determine their pace of economic development.

It is against this backdrop that evidence from the reviewed scholars linking foreign military bases and economic security in Djibouti has become inadequate and necessitates urgent attention. This inadequacy has constituted the gap this study has attempted to fill. Therefore, it becomes important to delve into this course as presented above.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

This chapter deals with methodological issues such as theory, method of data collection, Data analysis, hypotheses, research design and a tabular description of the Logical Data Framework (LDF) at a glance. In this chapter, it shows the applications of basic methodological issues that are required in this study as a research process and also ease the understanding of this study through a glance at the Logical Data Framework.

3.1. Theoretical Framework

In explaining what a theory is, Ifesinachi (2010), sees a theory as a set of logically interrelated assumptions that is used to describe, interpret, explain and predict social reality. He went further to conclude that theories are therefore scientific explanations that relate ideas we have with the observations we make.

Consequently, this study adopts *the realist theory* of international relations. Realism as a theoretical framework in this study is used to explain the basis for the establishment of foreign military bases in a foreign soil, other related issues surrounding such establishments like the expansionist motives, national/economic interests of the foreign countries, military power which is being used to advance economic interest and the issues of grants, aids and trades.

However, the realist school of thought is an excerpt of the power theory which is commonly used in the international relations as propounded by Hans Morgenthau (1967). For him power possesses a relational sense of describing the relationship between one country and another in a specific situation while on the other hand power is relational to time and situation (Morgenthau 1967, p.29 cited in Omeje, 1999, p.2). The issue of power in

international politics makes it possible for nations to advance their economic/national interest across boundaries especially when such is premeditated by military power.

Realists especially neo realists like Kenneth Waltz and Henry Kissinger have critically observed the issues in the world politics, headed by the question of military security-the high politics of military security where power dominates the low politics of economic and social affairs (Koehn and Nye, 1989). Still in the same vein, Mbah (2014) noted that persuasion, manipulation as well as the use of economic instruments like reward, grants and other forms of assistance from other major tactics used by states in international system. Consequently, power in international relations is considered as relative to the goals to which it is used. It includes tangible factors such as military capabilities and intangible ones such as political will (Akinboye & Ottoh, 2007).

Application of the theory

In application of this theory to this study, *realist theory* is used to examine the establishment of the five military bases in Djibouti and what prompts or drives the location of these bases in the geostrategic horn of Africa. On another note, this theory is useful in the explanation of the economic security of the host country inferring from the surrounding issues of power, grants, trade and aid. This is testimony to the fact that the key driver for Djibouti's economic growth emanates from the political and economic security interests of external economically and politically dominant powers particularly the USA, China and Japan. Japan paid \$30 million for its base facilities in Djibouti not including other forms of assistance. Likewise, China continuously supported Djibouti since 1979. Many of the infrastructure projects located in Djibouti are funded by China (ADIT 2014). The above facts reveal the growing economic and political competition between the powerful states over Djibouti for their economic and security goals. In 2012 and 2013, foreign direct investment

grew. Construction of Doraleh container terminal and geothermal plants are examples. In 2012, the China-Africa Development Fund declared a US\$6.4 million soft loan to Djibouti. Currently, Djibouti is working to produce geothermal energy around Lake Assal at a cost of US\$240 million partly funded by China that is expected to produce 60MW by 2018. The US has also shown interest in supporting this project (Yewondwossen, 2014), China has funded the port facility at KhorAmbado and recently agreed to construct a new airport (Styan and Dawaleh, 2015).

The above overview allows us to infer that both the economically and politically strong countries of USA and China are deepening their presence in Djibouti to protect their economic and security interests. Nonetheless, their involvement could erode independence of Djibouti in pursuing its regional cooperation and integration plans in the Horn of Africa especially with Ethiopia. Furthermore, the US-led “War on Terror” may have its own adverse effects on the political stability and economic relations among the Horn countries.

3.2. Hypotheses

In response to the research questions, this study was guided by the following hypotheses;

1. The geostrategic location of the foreign military bases in Djibouti was implicated by the economic/national interests of the foreign countries.
2. The premium/rent on these bases has not significantly increased socio-economic development in Djibouti.

3.3. Research Design

The research design here refers to all the overall strategy that a researcher chooses to integrate the different components of his study in a coherent and logical way thereby ensuring that he will effectively address the research problem. According to Trochin (2006:26), “the function of a design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables you to effectively address

the research problem as unambiguously as possible. It is a detailed plan outlining how observations will be made. Leege and Francis (1974) observed that planning for the specifications and manipulations of variables constitute the logic of research design.

In this study, we adopted the “*time series research design*”. The Time-Series Design involves successive observations throughout a programmed intervention and assesses the characteristics of the change process (Gottman et al, 1969). The descriptive function of the time series is particularly important when the intervention extends over a considerable time period. Thus, the symbols **X**, **-X₁**, **-X₂** indicates such changes over time (Asika, 1990). The time series is also associated with continuous record of fluctuations in the experimental variables over the entire course of the program (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 1966). When faced with a historical log of potentially relevant non-experimental events, the time series is an invaluable source of post hoc hypotheses regarding observed, but unplanned, changes in programme variables. From this study, the change process that has occurred overtime in the establishments of foreign military bases in Djibouti from one to five bases and viewing it as a continuous phenomenon with the advent of Chinese naval base necessitated the use of time series research design.

Before we go further, it is necessary that we explain some of the conventional notation system of research design which are as follows;

X experimental treatment or independent variable

-X independent manipulable variable that is not manipulated

Y dependent variable

O refers to an observation of the dependent variable y

R assignment of groups by randomization (Ifesinachi, 2010:21)

From the above, the time series research design for this study is represented in this form: **-X**, **-X₁**, **-X₂** and **(O₁) x (O₂)**, where:

- X_1 is one indicator of independent variable (foreign military bases)


- X_2 another indicator of independent variable - X

O_1 is the First observation of (economic security in Djibouti)

X is the experimental variable

O_2 is the second observation (of Y)

In the above form, O_1 stands for the first observation, which is the first hypothesis for our study; the geostrategic locations of military bases in Djibouti. X stands for the experimental variable or causal factor, that is; the economic/national interests of these foreign countries. While, O_2 stands for the second observation; the premium/rents on these bases which has not significantly increased socio-economic development in Djibouti. This can be illustrated as follow;



In application of the *time series* research design to the investigation of our research problem, it provided a veritable tool for validating our hypotheses that:

- The geostrategic location of the foreign military bases in Djibouti was implicated in the economic/national interests of the countries that own such bases.

- The premiums/rents on these bases have not significantly increased socio-economic development in Djibouti.

Again, the use of this type of research design enabled us to identify the most severe threats (internal and external) to the validity and reliability of the topic under study. For example, as a secondary observer, we are not directly involved in direct and primary observation. Sequel to this threat, the rigorous use of secondary method and documentary evidence to ensure reliability and validity will be applied. *Time series design* enabled us to structure our observation since it is applicable in *Time series analysis* and *multiple time series design* which are some its extension. This design and the analytic tool help examine a change process overtime and in historical aspect. Again, a theoretical framework of analysis based on the realists' theory of states an offshoot of power theory will help to link the theoretical base of this research with the observable consistent interactions and interplay between foreign military bases and economic security in Djibouti.

3.4. Method of Data Collection

For the purpose of this study, we adopted observation method, precisely the indirect type. The indirect observation involves archives, electronically or mechanically recorded activities, or through photography (Nweke &Nwoba, 2016) as can be seen in the map of Djibouti and the presence of these bases. Other ways through which data was gathered for this study include text books, journal, periodical, AFDB reports, news agencies like Aljazeera and BBC, UN documents on security etc,

3.5. Method of Data Analysis.

Data in a generic sense refers to information on phenomena. Asika (1990), puts data as quantitative information. Analysis on the other hand, refers to the breaking down of a complex whole into single and simple components for adequate comprehension and

understanding of each unit. Consequently, the data collected will be analyzed using *qualitative descriptive method of data analysis*. The type of data analysis involves the explanation and description of the secondary sources of data that was used in this study and how it relates to the dependent variable under study. In doing this, we sieved and analyzed the mass of relevant data found in official documents, fact finding reports, books and journals used in this study. *Qualitative descriptive analysis* is a research technique used to explain, describe and interpret qualitatively the secondary sources of data by systematically evaluating texts (e.g., documents, graphics like maps, books and journal articles). Although the method has been used frequently in the social sciences, but it is prevalent in qualitative analysis of secondary sources of data.

3.6. LOGICAL DATA FRAMEWORK

Research questions	Hypotheses	Major variables of the hypotheses	Empirical indicators of the variables	Sources of data	Method of data collection	Method of data analysis
Are the geostrategic location of five military bases in Djibouti driven by economic and national interests of the foreign countries	The geo strategic location of the Five foreign military bases in Djibouti are related to economic/national interest of the Foreign countries.	X Geostrategic location of the foreign Military Bases in Djibouti.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The presence of US military camp Lemonnier and Chadley Base including over 4000 personnel soldiers. • Japan Ambouli airport base used for counter-piracy operations in the region. • Italy Base Militare Nazionale di Supporto, stations including 300 personnel, used for counter piracy missions. • France: Héron naval base which stations over 2900 personnel, also hosts German & Spanish forces. • Chinesenaval base which opened in August 2017 and used as supply centre for peacekeeping & humanitarian assistance operations 	Secondary sources	Qualitative method of Data collection.	Qualitative descriptive method of data analysis.
		Y Economic and national interests of the Foreign countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Location of these five military bases around the coast of Djibouti and easy access to the Gulf of Aden. • The Japanese and Italian base for counter piracy and the control of transshipment of goods on the Gulf of Aden. • Maritime activities and transshipment of goods 			

Does the premium on the bases have any significant impact on the economic growth and development of Djibouti?	The annual premium on these bases has not significantly increased economic development in Djibouti.	X Premium on the 5 bases in Djibouti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Premiums paid on the leased land occupied by these bases (\$63m US, \$36m France, \$20m China, Italy; \$2.6) annually. (these premiums are paid annually to the Djiboutian government in terms with her bilateral relations with the countries involved) 	Secondary sources.	Documentary method.	Qualitative descriptive method of data analysis.
		Y Insignificant increase in economic Development in Djibouti.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased indebtedness/debt from 52.5% to 79% in 2017. • More than 48% of the working-age population, especially young people and women, is unemployed; • Poor quality of economic infrastructure, the high cost of services, and weak institutional capacity. • Extreme poverty has not declined since 2002 and affects about 23% of a population of less than 1 million. • High exposure to environmental shocks eg. Weapon tests in the bases. • The political governance index has generally deteriorated in recent years. • Dependence/reliant on rent economy owing to its geostrategic position. 			

CHAPTER FOUR

GEOSTRATEGIC LOCATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN DJIBOUTI

The geostrategic location of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa region cannot be over emphasized. Its proximity to Suez Canal, access to Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Aden have made it attractive and had drawn international attention. Apart from these, its peaceful environment as compared to other countries of the region has made it a matter of preference for international garrison hosting five foreign military bases. Hence, it is from this small hub of horn of Africa region that these bases project their motives like counter terrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen on one hand and then trade route for transshipment of goods and services across Africa and Middle East.

4.1. Location of the Five Military Bases around the Coast of Djibouti and Access to the Sea including other Maritime Activities

Although there are other countries in the Horn of African region like, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. However, the relative peace in Djibouti, her strategic position, and nearness to maritime corridor could be among the reasons that it endears international attention. According to Al-Yadoomi (1991), the West has uncompromised interest in the region: economic, political, security and military with particular reference to France and America that have their military presences in the Horn of Africa region. Consequently, Woodward (2005) observed thatHorn appeared on the agenda in the White House mainly for geo-strategic reasons. Sequel to this, it can be argued that US presence in the Horn of Africa has been pre-mediated by America's interest to maintain its unchallenged post-cold war hegemony. Similarly, Samatar (2007) noted that US foreign policy towards Horn of Africa is driven and largely determined by its national interest. Hence, the war on terror in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attack, the intention to control the Red sea coastal area and Persian Gulf oil, to save its Middle East ally, Israel and to sustain its superiority- can be linked as the

determinant of US increasing involvement in the Horn politics. Be that as it May, other countries such as France and china have their bases in Djibouti which their interest goes beyond counter terrorism strategies to driven economic and national interests as it has to deal with passage and transshipment of goods through gulf Aden.Horn of Africa in particular Djibouti is the only region in the world in which US, French, Italy, Japanese and recently the Chinese military forces are stationed simultaneously (Sun &Yahia, 2016). This is largely due to the region's strategic location. First, the Red Sea is the main transit of oil ships both in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Moreover, the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean are the main shipping route for goods from the Middle East and the Far East to Europe and the Americas (Abera, 2013). It is also a main transit of oil producing Arab countries oil ship into East, China, Japan, India, Europe, and America. Thus, it can be argued that international and regional powers have an undeniable interest in controlling the area. Second, the intractable Arab-Israel conflict increases the geo-military significance of the region. Israel also wants to save the Red Sea from becoming an Arab Lake (Al-Yadoomi, 1991 & Woodward, 2005). Thus, Israel's singular alternative is to strengthen its relation with non-Arab country of the region, mostly Ethiopia. Third, the region's geo-strategy for maritime security and anti-piracy increased the significance of the region. Other reasons are not limited to its situation on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a gateway to the Suez Canal, which is one of the world's busiest shipping routes. Djibouti also provides a vital port for landlocked neighbour Ethiopia, even more important now as a railway between both their capitals is completed (Oladipo, 2015).

The figure 4.1a below illustrates Djibouti's geostrategic location and access to the sea



Transportation Network

Since her independence in 1977, Djibouti has maintained its strategic value. However, the year 2001 made Djibouti an international garrison for Foreign Super powers. The attacks of 11 September and the subsequent Global War on Terror (GWOT) by the United States (US) made Djibouti a location sought by all the powers involved in this new model of conflict. A US base quickly took shape alongside the long-standing French presence. One of the reasons that endeared such installations is that Djibouti is located in the Horn of Africa, in a strategic area near the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, by implication grants access to the Indian Ocean and hence contributed to the necessity for such establishments. Accordingly, in May 2014, North-American president Barack Obama and Djibouti's president Ismail Omar Guelleh had signed a 20-years lease on this military installation (*The New York Times*, 2014). The Republic of Djibouti is a sentinel keeping watch over the Red Sea, the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Capitalizing on an exceptional location, the current head of state has managed to attract investments to develop Djibouti's economy and to focus his central strategy on the port of Djibouti. The population are mostly subsistence pastoralists and has trade relations with regional neighbors and Arabian Peninsula. The country has a harsh

climate and lacks arable land, fresh water, significant mineral and vegetation resources (Brass, 2008).

The country retains close relations with France too, being host for the largest French foreign military base. According to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the purpose of these military facilities is to promote regional security, since the location of Djibouti allows France to exercise military influence in the Middle East (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008). This is also supported by Djibouti's Western cooperation for international peace and regional stability as declared by their president (*The New York Times*, 2014). In the same vein, in 2010 Djibouti also had reinforced its Eastern partnership, through an agreement with Japan, which allows the establishment of a Japanese military base in the African country. This installation is intended primary to counter piracy in the region (*The Japan Times*, 2011). Recently, Djibouti's Defence Minister Hassan DararHouffaneh has declared the country's intention in reinforcing military cooperation with China, which has funded many infrastructure projects in the region. He has also said that Djibouti is ready to allow Chinese military ships to access its ports in order to increase the operational capacity of Djibouti Armed Forces (*Global Times*, 2014). Accordingly, BBC News in 2015 observed that Djibouti's status as a model of stability in an otherwise volatile region is one of its greatest assets.

Maritime Activities along the Coast of Djibouti

Maritime and port fields have unique security stakes. Due to economic and geopolitical reasons, security threats like piracy are not far-fetched from the region. In fact, hampering ports and shipping would have major effects on Djibouti due to the role of shipping in their economies. Because it is a strategic crossway between many routes linking Europe, Asia and Eastern Africa, 78% of Djibouti's GDP is related to port activities like a free zone, an oil terminal and a container terminal (Aden, 2016). One of the reasons for the

location of these military bases around the coast is that the Port of Djibouti is located at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, at the intersection of major international shipping lines connecting Asia, Africa and Europe. The Port is a minimal deviation from the principal East-West trade route and provides a secure regional hub for transshipment and relay of goods. Since 1998, the Port handled 100% of Ethiopia's maritime traffic, which moves to and from Addis Ababa by truck and rail. To accommodate this important business, the Port has made many additional dry yard areas available. The Port of Djibouti is ideally located to serve the COMESA market, linking 19 countries and 380 million peoples (Port de Djibouti retrieved 12/10/2018). Since 2008, Djibouti port facilities have welcomed and furnished a set of services to more than 300 navy ships per year. Regarding the extension of the only US African-based permanent base and the current re-settling of the French Navy, Djibouti became an international hub involving new cooperation methods. The last opening of the IMO funded centre for regional maritime activities underlines the importance of Djibouti for the international community (Trelawny, 2016). As the main sea outlet for Ethiopia, Djibouti is building mega port and rail projects targeted to meet the increasing demand. But more importantly, the independence of the oil exporter South Sudan has paved the way for new realms of cooperation between Djibouti and other countries in the region. This has resulted in a tripartite agreement among South Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti on a logistical corridor port service. Likewise, the rail and road expansion, construction of new ports and water projects are expected to provide immense benefit for the two countries. The projects include the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway and upgrading the capacity of the old ports in Djibouti. Recently, Djibouti has allocated a \$9.8 billion budget for port developments targeting Ethiopian import-export. Furthermore, Ethiopia signed a bilateral agreement with Djibouti in 2013 to supply 103,000 cubic meters of water per day (Yohannes, 2014).

4.2. Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti and Horn of African Region

Horn of Africa in particular Djibouti is the only region in the world in which US, French, Italy, Japanese and recently the Chinese military forces are stationed simultaneously (Sun &Yahia, 2016). This is largely due to the region’s strategic location. First, the Red Sea is the main transit of oil ships both in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Second, the intractable Arab-Israel conflict increases the geo-military significance of the region. Israel also wants to save the Red Sea from becoming an Arab Lake (Al-Yadoomi, 1991; Woodward, 2005). Thus, Israel’s singular alternative is to strengthen its relation with non-Arab country of the region, mostly Ethiopia. Third, the region’s geo-strategy for maritime security and anti-piracy increased the significance of the region. The summation of these reasons makes Djibouti to be the military fort of foreign powers. Some of these bases are enlisted in tabular form below:

Table 4.2a: *Military Bases in Djibouti, Military branch and operations.*

Country	Military branch	No. of personnel	Operations
France	a Multiple services	Approx. 2,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air and naval base • Desert training centre •Support for EU-led counterpiracy Operation.
United States	Navy	4,000+	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HQ TF 48-4 (Countering violent extremism in E. Africa & Yemen)
Germany	Navy	30-80	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for EU-led counter piracy Operation.
Italy	Air Force		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for EU-led counter piracy Operation.
Japan	Multiple Services	600	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mission base for counter piracy operations • Operational and logistic supply facility
Spain	Navy	50	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support for EU-led counter piracy Operation.

Source:Djibouti: Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker and Patrick de Gategno CAN July 2017The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base.

According to Pettyjohn (2013), the establishment of military bases became more intense after the Cold War and for the US it became a way of conquering the influence of communism and which thereof made USA have more military installations abroad in the

world and its presence in many strategic regions of different continents as part of US foreign policy. For Petty John there was emphasis on locations as strategic yet they are part of US foreign policy. Similarly, The Global Research Centre Report (2015) observed that USA controls between 700 and 800 bases worldwide on one hand, while on the other Wilbert van der Zeijden (2009), from the Transnational Institute wrote:

...many of the 300 overseas military interventions and invasions of the US in the past century, like Korean War, Vietnam War and Gulf War, were only possible because the US had well-positioned military facilities to launch and support these military operations (Zeijden 2009:1).

Lachowski (2007), on the other hand is of the view that the basing of military forces on foreign territory at locations leased to them is a practice almost as old as warfare itself. He went further to retreat that Bases can have an economic, political or demonstrative rationale but in all periods their pattern has been linked with the strategic dictates and relationships of the time. Still in the same vein, Dufour (2007), is of the opinion that after the Cold War ended, military installations abroad have remained goals such as the War on Terror, control of markets and natural resources and of strategic positions which are the key factors and considerations that underlie motivations for states to establish bases overseas until today. According to Tsavdaridis (2016), Secretary of the World Peace Council (WPC) in relation to economic motivations; the establishment of military bases should not of course be seen simply in terms of direct military ends. They are always used to promote states' economic and political objectives. For example, USA corporations and government have been eager for some time to build a secure corridor for US-controlled oil and natural gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea in Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. This region -has more than 6 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and almost 40 percent of its gas reserves. The war in Afghanistan and the creation of U.S. military Bases in Central Asia are viewed as a key opportunity to make such pipelines a reality (Cited in Dufour 2007).

From the above, one can infer that some of the reasons and motivations for the establishment of foreign military bases include; Strategic locations, promote economic and national interests, expansion of markets and War on Terror. The economic implications associated with the location of military base brings to bear the issue of economic security of the host nation and Africa as a continent.

In an attempt to explain some of the motivations that underlie the establishment of foreign military bases, Khalid (2012) linked it to the issues and lines of communication. He observed that there are routes which connect military and commercial units with its supply base, being important to connect markets and being the main issue regarding military logistics abroad (Khalid, 2012, p.13). Therefore, to install air and navy bases overseas, it is fundamental to control sea lines and air lines of communication, since having the capacity to keep these lines open is as important as assuring the possibility of isolating them in strategic situations (Khalid, 2012). Therefore, the coast of Djibouti is along the sea lines of Arabian Peninsula and Gulf Aden. Another modern use of bases abroad refers to intelligence programs. According to Zeijden (2009), *Echelon* is an example of a signal intelligence system which uses states' foreign military bases as signals receivers. This network was created in 1946 by a treaty among USA, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand and its objective is to collect and analyze international intelligence data. These bases are also useful in cases of peace-keeping operations or of international aid in natural disasters, the Infrastructure represented by the military bases is also applied. Although, none of such signal intelligence has been created amongst the military bases that abound in Africa but the use of drones has covered the issue of intelligence and surveillance. On another note, Peterson (2012) observed that Military base helps to project power beyond boundaries, increasing the capacity of response and control over other regional security problems.

However in a counter opinion on the establishment of military base abroad, Wohlstetter (1951) emphasized on the cost by observing that military bases abroad represents huge costs to great powers: large investments in infrastructure result in heavy burdens to public budgets, even to the USA Bases system depends on relative positions regarding sources of supply, boundaries of enemies' territories and targets' localizations as can be observed in the global military expenditure of 2017 with USA taking the lead (*SIPRI.org world military spending 2017*). In support to this, Kandel (2014), opined that the mission of this US Command for Africa is “to protect and defend the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organisms and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development” (Kandel, 2014, p.15). Be that as it may, not minding the costs incurred by the foreign countries in establishment of such bases, it does not affect the socio-economic/political and military benefits associated to these bases especially when they are located at the coasts which gives them access to maritime corridor and sea outlets for transshipment of goods as well as through the host countries air system.

However, this study does not focus solely on US foreign military bases in Africa but other countries that have such bases in Africa in relation to the economic implication of the host African State beyond the notion of countering terrorism and violent extremism. Along with the US and France, other smaller foreign contingents from Japan, Germany and Spain based in Djibouti have contributed to the fight against terrorism and piracy. The facilities of the port of Djibouti and the French presence have allowed significant logistical support to various naval operations (International, European and NATO). Djibouti has become in a few years an international garrison due to its close proximity to regions in crisis (Yemen, Somalia) and through international shipping routes vital for European and Asian economies.

Rents paid by the various countries which maintain their military assets in Djibouti underlines the opportunism of the current head of state faced with present strategic realities. France which also operate in a significant number of military installations abroad as a remaining of their colonial empires has her base in Djibouti. One of the reasons can be referred to the new imperialism practices established in the 1880's and Berlin conference of 1884 when European powers divided and annexed regions of the African continent. Hansen (2008), observed that the formal imperialism that dominated Africa was replaced by foreign military presence and strategic economic partnerships. Hence, he was able to identify that these establishments were not mere or ordinary but beyond countering terrorism includes strategic economic partnerships in terms of location and economic interest which are always enshrined in their national interest. In continuation, Hansen observed that in order to secure its national interests, France maintains military bases in countries such as Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Senegal. Consequently, there are French troops installed in Mali and Libya too, as result of recent peacekeeping operations (Hansen, 2008, p.5).

The establishment of a naval base in Djibouti, the contribution of funds to African armed forces, the support of the PLA, amongst other recent forms of diplomacy and security cooperation, potentially mean even more to China than African countries. It is moving towards an ever more expansive definition of its global interests, as its business in Africa pushes it to create new mechanisms for securing those interests, including its own growing military footprint abroad, Pant (2017). From another point of view, India's perception of China's role in Africa is seen as a threat rather than security. China's Djibouti base is feared to form part of the pattern of Chinese naval bases along the Indian Ocean, or 'string of pearls', and given the ongoing hostility over the Doklam plateau, India is likely to view China's growing military footprint as more of a threat than a source of security (Pant 2017, p.21). Alex Vines of the African Programme in Chatham house London told Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in his commentary on military bases in Africa (2017) observed that

‘We now have Djibouti hosting many military bases. China in 2017 joins other recent arrivals in Djibouti with military facilities. Japan too has its only foreign military base there as do the Italians. Troops from Germany and Spain are hosted by the French, but the Russians failed to negotiate a partnership with the Chinese to share their facilities. India is also considering opening its own base in Djibouti, as is Saudi Arabia. He went further to note that, it isn’t only Djibouti that’s accepting new foreign military bases, he said. ‘In February 2017, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) secured agreement for a foreign military base in Somaliland, following its opening of a military facility in Eritrea in 2015. Turkey opened a military training base in Somalia in 2017.’ And now Russia is believed to be negotiating with Sudan to host the base it couldn’t establish in Djibouti. India has facilities in Mauritius and Madagascar ‘and would like to deepen its Seychelles presence’.

On the regional aspect, one would ask; what is the stand of AU in the establishment of these bases across the African continent? Francis Fabricius of ISS (2018) observed that the AU should be keeping track of the diversifying military and security arrangements on the continent and that should be the task of the AU’s PSC that is mandated to keep the continent safe and that should be high on its agenda added Goldbaum (2018).

From the above, the study affirmed that the establishment of foreign military bases in Djibouti has gone beyond the global war on terrorism and piracy which is often viewed as the reasons for such establishments. Consequently, major findings as it relates to first research question and hypothesis respectively affirms that military bases in Djibouti is seen as a means of expanding the economic and national interests of the countries that own such owing to the strategic location of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa region and the geostrategic locations of these bases along the coast of Djibouti. Hence, the foregoing explanation has helped to affirm our first research question and hypothesis respectively on the geostrategic locations of foreign military bases and their respective economic/national interests which is the driven factor for such establishments beyond counter terrorism objectives in the horn of Africa region.

CHAPTER FIVE

PREMIUM ON THE MILITARY BASES AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN DJIBOUTI

It is well known that military bases in Djibouti have incurred costs such as budgets for installations from the owners to premiums/rent of lease to the host. Thus, this chapter evaluated whether the premiums have had any significant effect on the socio-economic development of the host country. Foreign military bases can be put into different categories such that they can be divided into permanent (i.e. long-term) and ad hoc (short-term like lunch pads, supplies etc) bases. Djibouti may be located thousands of miles away from both the United States, China, France, Japan and Italy but it is becoming an increasingly salient focal point in international scene because of its' geostrategic location in the horn of Africa.

5.1. OVERVIEW OF DJIBOUTI'S LOCATION AND GEOSTRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY

Djibouti's geographical location attracts foreign powers most. One of the reasons is that, being situated within the maritime chokepoint of Bab el-Mandab, Djibouti is a key passage in the Gulf of Aden-Suez Canal trade route (Beng 2016) noted that, this route is crucial to the world's economy as an estimated number of 20,000 ships, and a significant 20 percent of global exports, go through it yearly. In addition, he added that the route is a conduit for the world's hydrocarbons trade, with almost 10 percent of the world's oil exports negotiating the Bab el-Mandab e.g. the port Kismayo of Somalia is also along this route. Consequently, this Gulf of Aden-Suez Canal trade route has become important for two Asian countries that situated their bases in Djibouti: China and Japan. According to (Beng 2016), out of the 20,000-odd ships that ply the route yearly, a good 10 percent are Japanese. Similarly, China's trade with the EU that worth \$1 billion daily, most of which is seaborne

and therefore has to use the Gulf of Aden-Suez Canal route is also an economic factor. It is hardly surprising that these two Asian nations have vested interests in protecting the sea-lanes of communications off the Horn of Africa (Beng 2016:2).

Fig. 5.1a showing the geostrategic location of Djibouti in the horn of Africa region



Another aspect of Djibouti's geographic position that makes it attractive to foreign powers is its proximity to potential crisis areas, not just in the restive Horn of Africa but also the rest of the African continent. Djibouti's nearest neighbours that have cases of insurgents and terrorist attacks include these two hot spots: Yemen and Somalia. The former is racked by a civil war between Houthi rebels and loyalists, while the latter is the base for Al Qaeda-linked militant group Al Shabaab, which has staged several high-profile terror attacks in the region. Foreign powers also set great store on Djibouti's relative peace and stability in an area of chaos which has become another reason they deem it a suitable staging area for their military operations in the region (Beng 2016; Mulat 2016). Though the geo-strategic importance of the Horn may seemingly over shadow its economic significance but there are economic possibilities to be considered for example the region is important for mineral

exploitation, especially oil and gas (Woodward, 2005). Oil is also found in South Sudan and Ogaden, Ethiopia. Thus, resource particularly oil is another reason.

5.2 Military Bases and Economic Development in Djibouti.

In the above subtheme, there is need to clearly state the impacts of the foreign military bases on economic development of Djibouti bearing in mind the positive and negative effects it incurs on the host sovereign state. Therefore, for good comprehension and clarity it is explained below:

5.2.1. Positive Impacts of Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti.

Inferring from the explanations and definitions so far, economic development is all encompassing and consists all other stages of development including human development and standard of living. Consequently, the age life expectancy in Djibouti is 61.8 years, and an average number of years of schooling of only 3.8 (UNDP 2014, p.162). In the past two decades, US assistance to Djibouti has been second only to that of France, the main contributor to Djibouti's state revenues. Since 9/11, this number has risen dramatically: in 2003 US economic and military aid rose to USD 26.37 million, and in 2004 to USD 37.37 million (*InsideGov*, 2016). The terms of the new agreement on the military base and facility services that the two sides signed in 2012 grant the United States the military base for 99 years, guaranteeing Djibouti a steady rent throughout this century. Prior to 2014, the rental of the base, including the use of Ouaramous Island, amounted to USD 38 million annually (*The Washington Post* 2013; Lostumbo et al. 2013, p.156).

France's base, located outside the city, costs EUR 30 million a year; the amounts the United States and France pay are second only to the USD 700 million in transit fees paid by landlocked Ethiopia to export its products through the Djibouti seaport (*Reuters* 2012). In May 2014, President Obama and President Guelleh met and agreed to nearly double the

annual rent of the base to USD 70 million, of which 7 million is allocated to development assistance. Apart from the lease, since 2010 the United States has spent between USD 300 million and 500 million annually on the base (Ploch 2011), providing employment, allowing for procurement (such as construction material and food supplies), and facilitating other social services (health and dental care for the population). Approximately 1,200 local employees and foreign labourers work on the base. The unemployment rate in Djibouti has been between 50 and 60 per cent since 2007 (CIA 2016), and from 1991 to 1997 Djibouti's GDP growth rate remained negative but became steadily positive from 2001 on, attaining 5.8 per cent in 2008 and standing at 5.5 per cent in 2014 (*Trading Economics* 2016). The rent from the US base and its spillover effects, combined with rents from other foreign powers, accounts for much of the steady economic growth.

In order to attract revenues, Djibouti has generally offered a welcoming environment and been tolerant of foreign military presence. As President Guelleh said, the Djiboutian nation is “African at heart, Arabist in culture, and universalist in thought” (cited in Schermerhorn 2005). Indeed, Djibouti's pragmatic diplomacy has resulted in friendly relations with almost all of the world powers, whatever their ideological position. The city-state has hosted US, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Japanese forces, and it has negotiated military cooperation agreements with the Chinese, who bought a sizable share of the Port of Djibouti for USD 185 million and plan on spending USD 420 million to modernize the port facilities (Lee, 2015). Djibouti has also embraced investments from India, which helped in the rehabilitation of the Ethio- Djibouti railway in 2011; it has welcomed economic and educational aid from the GCC countries; and, it has allowed ships from any country to use its seaports' dry docks. Yet, this seemingly friendly, stable environment does not necessarily mean that the US military deployment, or that of other powers, such as France, has entailed “zero cost” and come at “zero risk” for Djibouti.

Other factors that aid Djibouti in the economy from its location was the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea which increased Djibouti's strategic importance for Ethiopia. Ethiopia uses Djibouti as its primary sea outlet for its international trade thereby boosting Djibouti's leading foreign investor in Ethiopia Sheikh Alamoudi also contributed in financing and handling facilities in the old port. Since 1998, the volume of Ethiopian cargo and petroleum products has quadrupled (Styan, 2013). These developments pushed both countries in the economic, social, and security spheres shifting from the uneven and dependency relationship characterized by tensions and frictions of the past. As a result, Djibouti has become the sole cost-effective port for both import and export goods, (Muluaem, 2013). Consequently, it has started expanding and upgrading its port facilities and related infrastructure to increase cargo and container capacity. Since 1998, Djibouti has earned more than US\$3 million per day from Ethiopia (Yokob, 2004). These realities make the recently emerging Ethiopia-Djibouti cooperation a viable alternative way to tackle the economic and political animosities between the two countries.

In so doing, Djibouti earned US\$38m per a year from the US coupled with additional financial and development assistance. Furthermore, the US invested US\$70 million per annum including economic aid (Lee, 2015). Djibouti's strategic importance to global political and economic security attracted further foreign investment from countries such as Spain, Japan, Dubai and China. From 2004 to 2009, the country witnessed a great amount of FDI inflows (African Economic Outlook, 2012). Trade has significantly increased as a \$400 million container terminal has been planted at Doraleh supervised by Dubai Ports World (DPW). Consequently, the Horizon Oil Terminal owned by Emirates National Oil Company was constructed at Doraleh in 2004-2005 satisfying the fuel import demands in Djibouti, Ethiopia and of the French and US military forces. Since 2009, Doraleh has become the only deep-water port in the region handling 15,000tonnes. These developments illustrate

Djibouti's emphasis on bilateral cooperation arrangements irrespective of geographic proximity to harness economic benefits. These initiatives have strengthened the country's infrastructure targeting its geo-strategic location making it a hub of port services to other countries in Africa as well.

Djibouti is showing a growing interest in regional integration. Particularly, Ethiopia and Djibouti are engaged on infrastructure expansion activities on energy, water, port, and transport. Both countries are incrementally integrating their economies by building a strong cross-border economic zone hoping to enjoy mutual benefit and expand foreign direct investment. In so doing, they are working to ensure economic growth and alleviate poverty in line with their respective policies. Nonetheless, both countries face numerous economic, political and security challenges requiring their joint engagement.

Djibouti's revenue increments and fast economic growth is the outcome of its geostrategic location and the resultant infrastructure developments. Port services to Ethiopia, its geo-strategic importance for external powers, and cooperation on infrastructure development with Ethiopia are key sources of revenue for Djibouti. Consequently, Djibouti has registered 5% GDP growth on average for the last five years and is expected to maintain the same rate of growth in the years to come (Yewondwossen, 2014). Nonetheless, Djibouti's economy lacks diversification as the agricultural and industrial sectors are marginal, (Blaise, 2015). Economic growth has yet to result in the reduction of poverty and job creation.

Equally important is cooperation between Djibouti and Ethiopia on infrastructural projects such as railways, roads, water supply, power, trade and enhancing the capacity of the existing ports in Djibouti. Djibouti might face competition from both the Eritrean and Somaliland's ports in the years to come. Nonetheless, given the above-mentioned investments in port facilities and emerging infrastructure expansion; Djibouti has created greater cost and capacity advantage over regional competitors. Hence, it can be concluded

that Ethiopia and Djibouti in a manner of speaking symbolize best practice in the IGAD economic integration process. The economic cooperation between the two countries has boosted the economies of both by enhancing mutual economic benefits paving the way for regional economic interdependence.

5.2.2. Negative impacts of FMB in Djibouti.

While hopeful that foreign powers could bring benefits to the weak state, the Djiboutian authorities' major concern is that US presence might incite terrorist attacks or cause discontent within the population that could provoke the rise of jihadist Islam. Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh, Djibouti's minister of Economy, Finance, and Planning, asserted during an interview in 2012 that, though the local radical groups in Somalia and Al-Qaeda affiliates may not be able to launch attacks against the US military facilities, they could still sabotage the vulnerable Djiboutian infrastructure (*Reuters* 2012). Djibouti, a resource-poor nation of 14,300 square miles and 875,000 people in the Horn of Africa, rarely makes international headlines. But between its relative stability and strategic location—20 miles across from war-consumed Yemen and in destroyer range of the pirate infested western edge of the Indian Ocean—it is now one of the more important security beachheads in the developing world. Its location also matters greatly to global commerce and energy, due to its vicinity to the Mandab Strait and the Suez-Aden canal, which sees ten percent of the world's oil exports and 20 percent of its commercial exports annually (Beng, 2016).

Since November 2002, the country has been home to Camp Lemonnier, a U.S. Expeditionary base—the only American base on the African continent—along with other bases belonging to its French, Italian, and Japanese allies. But now there are two new kids on the block: On 21st January, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry announced an agreement with Djibouti to host its first-ever base beyond the South China Sea, and construction commenced days later (Hong Lei, 2016). Though Beijing called the installation a "logistics

and fast evacuation base," the Asian power's "near-abroad" rivals, such as Taiwan, opined that it is more likely the beginning of a new, aggressive military buildup to rival the United States. Six weeks later, Saudi Arabia declared that it too would construct a base in Djibouti, (Toumi, 2016) apparently as part of its newly assertive policy of countering Iranian proxies politically and militarily throughout the region (Mustafa, 2015). Both new players have made substantial economic and soft power investments in the country to boot. With this development, Djibouti has become an international military garrison. Since 2015, Beijing has poured over \$14 billion into infrastructure development (Sanchez, 2010). Saudi Arabia, itself a prominent donor to Djibouti's public works, has spent generously on social welfare projects for the country's poor; built housing, schools and mosques for its swelling Yemeni refugee population; and dispatched teachers and preachers from the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, long a pillar for the promulgation of Saudi-backed interpretations of Islam. Augmenting Saudi aid, moreover, has been further spending by some of its Arab military allies. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have poured millions into charitable work over the past few months—and the UAE in particular is working to spur economic development along the lines of the "Dubai model." Even cash-poor North Sudan, newly returned to the Saudi orbit after a years-long alliance with Iran, began construction of a hospital in Djibouti in early February. Neither the timing nor the confluence of these projects is mere coincidence but what are the interests of these states in this geostrategic horn of Africa? America's diminishing global military footprint has begun to affect the calculation of allies and rivals alike, and the outsized role Djibouti is poised to play in its neighborhood presents a case in point of the consequences. An examination of the changing role the country plays in American, Chinese, and Arab security policy offers a glimpse into potential conflicts as well as opportunities arising from the shift—and some steps Americans can take to prepare for both.

However, in spite of the presence of US and French troops, jihadist militants have, in fact, succeeded in carrying out attacks on Westerners, as was the case of the deadly bombing of La Chaumière café, a hangout for foreign military personnel and tourists, by the Somali Al-Shabaab on 24 May 2014, which resulted in the deaths of French army chiefs (Goldman, 2014). Furthermore, Djiboutian authorities seek to convince the population that the US base is not intended as a launching pad for attacks against Muslims and that those attacks against jihadists are launched from bases in Ethiopia (Anberbir, 2014).

For Djibouti, the economic rewards have always outweighed the risks of terrorism, but the government has not succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of the population, let alone improving the living standards for most. An officer from AFRICOM who served at the Djibouti base put it bluntly: The US faces similar challenges as in Iraq and Afghanistan: a highly militarized presence that for many Djiboutians is the first encounter they have had with Americans. Rather than being introduced to Americans through the Peace Corps or USAID, Djiboutians' first encounter is often with an aggressive US posture that is often very ignorant of their society and culture (Degang, Sun & Zoubir, 2016; Brooks 2012).

In addition to the discontent with the lack of genuine political reforms and the absence of tangible economic benefits for the population, anger over the drones and the heavy military presence may erupt. The US has deployed sixteen Predator drones in Djibouti since 2010, five of which crashed in 2013; the potential of unmanned aircraft colliding with passenger planes provoked resentment among Djiboutians (Whitlock & Miller, 2013). In 2013 the Pentagon was compelled to transfer the large quantity of drones from the crowded city to a desert location many miles away (Ramirez, 2013) to avoid such an occurrence.

Given the dire socio-economic conditions in the country and the potential consequences of heavy US presence in the tiny city-state, it is not surprising that the authorities have now decided to seek other sources of revenue. Thus, just a few months after

John Kerry's visit to Djibouti in May 2015, the Djiboutian government apparently asked the United States to vacate its secondary base in Obock and turn it over to the Chinese, who have made Djibouti a much more attractive offer. Indeed, the Chinese provided USD 3 billion to build a railroad (completed in 2015) from Addis Ababa to Djibouti and plan to modernize Djibouti's small port (Press TV, 18 August 2015). This followed the security and defense agreement signed with Beijing in early 2014 (Lee 2015). Government officials argue that Djibouti is not simply switching the source of its dependency from the United States and other Western powers to China (Degang, Sun & Zoubir (2016) and AU summit report. Addis Ababa, 29 January 2015). This might be true; what is more likely, though, is that Djibouti is taking part in the Cold War-era game of playing would-be patrons/powers against each other to wrest additional advantages. In this case, the Djiboutian regime seeks to deter Washington from exerting pressure regarding the government's authoritarian rule.

Another political issue arising from the establishment of this base is in change of government. In a number of respects, tiny Djibouti can be considered "the Bahrain of Africa." US failure to resolutely condemn the Guelleh regime's brutal repression during the "Arab Spring" is in line with Washington treating the Djiboutian government with kid gloves, and even actively supporting it (Bloice, 2011). This is reminiscent of US policy during the Cold War and its aftermath, when it supported authoritarian regimes that provided it with strategic military facilities. But, as seen above, when the United States seeks regime change, the client can turn to the patron's rival – in this case China, which has considerable economic leverage in Africa. The regime in Djibouti is quite concerned about US rhetoric on democracy promotion, especially since the city-state's human rights record is dismal (United States Department of State 2014); therefore, finding new sources of revenue with less stringent conditions has become a major priority for the Djiboutian elite. This article on US military deployment in Djibouti reveals four findings: First, since the end of the Cold War,

although US military deployment in Europe has shrunk, it has expanded in Djibouti as a result of a shift in the US global defense–offence posture. The increasing US military deployment in Djibouti over the past two decades has served as a hub to project US military power in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf for offensive purposes.

Second, although Djibouti and the US have not entered into a formal alliance, they have committed, through the base in Camp Lemonnier, to a quasi-alliance, their all-inclusive security cooperation, particularly in counterterrorism, has consolidated their quasi-alliance, but it is not an exclusive relationship. Third, while most US military bases are deployed in developed and/or relatively wealthy countries, this is not the case with Djibouti, which is economically and militarily fragile. This exception can be explained by Djibouti’s heavy dependence on the windfalls it collects from the great powers’ bases on its territory and, to a lesser degree, its citizens’ adherence to traditional Islam. Djibouti’s geopolitical and geo-economic goals combined with the US strategic requirements have created a seemingly mutually beneficial relationship. Fourth, in the past two decades, most US overseas military bases aimed to counter traditional threats, but the base in Djibouti, in addition to serving purposes related to humanitarian relief, addresses non-traditional threats – including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, and drug trafficking. The base also allows the United States to intervene in wars when needed. Ultimately, the objective is to maintain US hegemony. Will Washington transfer its AFRICOM headquarters from Stuttgart to Djibouti? There are actually four potential candidates for the new headquarters. The first is Djibouti because the country boasts the only US military base in Africa and because the Djiboutian government habitually pursues “moderate” and pragmatic policies; but, US officials have said that this is highly unlikely (Interview, New York, 16 October 2013). The second possibility is Morocco, because of its long-lasting security cooperation with the United States and because of its geographical proximity to the Sahel,

where numerous extremist groups operate. Yet, the demand that Morocco made in exchange for hosting – that Washington recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara (RITIMO 2012) – is unacceptable to the United States, which has developed close security relations with Algeria, a strong supporter of Western Sahara's independence (Zoubir & Zunes 2016). The third candidate is Ethiopia, because it boasts the headquarters of the African Union and is favourable to strong US cooperation with Africa. However, this will be nearly impossible, as it, like most African countries, fears the backlash that such a presence might generate (e.g. radicalism, anti-Americanism). The fourth is Liberia, which was eager in 2008 to host AFRICOM's headquarters, but the domestic controversy it had caused killed off that possibility. No matter whether, when, or where AFRICOM eventually establishes its headquarters in Africa, Djibouti will remain the most important and possibly the only US military base in Africa for the foreseeable future. But, should some strategically located failed states decide to emulate Djibouti, then perhaps the US search for an AFRICOM headquarters in Africa might materialize.

However, the increasing involvement of US and China endangers France's interest. Liebl (2008) argued that any loss of French presence in Djibouti directly threatens the French lifeline to its Indian Ocean- and Pacific Ocean-based citizens and dependents, numbering over 1.4 million people. Thus, the region is the subject of Big powers competition. Beside the two Western countries, others such as Germany, Italy and the whole Europe through European Union (EU) have an interest in the region. For instance, EU has been involved in the region mainly in countering piracy operation (Council of the European Union, 2011). Thus, the Horn of Africa goes beyond foreign States competition and it successfully attracts supranational institutions. This has its own repercussion to the regions States particularly Ethiopia, landlocked State of the region.

In summary to the above chapter 5.2 “military bases and economic development in Djibouti” which has two subthemes, the implications of both the negative and positive aspects of the establishment of foreign military bases in Djibouti can be seen. However, other issues that are concerned with economic development such as unemployment, poverty, standard of living, per capita income etc are explained thus; when compared with economic development and foreign military base, Real GDP growth was an estimated 5.6% in 2018, up from 4.1% in 2017, due to normalization of the situation with Ethiopia and large infrastructure investments. Unfortunately, The fiscal deficit worsened slightly, to an estimated 15.5% of GDP in 2018, from 15.3% in 2017, due to large imports of goods for infrastructure projects started in 2014 and financed by foreign loans and foreign direct investment. Foreign debt was estimated at 102.9% of GDP in 2018, up from 49.9% in 2014 and 97.4% in 2016. World Bank and International Monetary Fund analysis of debt sustainability at the end of 2017 showed high risk of insolvency in the short term (AFDB Macro-economic report, 2018). Though this report were on macro-economic outlook, however the unemployment rate has decreased from 6.32% in 2007 to 5.81% in 2017 which invariably does not hinge such development on the establishment of FMB but on indigenous economic activities such as agriculture (AEO, 2019). Despite the growth however, an estimated 16 percent of the population lived below the international poverty line of US\$1.90 per day in 2017. The most recent official national extreme poverty rate stood at 21.1 percent (IBRD, 2018). From the above explanations, we can infer that the establishments of these military bases in Djibouti has not made significant increase in the economic development of the host country. Hence military bases only cannot bring about sustainable economic development when less attention is given to indigenous socio economic activities like agriculture and good standard of living.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Summary

This study examined foreign military bases and Economic security in Djibouti. Special attention was given to geostrategic locations and premiums on these bases; hence the research questions:

- Are the geostrategic locations of foreign military bases in Djibouti driven by economic/national interests of the countries that own such bases?
- Do the premiums on militarybases have any significant increase on socio-economic development in Djibouti?

However, the study has six chapters, chapter one focused on general introduction, chapters' two to six discussed the following issues: Literature review; geostrategic location and economic/national interests, premiums and socio-economic development in Djibouti. After which, we analyzed foreign military bases and Economic security in Djibouti.

In reference to other scholars and researchers on the subject-matter, numerous existent literatures were reviewed. At the end of the review, the gap which was located made the study necessary. Sequel to this, the existing literature as reviewed have not paid adequate attention to this burning issue. Thus, we went further to hypothesize that:

1. The geostrategic location of the foreign military bases in Djibouti was implicated by the economic/national interests of the foreign countries.
2. The premium/rent on the military bases has not significantly increased socio-economic development in Djibouti.

The above hypotheses are logically linked to the research questions and the objectives of the study. The realists' theory of states provided the philosophical justification for our

hypotheses. Upon verification of these hypotheses, data were collected through observation and analyzed using qualitative descriptive analysis.

From the findings we observed that the Horn of Africa is one of the world's single-most important geo-strategic region. Its geo-strategic significance is related with the Red Sea, oil, Nile factor, Indian Ocean, Gulf Aden, Suez Canal Trade route, transshipment of goods and services amongst others. Historically, the region had been an athletic field of foreign powers between Ottoman Turkey and Egypt, during colonial period between France, Britain and Italy, during cold war between US and Soviet Union, and now between different competing Arab countries, western and the emerging south notably China. Now, Djibouti has become world's largest military base of foreign powers in terms of the established foreign military bases. It can be argued that the region has become a military garrison: US, France, Germany, Italy, and China have already established their military base at Djibouti. This militarization is both an opportunity as well as a risk for Djibouti. It is an opportunity in areas of military, regional stability, accelerated factor of coasts, Gulf Aden, Suez Canal trade route amongst others. However, these opportunities are largely determined by the Djibouti's diplomatic utmost effort both with the foreign countries, her neighbors in East Africa like Ethiopia Eritrea and Somalia and African countries as a whole.

Despite these opportunities, the rise of foreign powers in Djibouti has a security risk: national security, economic, political and military. The overt-militarization of the country may threaten the national interest and security of Djibouti. Therefore, Djibouti needs a rational and responsive domestic and foreign policy to utilize the opportunities and at times to minimize the security risk.

Change in Djibouti's economic and strategic options has been driven by four factors: The Ethiopian–Eritrean war of 1998–2000, the impact of Ethiopia's economic transformation and growth upon trade; shifts in US strategy since 9/11, and the upsurge in piracy along the

Gulf of Aden and Somali coasts. With the expansion of the US AFRICOM base, the reconfiguration of France's military presence and the establishment of Japanese and other military facilities, Djibouti has become an international maritime and military laboratory where new forms of cooperation are being developed. Djibouti has accelerated plans for regional economic integration. Building on close ties with Ethiopia, existing port upgrades and electricity grid integration will be enhanced by the development of the northern port of Tadjourah. These strategic and economic shifts have yet to be matched by internal political reforms, and growth needs to be linked to strategies for job creation and a renewal of domestic political legitimacy.

6.2. Conclusion

Foreign Military bases in Djibouti and the Horn of Africa region has its opportunities and risks. The opportunity of providing a rent economy to the host country owing to its geostrategic position to different regions. On Another note such revenues can be used to enhance socio-economic development of Djibouti. The risks here are the environmental implications arising from tests of weapons, environmental insecurity of flying drones overheads, internal scuffles and uproar that may arise from the country owners of these bases among themselves and the host country amongst other risks. However, this research which focuses on foreign military bases and economic security in Djibouti was able to find out that beyond the GWOT ie Global War on Terror, Counter terrorism and countering Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa region there are economic imperative or interests which brought about the establishment of such bases as can be seen in the economic implications of Chinese Military base and foot prints in Africa. Djibouti which is less volatile or hostile creates a platform for the transshipment of goods across Africa and Asia hence serves as a strategic hub which is not in essence a habiting place but "port of call". Again, the revenues

derived from these bases does not imply economic development in essence. Such revenues can be mismanaged and unaccounted for owing to issues like corruption or mismanagement from the host country.

On the regional level, these bases, especially those maintained by global powers, have affected the AU from implementing indigenous continental solutions, especially those requiring inclusiveness and mediation example is Mali where the Operation Barkhane has not stymied the operations of Islamist Ansar Dine. There is a great need for Africans to be concerned about these developments and this focus on the creation of bases, because of their impact on the populations of various countries, and implications for state as well as continental sovereignty. Diego Garcia, the base that set the trend for this phenomenon in Africa, illustrates the rather drastic potential impacts of these. The island's population has been reduced to one lacking rights and freedoms, with many of its members forcibly removed from their homes and deported – most to Mauritius and Seychelles, not allowed the right to return. Further, the presence of the base has ensured that the African Union has little influence over the island; it is still de facto ruled as a British territory. Similarly, the 'global war on terror', coupled with the rise of China, has seen global powers seeking to re-enter or strengthen their presence on the continent, with economic and national interests such as France's bases in Niger, which are more an attempt to protect French interests around Niger's vast uranium resources.

6.3. Recommendations.

Having examined foreign military bases in Djibouti, it is upon the strength of our findings that we put forth the following recommendations:

That with regards to Djibouti's geostrategic location, the country should focus on other socio- economic activities like tourism which has aesthetic nature in coastal region, and

equally attracts tourists and expatriates. Consequently, this will help bring a drift from the rent economy of hosting military bases on its soil. Again, she should be on top of her diplomacy and relations with neighboring states of Africa in order not to be used as a guinea pig when an uproar or disagreement arises as a result of the bases and also used to pay a price in terms of conflict situation like military base in Eurasia.

Djibouti as a country should look beyond the revenues and premiums realized from these bases as a result of its geostrategic location to how it can indigenously enhance such opportunity to bring about economic development and a good standard of living among her citizens. Based on the findings of this study and the questions it sets to address, the premiums and rents on these military bases has not had any significant increase in the socio-economic development of Djibouti (UNECA, 2016-Djibouti's country profile).

In a regional sense, AU will need to increase its capacity (a challenge in a general sense) to have a stronger focus on preventing foreign exploitation and interstate conflicts – more critical threats than terrorism. The institution has had many successes in the fight against the militancy of non-state actors, especially in the area of promoting sub-regional state coordination. The joint multinational task force amongst Lake Chad basin states and the G5 Sahel (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Chad) are welcome steps in ensuring neighborhood solutions to cross-border militancy, although though these still need to be coupled with more focus on inclusivity. Consequently, if AU would adopt such mechanism to fighting terrorism in the Horn of Africa region it will help reduce the influx of military bases in Djibouti.

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APPENDIX 1

Tabular overview of some of the foreign military bases in Africa; their host nations and the purpose it serves.

FOREIGN MILITARY BASE	HOST NATIONS IN AFRICA	INTENDED PURPOSE OF THE BASE.
CHINA	Djibouti	China's first oversea military base at the port of Obock, across the Gulf of Tadjoura from the US Expeditionary Base at Camp Lemonnier. The base will have the capacity to house several thousand troops, and is expected to help provide security for China's interests in the rest of the Horn of Africa.
FRANCE	Chad	Headquarters of the anti-insurgent Operation Barkhane. Housing about 3,500 French troops who also operate in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.
	Cote d'Ivoire	This French base is located at the Port-Bouët, a suburb of Abidjan. It is expected to be expanded from 500 to 900 men and form a forward operating base for West Africa.
	Djibouti	A long-standing French military presence, now comprising roughly 1,700 personnel.
	Gabon	A key base that has contributed troops to France's interventions in Central African Republic.
GERMANY	Niger	An air transport base at Niamey international airport to support Germany's growing troop contribution to the UN mission in Mali.
INDIA	Madagascar:	India's first foreign listening post and was set up in northern Madagascar in 2007 to keep an eye on ship movements in the Indian Ocean and listen in on maritime communications.
	The Seychelles	Has allocated land on Assumption Island for India to build its first naval base in the Indian Ocean region. The ostensible interest is counter-piracy, but India also seems to be keeping an eye on China. (yet to be established)
JAPAN	Djibouti:	Since 2011, a contingent of 180 troops has occupied a 12-hectare site next to Camp Lemonnier. The move is seen as a counter to Chinese influence, linked to a new strategic engagement with Africa, underlined by the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development held in Nairobi.
SAUDI ARABIA	Djibouti:	After falling out with Djibouti, Riyadh is now finalising an agreement to build a new base. Saudi Arabia is leading a coalition fighting Houthi rebels in Yemen, across the narrow Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. (yet to be established)

TURKEY	Somalia	Ankara's first military base in Africa and a training facility for Somali troops. Turkey has steadily increased its influence in Somalia, In 2011, then Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan visited Mogadishu, which also portrays Turkey's influence in the region.
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Eritrea	In 2015, the UAE began developing the mothballed deepwater port of Assab and its 3,500-metre runway, capable of landing large transport planes. Assab is now the UAE's main logistics hub for all operations in Yemen, including the naval blockade of the Red Sea ports of Mokha and Hodeida. In return, the isolated Eritrean government has received a financial and infrastructural assistance
	Libya	Operates counter-insurgency attack aircraft and drones from Al-Khadim airport in eastern Libya in support of the Libyan National Army fighting jihadist militants.
	Somalia	The UAE trains and equips Somalia's counterterrorism unit and National Intelligence and Security Agency. It also supports the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which is believed to have played a role in interdicting Iranian weapons smuggling to the Houthis.
	Somaliland	The UAE has a 30-year lease on a naval and airbase at the port of Berbera. Dubai Ports World won a contract to manage and double the size of the port, ending Djibouti's monopoly on Ethiopia's freight traffic. The UAE is reportedly providing military training and a security guarantee to the self-declared independent territory.
UNITED KINGDOM	Kenya	A permanent training support unit based mainly in Nanyuki, 200 kilometres north of Nairobi
UNITED STATES	Burkina Faso	A "cooperative security location" in Ouagadougou which provides surveillance and intelligence over the Sahel.
	Cameroon	Garoua airport in northern Cameroon is also a drone base targeting Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria. It houses unarmed Predator drones and some 300 US soldiers.
	Chad	Predator and Reaper drones are based in the capital, Ndjamena.
	Central African Republic	US special forces are based in the "temporary sites" of Obo and Djema, helping the Ugandan army hunt for Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army
	Democratic Republic of Congo	Dungu is another "temporary site" used in the hunt for Kony.
	Djibouti	Camp Lemonnier, a 200-hectare expeditionary base housing some 3,200 US soldiers and civilians next to the international airport. Home to the Combined

		Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa of the US Africa Command, it is the only permanent US military base in Africa
	Ethiopia	A small drone facility at Arba Minch was operational since 2011 but is now believed to have closed
	Gabon	Bare-bones launch pad for quick-reaction forces called in to protect diplomatic facilities in the region
	Ghana	Bare-bones launch pad for quick-reaction forces
	Kenya	Camp Simba in Manda Bay is a base for naval personnel and Green Berets. It also houses armed drones for operations in Somalia and Yemen.
	Niger:	An initial base in Niamey has been overshadowed by Agadez, capable of handling large transport aircraft and armed Reaper drones. The base covers the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin
	Somalia	US commandos are operating from compounds in Kismayo and Baledogle
	The Seychelles	Drone operations from a base on the island of Victoria.
	Senegal:	The Senegal facility was used during the US military's Ebola response.
	South Sudan	Nzara airfield is another base for US troops searching for Kony, and related surveillance operations. US special forces have also provided training to South Sudanese troops.
	Uganda	PC-12 surveillance aircraft fly from Entebbe airport as part of the US special forces mission helping the Ugandan army hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army.

(Source: *IRIN-inside Story on Emergencies. Irinnews.org 2018 and compiled by the author, 2018*).