

**INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ALLIANCE AND THE WAR AGAINST
BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA, 2011-2015**

BY

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PG/M.Sc/15/76700

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
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TITLE PAGE

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**PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF
SCIENCE (M.Sc.) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
(INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA**

SUPERVISOR: DR. H. C. EDEH

APRIL, 2017


APPROVAL PAGE

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the ever-living God who bequeathed His grace upon me to make this work come to fruition.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The success of this work would not have been so if not for the input made by certain people. Am overwhelmed to have come in contact with such a humble personality as my supervisor, Dr. Herbert Chijioke Edeh, who didn't just painstakingly teach me nitty-gritty of qualitative academic research, but also coached me in attaining greatness and yielding to societal needs. The manner he held himself as an associate to not just me, but to all his supervisees is unparalleled. My profound gratitude goes to the erudite scholars in Political Science who in the course of their tutelage and academic mentorship have impacted positively in me. They include the savvy head of the department, Prof. Obasi Igwe, the immediate past PG Coordinator, Prof. Aloysius-Michael Okoli, Prof. Jonah Onuoha, the present PG Coordinator, Dr. Abada, Dr. Jerry Ezirim, Dr. Agbo, Dr. V.C. Onah, Dr. H. C. Edeh, Dr. Ike, Dr. Mbah, Dr. Ezeibe, Dr. Benjamin Okpukpara and in posthumous, Prof. Ken Ifesinachi who until his death was a consummate scholar.

My appreciation also goes to my parents, Chief and Mrs. Ozioko Fidelis, who were instrumental to the successful completion of this second degree.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU-----	African Union
ECOWAS----	Economic Community of West African States
UN-----	United Nations
MNJTF-----	Multi National Joint Task Force
BH-----	Boko Haram
BHT-----	Boko Haram Terrorist
USA-----	United States of America
UK-----	United Kingdom
LCBC-----	Lake Chad Basin Commission
ICG-----	International Crisis Group
START-----	Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
ICC-----	International Criminal Court
ICJ-----	International Court of Justice
UNCHR-----	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
EU-----	European Union
PSC-----	Peace and Security Council
EUR-----	European Union Report
MEND-----	Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
NDVF-----	Niger Delta Volunteer Force
HRW-----	Human Rights Watch
UNNHR-----	United Nations Nigeria Humanitarian Report
UNHC-----	United Nations Humanitarian Centre
IDPs-----	Internally Displaced Persons
NPF-----	Nigerian Police Force

CBN-----Central Bank of Nigeria

AGIM-----Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb

ITSR-----International Terrorism and Security Research

USDD-----United States Department of Defence

FBI-----Federal Bureau of Investigation

FTO-----Foreign Terrorist Organisation

JTF-----Joint Task Force

IGO-----International Governmental Organisation

ACF-----Arewa Conservative Forum

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ABSTRACT

Insurgency as an affront on political systems across the globe is an aged long phenomenon. In Nigeria, it has on different occasions threatened to tear asunder the fabrics that bind the nation and its people together. The latest in this sequence of unrelenting confrontation with the Nigerian state is the Boko Haram insurgency. The fact that this insurgency has proven herculean to control for the Nigerian state is evidenced in its appeal for international assistance and cooperation that she consequently garnered. Therefore, the study focuses on interrogating the nexus between international military alliance and Boko Haram insurgency. Specifically, the study set out to ascertain if the establishment and operations of Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF) undermined Boko Haram insurgency and also determine whether the provision of logistical support by western nations resulted in the effective implementation of counter-terrorism strategies by MNJTF against Boko Haram insurgency. The study adopts documentary method of data collection, qualitative method of data analysis and ex-post facto research design. The study anchors on the functionalist theory of international relations. It also notes that the establishment and operations of MNJTF has not checkmated Boko Haram insurgency because the sect still carry out its belligerent attacks within and along Nigerian, Chadian, Nigerien and Cameroonian borders. The study recommends among others, that greater coordination and understanding among MNJTF countries in order to achieve the purpose of the alliance and those other western countries should also provide the much needed logistics and support in quelling the insurgency.

Keywords: International Military Alliance, Multi-national Joint Task Force, Boko Haram Insurgency, Terrorism.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Boko Haram insurgency evolved as mere disgruntled muttering, pockets of resistance, a challenge to national cohesion, and an affront to international peace and security. This development has inevitably necessitated an international approach in addressing the grave security concern it poses. In this context, Oluwatoyin (2013), noted that since the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, the sect has waged a war of terror on Nigeria, exploiting ethno-religious differences in the country to advance its brand of religion. To this end, the sect's capacity to threaten peace, security and political stability has been felt not only in Nigeria but also by countries that share borders with Nigeria, especially those situated within Lake Chad Basin.

The dynamics and manifestations of Boko Haram which is anchored on global Islamic revivalism has given rise to geo-religious conflicts that have contributed to astronomic human fatalities among nations affected by the sect's onslaught. Boko Haram, whose official name is Jamabatu Ali's Sunna lid Da'watiW'l-Jihad (an Arabic name that means 'Society of Adherents to the Prophet's Teachings Committed to the Propagation of the Faith and Jihad) was established in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno, a northeastern state (Farouk, 2015).

Although some accounts trace its inception to the 1990s, most sources associate its creation to the time the group began to be noticed by the authorities, in the early 2000s (International Crisis Group, 2014). The group was led by a charismatic cleric named Mohammed Yusuf, who was later killed while in police custody in 2009, which, according to a number of sources marked the point at which the group turned violent (Law of library Congress, 2015). Though, historicizing the origin of Boko Haram is a herculean task given the many versions of the origin and founder of the group (Blanchard, 2014). In similar vein, Walker (2012:54) posited that:

throughout its existence, the organisation has constantly morphed and changed its nature as it has gone through various incarnations. This evolution has made it difficult for observers to pin the organisation down and define it.

However, it is indisputable that the sects sprang up in north eastern Nigeria where it metamorphosed and underwent transformations. To this end, Ogwu (2013:7), observes that these realities:

typify new trends in the global security agenda that have assumed greater urgency in the 21st century. The emergence of terrorism on the global scene is a dangerous trajectory because it poses a serious threat to human existence, collective peace and global security. In view of the enormous threats posed by global terrorism, the international community is faced with the challenge of bringing the phenomenon under control, since its activities transcend national boundaries.

Furthermore, it is now beyond dispute that Boko Haram terrorist group is a threat to national security, but it clearly has not remained so because the activities and carnage masterminded by the sect cut across national boundaries. Also, the sect has contacts with terrorist groups outside Nigeria and has recruited foreign fighters that are not of Nigerian or even West African descent, and this symbiotic or mutually reinforcing relationships have emboldened the group, predicating it to embark on more deadly attacks that cut across territorial spaces of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Since Boko Haram started its violent attacks in 2009, over 8,000 particularly in Nigeria are casualties of this insurgency (Human Rights Watch, 2014). More so, these constant attacks by the sects in these countries have led to the displacement of people, particularly of Nigerian extractions in other countries. According to International Crisis Centre (2015:32):

the conflict centred in north eastern Nigeria which is now driving a crisis with regional implications. Boko Haram has on several occasions attacked targets over the Nigerian border in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger driving displacement and humanitarian needs in these nations as well. By January 2015, UNHCR reported that 130, 000 Nigerian refugees were registered in Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

Moreover, the dynamics and manifestations of this group and the large scale of human casualties in the above countries motorized the establishment of international military alliance such as the Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), to quell the steaming tide of Boko Haram insurgency and this is because the sect has morphed from being a local Salafi-Jihad group into a major player in West African radicalism. Its tactics ranges from standard guerrilla pin-prick attacks against government, military and Christian targets to sophisticated suicide attacks and mass slaying of target populations (Cook, 2014). To be exact, the MNJTF, originally a tripartite organisation involving majorly Nigeria, Chad, and Niger Republic was established as Operation Flush Out, to flush out Chadian and Nigerian rebels who operated in Lake Chad region before September, 1998. The force is charged with the responsibility of containing cross-border banditry and criminal activities born as a result of the presence of rebels around the international borders of Nigeria, Chad and Niger Republic (Olusola, 2013). As a corollary to the foregoing, MNJTF was set up in 1998 in order to combat transnational crime in Lake Chad region, but was mostly dormant until 2012, when it was reactivated in order to deal with Boko Haram insurgency and nip it in the bud. Historicizing the origin of MNJTF, Onuoha (2015) noted that in order to cope with the spread of terrorism in the region, the Paris Summit of May 2014, which brought together the heads of states of Benin, Chad, Cameroon, France, Niger, Nigeria, and representatives of the US, UK, and EU, decided to enhance regional cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram, by means of coordinated patrols and border surveillance, pooling intelligence and exchanging relevant information. Similarly, in October 2014, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) member states (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin Republic) decided to improve their cooperation to combat Boko Haram, by pledging troops to the MNJTF, which should have become operational inside national borders by November 2014. It was also decided to ask the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) to establish the appropriate legal framework for cross-border military operations. Despite the establishment of MNJTF, Boko Haram sects are still conducting more attacks and carrying out more raids in these countries. Corroborating this view, EUR (2015:2), noted thus:

at the beginning of 2015, the MNJTF headquarters fell into the hands of Boko Haram militants, together with the town of Baga in north eastern Nigeria where it was sited. It appears that, by that time, only troops from Nigeria were stationed there as Niger and Chad had withdrawn their troops because of security risks. It thus became even more urgent to revive the regional approach to combating Boko Haram. On 20th January, 2015, leaders from 13 West and Central African countries (Nigeria was not represented) held discussions about setting up a multinational force to combat Boko Haram, the day after the UN Security Council's president issued a statement in which it called for the enhancement of the MNJTF's operational capacity.

Given the monstrous and catastrophic attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram in Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon that often got international attention, particularly the kidnapping of over 300 Chibok girls in a secondary school in Chibok, Borno state in Nigeria (Blanchard, 2015), the African Union deemed it necessary to support MNJTF through a decision of 29 January 2015 by the African Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting at the level of heads of state and government. The PSC is a standing decision-making body of the AU, competent for peace and security issues. The decision authorized the deployment of the MNJTF, comprising up to 7,500 military and non-military staff, for an initial period of 12 months, which can be renewed. The mission will aim to create a secure environment, restore state authority and facilitate humanitarian assistance in the affected areas (AU, 2015).

The MNJTF's more specific tasks include conducting military operations, achieving coordination of inter-state level, conducting border patrols, finding abducted persons, stopping the flow of arms, reintegrating insurgents into society and bringing those responsible for crimes to justice. In its decision, the PSC also asked the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution authorizing the military operation, as well as to create a Trust Fund and mobilize international support (Onuoha, 2015). This path is similar to that followed in previous cases, in which the AU sent peace support missions (Mali, Central African Republic and Somalia); the missions were authorized and supported, including through the establishment of a Trust Fund by the UN Security Council (Agibeoa, 2015). The PSC decision also noted the need to address the root causes of the crisis, by

improving the livelihood of the people in the region. The PSC's decision was endorsed by the AU Assembly at the AU's 24th Summit held in Addis Ababa on 30th and 31st January, 2015. The Assembly expressed its support for the international efforts deployed to fight Boko Haram including for Chad's timely intervention in Cameroon and for the commitment of troops by the LCBC states of Benin, and the establishment of military headquarters to conduct operations against Boko Haram (EUR, 2015).

Despite the above, Boko Haram is still waxing stronger, given the daily occurrence of raids, ransacking of villages, kidnapping of public figures, women and girls, drive by shooting of Islamic clerics that opposes the group, incessant suicide bombing increases among others not just in Nigeria but also in other neighbouring countries too. To this end, Ostebo (2012), posited that since 2009, the sect has grown from being a localized problem to a national and regional threat. It has opportunistically tapped into Islamic revivalism globally, and, while it has local roots and origins, it is part of a broader, global ideological current. All these pose a question mark on the effectiveness and efficiency of the MNJTF in tackling and combating Boko Haram insurgency.

In the light of the above, the central concern of this study is to examine the nexus between International Military Alliance and Boko Haram Insurgency. Hence, the major focus of the study is to unravel the linkages between MNJTF and Boko Haram insurgency.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Across the world, the realities of insurgent groups, terrorist groups and organised crime is not a new phenomenon. Since the past decade, Nigeria has become a theatre of bloodshed and carnage due to the manifestation of ethno-religious and political violence. This crisis is a feature of every society and this exist in multiple forms and dimensions across the globe. In Nigeria, it is not a new phenomenon because the history of Nigeria is blighted by ferocious crisis before and after her independence. These crises are of varying degrees, durations, intensities, multi-dimensional and include historical animosities, colonial legacies over issues of ethnicity, religion, regional/state

divisions, indigene/settler, fears of domination/marginalisation, revenue allocation formula and more importantly, struggles over resource control (Olusapo, 2013). To be specific, the Nigerian state has witnessed variants of ethno-religious, economic and political crisis such as Kano Riot of 1953, Census Crisis of 1962, Action Group Crisis of 1962/63, Federal Election Crisis of 1964, coups and counter-coups, the Civil War of 1967-1970, June 12th Political Crisis of 1993, Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram crisis (Ajoda and Aju, 2014).

Since the return of civil rule in 1999, Nigeria has been battling with series of violence and agitations from various groups in the country. These agitations which have taken terror dimensions have culminated into national and regional security threat, and are capable of threatening the continuous existence of the country (Ikelegbe, 2009). Terrorists of various groups and camps have, over the years, taken up arms against the Nigerian state and unleashed untold pain and havoc on the Nigerian people. Though these groups are numerous, the most noticeable and deadly are the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), and the rampaging Boko Haram sect (Human Rights Watch, 2014:12).

Meanwhile, Boko Haram insurgency is the latest in the long line of crisis that has bedevilled the Nigerian state. In fact, the alarming acts of terror perpetrated by Boko Haram insurgent group is perhaps the greatest and most critical security challenge confronting the cohesion and development of the nation. Moreover, the activities and operations of Boko Haram insurgent group since the last 2009 have engendered a state of crude fear in Nigeria and beyond. Prior to 2009, the insurgent group and their activities were not given a serious attention by government, as the sect was perceived to be merely preaching the purification of Islam. The game changer was, probably, the extra-judiciary and arbitrary killing of the group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf while in the custody of the members of the Nigerian security (Okoli and Philip, 2014:64).

Following confrontation with security operatives on issues relating to road safety and use of helmet, the activities of the members of the group escalated violently. There were brazen attacks on Nigerian police posts, particularly in Maiduguri, Bauchi, Yobe and Kano. These attacks have

continued almost unabated. The increasing level of organisation of the group and the sophistication of their attacks have led many observers to believe that there could be technical assistance being rendered to the group by seasoned international terrorist organisations (Olojo, 2013:42).

The escalation of insurgency in early 2010 caught the government flat-footed and it was initially believed that the violence would pan out. Sustained attacks, however, ushered in more sober responses. The increase in the spate of attacks by the sect within Lake Chad Basin/region and given the purported establishment of ties or links by the sect with other international Islamic Terrorist Organisations such as: A-Ishabaab in Somalia, Ansar-Al-Dine in Mali, and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan among others led to the formation, resuscitation and support of MNJTF (Winsor, 2015). Yet, the attacks has not abated, but rather has continued unchecked. In short, the boldness of Boko Haram to carry out mind-blowing attacks has increased over the years. Moreover, the extent of violence and destruction of invaluable amount of public and private properties have left over 650,000 persons displaced in north-eastern Nigeria. (Human Right Watch, 2014) According to the United Nations Nigeria Humanitarian Report (UNNHR) (2014:3):

in2014, Nigeria continued to see a rise in violence related to the activities of Boko Haram, who at the same time expanded their control of territory in mid-2014 by occupying towns in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states in north eastern region of the country. Attacks on communities in this region have been occurring at nearly a daily pace, and the degree of violence from these attacks are also rising dramatically, with the number of fatalities reaching over 7, 000 in 2014 alone.

Since the outbreak of sectarian violence, Salkida (2012), noted that towns bordering Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad have ceased to know civil normalcy. Intermittent suicide and car bombings have become the part of their daily lives. Hate-filled adherents of the extremist sect called Boko Haram and other criminals assuming their identity wielding semi-automatic rifles speed through streets at intervals to shoot down, randomly at their ever widening targets. In this regard, the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2014:1), noted that:

Boko Haram's insurgency has pitted neighbours against neighbours, cost more than 4, 000 lives, displaced close to half a million, destroyed hundreds of schools and government buildings and devastated an already ravaged economy in the north east, one of Nigeria's poorest regions. It overstretches federal security services, with no end in sight, spills over to other parts of the north and risks reaching Niger and Cameroon.

The above may have been possible because the MNJTF has not been properly funded and therefore lack the necessary logistics to counter the superior fire power of Boko Haram. Since it is a joint task force of more than one country, it is funded mostly by countries in the AU and USA. European Union on the other hand was not motivated to sponsor or fund MNJTF with money and other necessary logistics to combat the sect (Babb, 2015).

Even in the very face of MNJTF, the group is still fomenting insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin region. The kidnapping of civilians is one of its stock in trade. According to Zenn (2015), Boko Haram has kidnapped more than 25 foreigners in northern Nigeria and Cameroon, including Engineers, Priest, Nuns and tourist. Thus far, 10 foreign hostages from the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Greece, China and Lebanon have been killed, while 10 from France have been exchanged for millions of dollars. On Thursday, April 15th 2014, the terrorist organisation, Boko Haram attacked girls' school in Chibok, Borno state, in north eastern Nigeria, abducting between 250 and 300 young girls (Centre for the Study of Terrorism, 2015). Sadly, despite international and national attempts to rescue them, the girls have not been completely rescued ever with the presence of MNJTF. Again, it has been rumoured that most of the countries within the region are sabotaging the efforts of MNJTF to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency (Onuoha, 2014). Corroborating this view, United Nations Humanitarian Centre (2015:21), noted that:

this conflict and insurgency is driving massive displacement with an estimated 1 million people reported to have fled their communities in 2014. This displacement is in turn driving acute humanitarian needs as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are cut off from their livelihoods, basic services, social ties, and their homes. There are over 150 known sites hosting IDPs and only 10% of the displaced population is staying in camps or

‘camp-like’ settings, while the rest are staying in host communities, the coping capacities of which are under severe strain. Insecurity also continues to restrict humanitarian access particularly in the areas under the control of north eastern region where the security situation remains highly volatile.

The establishment of MNJTF in the region with one of its goal of helping in settling people dislodged by the conflicts has not reduced the humanitarian crisis which is still rocking the region. Boko Haram insurgency has led to the displacement of huge human population in the affected states. Available information suggests that the number of internally displaced persons and refugees associated with the insurgency has been enormous (Akintola, 2014). Based on a recent United Nations Humanitarian Commission on Refugee (UNHCR) report cited in Adebowale (2013), no fewer than 5, 000 people have been displaced in the north eastern region off Nigeria as a result of the raging insurgency. The UNHCR further reveals: some 10, 000 Nigerians have crossed into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger in recent months.

The above shows the international and regional dimension of the conflict and given that MNJTF was set up to cater for the needs of these displaced people and get them settled in their various camps. According to Okoli and Philip (2014), the plight of these displaced persons in their various places of refuge can be best described as critically threatening. This is more so considering the fact that they have been dislocated from their family and social capital bases. According to a United Nations Humanitarian Reports (2015), most of these displaced people lack access to good water, clothe and health care. They are left in the camp at the mercy of nature. Most of this happens because of internal wrangling by countries involved in the MNJTF, especially on who will lead the force (EUR, 2015).

Furthermore, the daily occurrence of suicide bombings in the region, even with the presence of MNJTF is mind baffling given that its very formation was to quell or minimize the Boko Haram insurgency. According to Scheweitzer, Levin and Yoge (2015:43), 32 suicide attacks was carried out by the Boko Haram in 2014 and this accounted for about half of all such attacks it has

perpetrated since it had recourse to this method in 2011. About 5000 people were killed in Boko Haram suicide attacks in 2014 and these suicide bombers were trained and sent by the organisation. The foregoing lapse of the MNJTF according to EUR (2015) was because of logistical difficulties, insufficient number of troops, lack of adequate funding, together with the attitude of countries involved which have always tendered to focus more on their own interest than on regional approach and have delayed and derailed operationalization of this force among others. From the above, it is seen that since its inception in early 2000 and resurrection in 2009, Boko Haram have always occupied the front burner among scholars (Nigerian and foreign), governments, non-governmental organisations and other concerned groups. Okoli and Philip (2014), Imasuen (2015), (ICG, 2014) UNHR (2014) among others investigated the nexus between Boko Haram and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria and other neighbouring countries. Onuoha (2013), Ostebo (2012), Salkida (2012), Okoli (2013) among others interrogated Boko Haram, situating their studies on radicalization, ideology, methods of recruitment, organisational composition and leadership strength of Boko Haram. Not much has been written on the effect of International Military Alliance, especially MNJTF on the Boko Haram insurgency.

Although, Akintola (2014), Winsor (2015), Babb (2015), among others have interrogated MNJTF as regards Boko Haram insurgency, they looked at its purpose; weakness; strengths and possible achievement. However, they did not pay systematic and adequate attention on how International Military Alliance especially the use of MNJTF contributed to reducing or eliminating Boko Haram insurgency and how the provision of logistical support by western countries led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria. It is the epistemological lacuna and the need to contribute to the existing literature linking both phenomena that necessitated this study. On the basis of this gap in literature, this study seeks to address the following research questions:

1. Has the introduction of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the insurgency theatre in north eastern Nigeria enhanced the war against Boko Haram Insurgency?

2. Has the provision of logistical support by western countries led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

This study has both broad and specific objectives. While the broad objective is to examine the linkage between International Military Alliance and Boko Haram Insurgency, the specific objective of the study, however, includes:

1. To determine if the introduction of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has contributed to the war against the Boko Haram insurgency.
2. To ascertain whether the provision of logistical support by western countries has led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria.

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study is significant in both theoretical and practical folds. Theoretically, this study will provide an in-depth understanding of international military alliance in the struggle and fight against insurgency. Specifically, the study offers fresh insight in ascertaining if the establishment and operations of Multinational Joint Task Force undermined Boko Haram insurgency and also whether the provision of logistical support by western countries has led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria.

Practically, this study will aid policy makers, administrators, governments (Nigerian and foreign), non-governmental organisations and even donor agencies by providing policy options and ideas on how to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency by improving MNJTF. The study will show the necessity of a strong alliance with support from western countries in curtailing Boko Haram insurgency along the Lake Chad Basin region. Definitely, the findings of the study will offer practical insight on the strengths, weaknesses, possible benefits and pitfalls of such alliances.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The aim of this study is to investigate the nexus between international military alliance and Boko Haram insurgency. Also, this study seeks to determine if the establishment of and operations of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has contributed to the war against the Boko Haram insurgency and to ascertain whether the provision of logistical support by western countries has led to the effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria. In this context, it is pertinent to review principally the divergent views of scholars on the major variables of research questions based on the following themes:

2.1 Establishment of Multinational Joint Task Force and Boko Haram Insurgency

Security situation in the Lake Chad Basin area since Boko Haram sect decided to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region has not only been alarming but has assumed threatening posture to regional peace and stability along Nigerian borders. Based on the above and coupled with the nature and character of cross border security along Lake Chad Basin even before the inception of Boko Haram, MNJTF was established to checkmate the above situation. According to Olusola (2013), the MNJTF is a tripartite organisation involving Nigeria, Chad and Niger Republic. It was established as 'Operation Flush Out' so as to flush out Nigerian and Chadian rebels who operated in Lake Chad region before September 1998. The force is charged with the responsibility of containing cross-border banditry and other criminal activities born as a result of the presence of rebels around the international borders of Nigeria, Chad and Niger Republic. To be specific, MNJTF was set up in 1998 in order to combat transnational crime in the Lake Chad region, but was mostly dormant until 2012, when it was reactivated in order to deal with Boko Haram. In order to cope with the spread of terrorism in the region, the Paris Summit of May 2014 which brought together the heads of state of Benin, Chad, Cameroon, France, Nigeria, Niger and

representatives of the US, UK, EU, decided to enhance regional cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram, by means of coordinated patrols and border surveillance, pooling intelligence and exchanging relevant information (EUR, 2015).

From the above, it can be deduced that transnational efforts to combat crime in the region preceded the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency because the MNJTF which originally was made up of Nigeria, Chad and Niger was established in 1998 to combat transnational crime such as prostitution, illegal movement of people, drugs and goods in the Lake Chad Basin region, but was mostly dormant and inactive until 2012, when it was reactivated in order to deal with Boko Haram growing spate of havoc in the region (Akintola, 2014).

However, the MNJTF with its original member states were finding Boko Haram quite a handful because the sect as executing more daring attacks on these states. Nigeria in particular was worse off given the continuous onslaught on human lives it recorded daily because of the sects. The abduction in April 2014 of over 300 Chibok girls in Borno state is one amongst many attacks according International Crisis Group (ICG, 2014).

Consequently, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) member states (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) and Benin decided to improve their corporation to combat Boko Haram, by pledging troops to the MNJTF, which should have become operational inside national borders by November 2014. It was decided to ask the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) to establish appropriate legal framework for cross-border military operations. Despite the establishment of MNJTF, however, Winsor (2015), was quick to point that external source of support and assistance in combating the dreaded Boko Haram, may perhaps never have been considered a viable or worthwhile option if not the sudden transnational posture and activities of the group.

To be exact, postulations and discourses on the nature, character and origin of this group known as Boko Haram is conflicting, but central to all these is that the increase in the spate of BH attacks is as a result of Nigerian government's initial response to the group, particularly the extra-judiciary killing of Mohhamed Yusuf. Buttressing this view, Okoli and Philip (2014: 44), noted that:

the eventual extra-judiciary killing of Yusuf was the major impetus for Boko Haram insurgency and the spate of violence that followed. Following the clamp-down on members of the sect, those who survived arrest and trial went underground telling their stories of injustice and nursing their grievances in exile.

However, historicising the origin of Boko Haram is a herculean task because there are constant contestations among scholars on origin, founder, name and even purpose of the sect. Most authors generally agree that the Boko Haram group first appeared in 2002. However, a view seems to be emerging that traces back the rise of the group as far as 1995, when it existed as a little known Muslim youth organisation known as Shahabad (Madike, 2011; Bello, 2013). The origin and founder of BH is shrouded in uncertainty. Some scholars trace the origin of the sect to 1995 with LawanAbubakar as its founder. It was when Abubakar left for further studies in Saudi Arabia that Mohammed Yusuf who was regarded as the leader, took over the affairs of the sect. there are additional accounts that trace BH emergence to a group of Muslim students from the University of Maiduguri. For as Olojo (2013:3), noted that:

these students, led by a man known as AminuTashenIimi, who dropped out of the school in response to the preaching of a foreign Islamic scholar who convinced them that western education was haram (unlawful) in Islam. This particular account suggests that it was a band of individuals that came in contact with Mohammed Yusuf, who, following conviction about his new-found ideology, altered the message of his religious sermons to the extent that he was later prevented from preaching at the Indimi mosque in Maiduguri around the year 2000.

Apart from the above, numerous expositions on the origin and founder of BH abound. Danjibo (2009; Bumah and Abimbola 2009; Langmang 2011, Adike 2012; Uzodike and Maingara 2012).

According to Andrew (2011: 7):

there are many barriers to understanding the group. So little information about the organisation can be verified, and solid, dependable information in general is hard to come by in Nigeria. Naturally, questions have been raised about what it has and has not done.

For Mustapha, (2013), anyone who doubts that a single group is operating in northern Nigeria is in denial. He pointed out that throughout its existence; the organisation has constantly morphed and changed its nature as it has gone through various incarnations. This evolution has made it difficult for observers to pin the organisation down and define it. Clarity has been obscured because contact with the organisation is difficult to establish. It has made announcements about its goals that are contradictory, not really achievable, or unrealistic (Andrew, 2013). Moreover, according to Onuoha (2015), a fruitful way to understand Boko Haram's ability to persistently mount audacious attacks is to view it within the context of the transnational flow of ideological influence from global Salafi Jihadist Islamism. The term "Islamism" for Denoëux (2002) means different things to different people. He posited that:

It is a form of instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups and organisations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on re-appropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition. (Denoëux 2002: 61).

Certainly, Islamism is politically heterogeneous in the sense that different Islamist movements specialise in qualitatively different political activities depending on the context that underpins their emergence (Hegghammer, 2009). Some oppose local regimes by non-violent means (radical Islamist); others try to topple regimes with terrorist tactics (jihad Islamist); and still others wage armed assistance against occupation by non-Muslim powers (Onuoha, 2015). According to Rasheed (2012), Boko Haram belongs to Salafi Jihadist Islamic stock, and it seeks to topple the secular Nigerian state. The sect's ideology and operational tactics is derived from the global Salafist Islamic ideology, which seeks the imposition of its own interpretation of Islamic Law and a safe haven for jihadist. However, Salafi Jihadism, which Boko Haram advocates and practice according to Onuoha (2015), focuses on the use of violence to bring about such radical change. It refers to the merging of Salafi outlook and Jihadi cell to violence.

Despite these contradictions about Boko Haram, the ferocity of its attacks on the Nigerian state and its citizens and institutions are not in doubt and this increased after the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf by the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). Corroborating this view, Amnesty International (2013) stated that everything escalated because of the extra-judicial execution of Yusuf. Since his death, the group became stronger and bolder in attacks. According to Marchal (2012:13), this major blow (the killing of their founder) pushed the movement to transform itself into a network of underground cells with a hidden leadership. Of the reasons for the dynamics and manifestations of Boko Haram in north eastern Nigeria is the level of poverty in that region. In short, poverty and Boko Haram insurgency motorised each other given that they enjoy a symbiotic relationship in that region. Kwaja (2011: 11), for example, argues that “religious dimensions of the conflict have been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement and inequality are the root causes”.

Corroborating this view, Saleem (2012) noted that it is Nigerian government’s inability to manage corruption, the rising inequality between the rich and poor, the gross violation of human rights, and inaccessible education, could also be responsible for the high level of radicalisation. Categorically, Saleem (2013:53) stated that:

due to ineptitude and corrupt practices, the political leadership of Nigeria failed woefully to utilize the naturally endowed resources to address the many social problems facing the country. The poor became poorer, while a fraction of the political elite became wealthier, which generated many social problems, including religious bigotry, mass illiteracy, poorly-funded administrative institutions, the unavailability of basic health care for most, and fraudulent elections. Given this myriad of problems (excruciating poverty, unemployment, and mass illiteracy), especially among the religious inclined vulnerable youths in northern Nigeria, individuals like Mohammed Yusuf were able to seize the opportunity to seek relevance by preaching an alternative platform for disenchanted, vulnerable youths and consequently radicalize them to attack the system which, they believe, is largely responsible for their situation.

The above assertion tied the rise in Boko Haram insurgency strictly to the high level of poverty occasioned by bad governance and corruption in Nigeria, particularly in north east. In similar vein, Oarhe (2013) posited that the Boko Haram sect opportunistically tapped and manipulated the high level of poverty in north east to recruit new members and Nigerian government must deal with worsening economic condition in the region. He noted that:

Boko Haram capitalizes on widespread poverty and limited economic opportunities in the north. The poor economic condition and inequality created a climate of desperation, which must be dealt with by the Nigerian government if the defence and intelligence establishments are to ensure sustainable counter-terrorism operations (Oarhe, 2013: 73).

From the above, it is seen that Boko Haram took advantage of the high level of poverty in north eastern Nigeria and created a base to recruit and initiate members. According to International Crisis Group (ICG) (2014), there is a linkage between poverty and violence. A bulging percentage of federal and state budgets are allocated to salaries, allowances, pocket money, foreign trips and temporary duty tours constraining capital and development. For many, the name of the game have been spending, importing and looting. (ICG, 2014) observed that:

decaying infrastructure, chronic electricity shortages and an influx of cheaper imported products have led to massive factory closures and worsening unemployment. Educated young people, including a growing number of university and polytechnic graduates seek ever elusive jobs. Many youths in the north lack education, have few or no skills and are hardly employable. Idle, they are easily recruited by anti-state and militant groups. Poverty has been increasing despite relatively strong economic growth. The north east, Boko Haram's main operational field, has the worst poverty rate among the six official geo-political zones.

The argument of ICG (2014) is that infrastructural decay, lack of electricity and unemployment in north east increased violence in the region. Furthermore, according to Osita-Njoku and Chikere, (2015), the growing poverty in Nigeria is one of the root causes of Boko Haram insurgency. This is in spite of the fact that Nigeria is blessed with abundant human and material resources. When there is existence of wide gap between the rich and poor, there comes a breaking point where there is

bound to be a class conflict that materializes in various forms of revolutions. Similarly, Olatunji, (2013) noted that one time president of America, Bill Clinton has noted that the truth about Boko Haram insurgency is poverty rate in north, which is three times of what it is in Lagos. Furthermore, when poverty and ignorance are garbed with religious, ethnic or other partisan sentiments, then the embers of violence and senseless destruction of lives and property becomes a norm.

On the other hand, Ajaji and Nwogwugwu (2014), argued forcefully that poverty in Nigeria is a direct output of bad governance, including bloated and inefficient administrations at federal and state levels. A larger proportion of the Annual budgets of federal and state governments in Nigeria go to recurrent expenditures, instead of capital expenditure which is supposed to engender development. Over the last few years, the Nigerian government has been borrowing to finance recurrent expenditure which is a very terrible condition. Taking a direct approach (Copeland, 2013), mentioned that poverty and malnutrition rates are to be worse in the Boko Haram dominated states of north east and north west at over 75% of the population surviving on less than one dollar per day. *Ajaji, et al, (2014:66)*, further posited that:

in the face of high level of poverty in the north eastern geo-political zone, some of the governors have acquired personal private jets and mansions in major cities of the world, arguably from funds looted from the public treasury. Their children and family members attend schools outside Nigeria while the public schools are not properly funded. There have been allegations that some of the governors of the affected states lack the moral and political will to fight the menace as some of them had in the past contracted members of the group to facilitate their “winning” of elections, while some are figured as sponsors of the terrorist group.

Taking a different position, Nnodim (2013), observed that unemployment and not corruption is a major precipitating factor to Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The unemployment rate especially among the youths is quite alarming. The Nigeria’s unemployment rate rose to 23.9% compared to 2.1% in 2010. The jihadist terrorist group find the unemployed youths as fertile ground to indoctrinate their unguided ideology. It should be noted that Mohammed Yusuf’s radical

ideology gained a following among disaffected young men and unemployed youths, who are forced to make a living between the twin divide of creativity and criminality (Okoli and Lortyer, 2014:23).

For Kukah (2012), Boko Haram is no different from the likes of Maitasine Movement where many of their members are attracted and motivated by deep-seated socio-economic and political grievances such as poverty, corruption and poor governance. To this end, Campbell (2011) noted that Boko Haram, once an obscure, radical Islamic cult in the north, has evolved into an insurrection with support among the improvised and alienated northern population. However, Walker (2012) holds a much wider and multi-dimensional view about the sect. He argued that foreign aid from Saudi Arabia helped fuel the operations of the group in its embryonic stage as well as tapped into the wide spread pool of unemployed northern Nigerian youths and the high rate of poverty in the region. And this in particular gave the group the advantage to spread proportion. On his part, Isa (2010) observed that Boko Haram communities are wreaked by poverty, deteriorating social services and infrastructure, educational backwardness, rising numbers of unemployed graduates, massive numbers of unemployed youth, dwindling fortunes in agriculture and the weak dwindling productive base of the northern economy.

In a similar vein, (Kwaja, 2011), argued that religious dimension of the conflict have been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence, when, in fact, disenfranchisement and inequality are the root causes. Additionally, Elegbe (2011), posited that the increasing poverty in Nigeria is accompanied by increasing unemployment. Unemployment is higher in the north than in the south, and when this mix with radical Islam, which promised a better life for martyrs, violence in the north is inevitable. Going further, Achebe (2012), described Boko Haram as a product of economic deprivation and corruption in northern Nigeria. He noted that economic deprivation and corruption produce and exacerbate financial and social inequities in a population, which in turn fuel political instability. In his analysis, Mustapha (2012:3), opined that:

Boko Haram has grown at a time when there are many national issues that drew anger and feed the group. This include continued killing and corruption perpetrated by the police on people connected to the group; the brutal manner in which the police behaved to the public at large; the financial corruption of government; the moral corruption of the religious establishment (as perceived by Boko Haram); a festering conflict in Plateau state; a perceived wider attack on Islam by a government led by a Christian president; the end to the 'zoning deal' that saw power rotate between north and south; and the terrible political economy, the general poverty, and the poor state of northern Nigeria. It is anger at these issues that sustains the group and gives its recruits to continue its work.

However, Isa (2010), observed that Boko Haram communities are wrecked by poverty, deteriorating social services and infrastructure, educational backwardness, rising numbers of unemployed graduates, dwindling fortunes in agriculture and the weak productive base of the northern economy. In similar vein, Kwaja (2011), argued that religious dimensions of the conflict have been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement and inequality are the root causes. Additionally, Elegbe (2011), posited that increasing poverty in Nigeria is accompanied by increasing unemployment. Unemployment is higher in the north than in the south, and when this mixed with radical Islam, which promised a better life for martyrs, violence in the north was inevitable. Going further to this, Achebe (2012), described Boko Haram as a product of economic deprivation and corruption in northern Nigeria. He noted that economic deprivation and corruption produce and exacerbate financial and social inequalities in a population, which in turn fuel political instability. In his analysis, Mustapha (2012:3), posited that:

Boko Haram is a symptom of the failure of nation-building and democratic policies of Nigeria. It is the misguided cry of a disgruntled youth crushed by the socio-economic system on the one hand and then repressed by the state on the other.

In similar vein, Marchal (2012) highlighted the issue of the divergent (and largely unequal) economic and social dynamics of northern versus southern states in Nigeria as a main factor in the Boko Haram rebellion. He posited that Boko Haram is an ultra-violent social movement that has

deep roots in the social and economic marginalisation of a large section of Nigeria's northern population. However, Blanchard (2014), noted that Boko Haram is multi-dimensional and is not a monolithic organisation. Beyond its core militants, who appear to ascribe to a violent Sunni extremist ideology, the group appears to draw support from a broader group of followers, predominantly young men from the north east. According to him, experts do speculate that the group's supporters may be driven by frustration with perceived disparities in the application of laws (including Sharia); the lack of development, jobs and investment in the north, and/or the abusive response of security forces in the region. As aptly observed by Nchi (2013; 210), that:

poverty and ignorance are fertilizers for insurgency anywhere and in any age. When they combine and cloak themselves in religious, ethnic, or other partisan robes, they become ready incendiary for the most brutal and reckless of violence.

Though poverty is a global scourge that is affecting mankind, however, the level of poverty in Nigeria is alarming. According to Omemma (2012:45):

Poverty has become so endemic in the land that the latest National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) put the national poverty rate at 67.1%. Poverty has been on a steady increase in the nation. The endemic poverty level in the north is so enormous that the latest report from official statistics showed that poverty in North West is 77.7%; north east 76.3%, which is much higher than that of national poverty rate of 67.1%.

Not just north east, Nigerians are generally poor. In short, most Nigerians live below the poverty line because 70% of the populace do live below one dollar per day. The high rate of crime, illiteracy and unemployment is rooted in the prevalence of poverty in Nigeria (Okoli, 2008). In this context, Anumudu, Umar and Madu (2013: 1), noted that:

poverty is a global phenomena which affects continents, nations and people differently. It affects people in various depth and levels at different times and phases of existence. There is no nation that is absolutely free from poverty. Nigeria ranked among the 20th poorest countries, started its independence nationhood with poverty level of barely 15% of its population in 1960 and is today struggling to bring it down from about 162 million people (World Bank, 2012). Of the number of poverty-stricken people, about

73% is concentrated in the rural areas, where illiteracy prevalence is high. Potable water and health facilities are rarely available, road and electricity infrastructures are either unavailable or ill-managed.

Moreover, poverty is a serious challenge to past and present governments in Nigeria. According to Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN, 2009), poverty is a state where an individual is not able to cater adequately for his or her basic needs of food, clothing or shelter, unable to meet social and economic obligations, lacks gainful employment, skills, access to socio-economic infrastructure such as education, health, water and sanitation as well as chances of advancing his or her welfare. Its effects include lack and deprivation in the basic necessities of life, which is worrisome. Poverty humiliates and dehumanises its victim (Offiong, 2010). Poverty is a social condition characterised by inadequate access to basic human needs to the sustenance of a socially acceptable minimum standard of living in a given society. It refers to the inability of an individual to attain the minimum standard of living. According to Chikwem (2012:23), not just poverty per se but the manipulation and politicization of poverty by the northern ruling elites emboldened Boko Haram sect. To Onuoha (2015:41), though, the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf influenced the radicalisation and violent manifestation of Boko Haram, however, poverty and the worsening economic condition fuelled Boko Haram insurgency. He noted that:

the tipping point in the radicalisation of Boko Haram has been traced to the extra-judicial killing of its charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf, as well as the gruesome murder of some arrested members in the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt. However, this factor rode on a groundswell of dissatisfaction, especially among Moslem youths in northern Nigeria, over governance failure on the part of the secular Nigerian state. Although political leaders from northern Nigeria dominated the positions of leadership, such as president and heads of state, before the return of democracy in 1999, they did little or nothing to address the pervasive poverty and unemployment afflicting the northern region.

However, the nexus between poverty and Boko Haram has been faulted. The argument is that most of the radical terrorists around the world are well educated and economically well to do.

According to Perouse de Montclos (2014), though Boko Haram had a welfare system that attracted the poor, yet, there is no evidence that Boko Haram has a particular support from the poor, or is fighting of economic justice. According to him (Perouse, 2014: 8):

It has been alleged that the Almajiri itinerant students of quaranic schools are Boko Haram foot-soldiers because they are beggars, have no access to modern education and are easy to be indoctrinated to carryout suicide attacks. Such an argument assumes that there is a casual connection between poverty or illiteracy and participation in terrorism, but studies show that is not always the case. Within Boko Haram and its splinter groups, some elements went to university, including the British-born Nigerian Army deserter, AminuSadiqOgwuche, allegedly involved in the 2014 bombings at Nyanya, Abuja. It is currently not possible to draw conclusions on the extent to which poverty is a driver or feature of Boko Haram's membership since the social profile of the group remains unknown, as does the balance of membership.

The link between socio-economic conditions and outbreak of the conflict has been criticised as simplistic. This is largely because it fails to explain why some poor people or places do not participate in violence and because it offers very little in the way of clear recommendation for policy-makers (Agbbiboa 2013). Krieger and Meierrieke (2011), examined a host of possible influences on terrorism, including, inter alia, global order, modernisation, institutional order and identity conflict. Following a detailed review of the relevant empirical literature on what causes terrorism, they concluded that:

there is only limited evidence to support the hypothesis that economic deprivation causes terrorism...poor economic conditions matter less to terrorism once it is controlled for institutional and political factors...terrorism is closely linked to political instability, sharp divides within the populace, country size and further, demographic institutional and international factors (Krieger and Meierrieke 2011:3).

The International Crisis Group (2014), reports that 112.5 million Nigerians (70% of the population) are classified as poor and absolutely poor. The north east, Boko Haram's operational centre, has the worst poverty rate of the six official zones. This is compounded by the issue of

illiteracy and climate change. Education in the north is poorly funded and even so, secular schools are scarce in the north eastern part of the country. And because many children are sent to Quranic schools where they often beg for alms on the streets; in the context of widespread poverty and social decay, this practice is open to abuse by groups like Boko Haram (ICG, 2014).

For Agbibo (2013), Boko Haram soon announced its re-emergence with more advanced tactics and devastating attacks, example, the bombing of police headquarters in Abuja in June 2011 and the United Nations (UN) headquarters in August 2011. In the first ten months of 2012 alone, more than 900 people died in attacks perpetrated by the group more than 2010 and 2011 combined. In short, Boko Haram insurgency has been likened to the Nigerian Civil War. As corroborated by Okoli (2013) that:

apart from the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), no other single event of complex emergency in the country has been as debilitating as the Boko Haram insurgency in terms of devastating impacts. Granted, the Niger Delta Crisis (1999-2009) occasioned dire outcomes that threatened the national security of Nigeria. Nonetheless, its devastating consequences could not compare that of the Boko Haram insurgency in terms of scope, degree and diversity (Okoli, 2013:14).

Since the sect's violent emergence in 2001 and its virulent manifestations in north eastern Nigeria, the Nigerian state has known no peace. In short, it has become a metaphor for insecurity in Nigeria because the dreaded sect's emergence, continuous existence and manifestations threaten Nigeria's precarious political balance. According to Nwozor (2013), the sect has targeted and bombed state institutions, international organisations, churches, mosques, barracks, schools, and mass media, among others in furtherance of its avowed objective of deploying terror to achieve the Islamization of the Nigerian state.

Moreover, the extent of violence and destruction that has been associated with the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has been horrific. It is estimated that since 2009, the conflict has killed over 7,000 people and caused destruction of invaluable amount of public and private property leaving over 650, 000 displaced persons in north eastern Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The above

fatalities and casualties made Boko Haram one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world (Global Terrorism Index, 2014). United Nations (2015) reported that more than 6 million Nigerians have been displaced. The group has focused on a wide range of targets, but civilians in the impoverished, predominately Muslim northeast have borne the brunt of the violence. Nigeria's heavy-handed response to Boko Haram's insurgency and terrorist operations has also taken a toll on civilians. According to Blanchard (2015:1):

at this point, Boko Haram appears to pose a threat primarily to stability in northern Nigeria, and potentially to surrounding areas in neighbouring countries. Some of Boko Haram's attacks have targeted Christians in the north, threatening to fuel existing religious tensions in the country. The group also poses a threat to international targets, including western citizens in the region. The Nigerian government has struggled to respond to growing threat posed by Boko Haram. By many accounts, Nigerian troops are not adequately resourced or equipped to counter the insurgency. The government has been criticized in domestic and international press reports for what has been widely perceived as a slow response to the abduction of the school girls in April, 2014, and to offers of international assistance in support of the investigation possible rescue efforts. To date, it remains unclear to what extent Nigerian officials are cooperating with foreign advisors and experts, including those from the United States of America.

Although Boko Haram has focused its attacks to date predominately on north eastern Nigeria, yet it has also engaged in several kidnappings of foreign citizens in neighbouring Cameroon which have been attributed to the group and/or to Ansaru. Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have all nevertheless felt the impact of Boko Haram's activities together; the three countries are host to more than 60, 000 refugees who have fled Nigeria (UNHCR, 2014). Additionally, the threat of kidnappings and attacks affects local economies, and officials have expressed concern that Boko Haram may be transiting through or recruiting among border communities. Boko Haram fighters have also reportedly used remote border areas as a refuge from Nigerian offensives (START, 2015). In 2012, Boko Haram fighters reportedly operated alongside, and affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), after a major Nigerian military crackdown on the group's

operations. The above factors motivated governments in the region to sign agreement on how to quell Boko Haram insurgency. Corroborating this, Blanchard (2014) noted that governments in the region have repeatedly created a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to coordinate their security response to Boko Haram, and this MNJTF involved in agreement between Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and France to coordinate border policy. It compliments existing border security and intelligence coordination among the Lake Chad Basin countries.

The central motivation of MNJTF apart from the above, is that there are fears suggesting that there are elements of Boko Haram that aspire to a broader regional attacks to include not just in Africa, but Europe and the United States. The commander of U.S Special Operations Command cited in Blanchard (2014: 8) reiterated this concern in February 2014, stating “we see Boko Haram beginning to conflate with AQIM in North Africa”. These fears triggered the support for MNJTF by all western powers. More so, there has been speculation for years that Boko Haram may have acquired weapons from former Libyan stockpiles through Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) ties. The rise in kidnapping by Ansara and Boko Haram of western and other foreign citizens may be an indication of AQIM influence because AQIM has been associated with kidnapping (Blanchard, 2014:43).

From the above scholars such as Kukah (2011); kwaja (2011); Elegbe (2011); Mustapha (2012) Marchal (2012); Agbiboa (2013); Nchi (2013) ICG (2014) and others have interrogated the origin of Boko Haram in the north east. Also, scholars such as Akintola (2014); Windsor (2015), Blanchard (2015); Babb (2015) have x-rayed MNJTF and Boko Haram insurgency but have not paid systematic attention in investigating if the establishment of MNJTF have impeded Boko haram insurgency.

2.2 Logistical Support and Counter-Terrorism Measures in Nigeria

The word “terrorism” has elicited unquantifiable definitional wrangles rendering little room for definitional consensus among scholars. Terrorism, according to Lodge (1988:5), “*is an illegitimate means of attempting to effect change by the indiscriminate use of violence*”. Also, Madunagu (2001: 51) maintains that terrorism is “*the use of violence to achieve political objectives*”. The International Terrorism and Security Research (ITSR, 2014) allude to the fact that terrorism is not

new, and that even though the word has been used since the beginning of recorded history, it can be relatively difficult to define. Terrorism according to the International Terrorism and Security Research (ITSR) has been described variously as both tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justifiable reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination (<http://www.terrorism-research.com>).

Furthermore, the United States Department of Defence (USDD) (2013:23), defined terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological”. Within this definition, there are three key elements-violence, fear, and intimidation- and each element produce terror in its victims. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on its part defines terrorism as “*the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives*”. To the U.S Department of State (USDS) (2013: 4), terrorism is “*a premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience.*” (<http://www.terrorism.com>).

Outside the United States government, there are greater variations in what features of terrorism are emphasised in definitions. The United Nations (1992: 15), defines terrorism as “an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby- in contrast to assassination-the direct targets of violence are not the main targets”.

However, the British Home Office (1974:34) defines terrorism as “*the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public in fear.*” (<http://www.terrorism-research.com>). Moreover, the International Terrorism and Security Research (ITSR) (2014) argues that terrorism is a political and criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim, and that the strategy of terrorism is to commit acts of

violence that draws the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their course. The effectiveness of the terrorist act therefore lies not in the act itself, but in the public's or government's reaction to the act. Pillar (2001), has identified specifically four elements that distinguish terrorism from other acts of violence or criminality. These elements include:

- a. **Premeditation:** this means that there must be an intent and prior decision to commit an act that would qualify as terrorism under the other criteria. An operation may not be executed as intended and may fail altogether but the intent must be there. Terrorism is not a matter of momentary rage or impulse or even a matter of accident.
- b. **Political Motivation:** Terrorism excludes criminal volume motivated by monetary gain or personal vengeance except if such has direct bearing to the implementation of the terrorists' objectives. Nevertheless, other forms of criminal violence have been tagged terrorism but the fundamental difference between terrorism and other forms of crime or criminal violence lies in the onus of what gives rise to it and how it must be countered beyond simple physical security and police techniques. What terrorism have in common that separates them from other violent criminal acts is that they claim to be serving some greater good.
- c. **The targets are Non-Combatant Groups:** this suggests that terrorists attack people who cannot defend themselves with violence in return.
- d. **The Perpetrators are either Sub-National Groups or Clandestine Agents** (Pillar, 2001: 13-14).

Meanwhile, Igwe (2007:440), observed that "terrorism" whether local or international have their roots in the nature of the domestic policies of nations within which the gangs germinate and against which they supposedly act. The implication of the foregoing statement is that terrorism is a by-product of policies whether domestic of foreign. Faulty domestic policies produce domestic terrorism, while faulty foreign policy or international policies produce international terrorism. Terrorism is difficult to define because it is often seen as a pejorative and derogatory concept. The analysis of who is a terrorist depends largely on who is a terrorist depends largely on who is calling it. It has no precise meaning and it is safe to say that terrorism is in the eye of the beholder (Kilani, 2015). According to Cook (2009), terrorism is an attempt to achieve a political end by creating a climate of fear through bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and hijacking of aircrafts' mechanisms or strategies in order to create fear because when people are afraid, they tend to surrender to those who inflict them with the fear and terror. Lacquer (2007), posited that

terrorism is the application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society to weaken or even overthrow the incumbent and to bring about political change. In other words, one can say that terrorism and revolution are synonymous because both are intended to bring about political change at the tail end. According to Pape (2005), terrorism can be classified into demonstrative terrorism, which seeks publicity; destructive terrorism which seeks to exert coercion through the threats of injury and death as well as to mobilize support; and suicide terrorism which involves an attacker actually himself/herself along with others, generally as part of a campaign. Sadly, the acts of terrorism have increased over the years since September 11, 2001 terrorist attack directed at the World Trade Organisation, United States of America. Since then, some nations including Nigeria have been suspected as pro-terrorist countries and possible haven for the terrorists and also prone to terrorist attacks. The international community has also been engaged in a fierce battle against terrorism. The efforts of the United States for instance have been most significant. The U.S government through its department of state has over the years taken it upon her to designate groups found to be involved in terrorism as “Foreign Terrorist Organisation” (FTO). Most of the groups so labelled including the Boko Haram, are Islamic fundamentalist groups. Hence, terrorism has come to be synonymous with Islam thereby portraying the religion as a violent one (Ugwueze, 2013:12). Dismissing this allegation and in total condemnation of terrorist attacks, Sheik Abdul-Rahamal-Sudai, at the ground mosque Mecca, Saudi Arabia according to Reuters stated that:

it would be grave calamity when followers of this phenomenon (terrorism) use religion as a camouflage, because true Islam stands innocent from all that. Its teachings stand aloof from people who believe in violence as a course of action and sabotage as a method and bloodshed as a way of reform (US Department of State Report, 2001; cited in Ugwueze, 2013:22).

Nigeria is one of the first countries to in Africa to comply with the United Nations conventions, protocols and resolutions on combating financing of terrorism and anti-money laundering (U.S

Department of State, 2007, cited in Eke, 2013: 268). Nevertheless, the operation of the Boko Haram initially was not given serious attention by the Federal Government prior to 2009 as an Islamic organisation whose teachings were the purification of Islam and it was not the only one with the same objective in the northern region of Nigeria. This however, changed after the violent activities of the group in 2009. In its efforts to combat the Boko Haram insurgency, the Nigerian state has responded to the activities of the group with what this study describes as a soft-hand and a heavy-hand two approaches. The government's efforts in combating terrorism in the country was given a legal backing with the passing into law of the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 which was later amended in 2013 to provide for extra-territorial application of the Act and strengthening of terrorist financing offences; and for related matters" (Terrorism Prevention Act (Amended), 2013).

Felix Akpan et al (2014), observed that government had tried different approaches in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency. He puts that government had embarked on "poverty alleviation programmes, economic development, education and social reforms" as a strategy⁹ in the fight against Boko Haram. They furthered that this has led to "the provision of modern basic education schools for the Almajiri and the establishment of nine federal universities in several northern states. The government is also aggressively addressing the challenges of poverty through its youth empowerment programmes like Youwin and investing massively in infrastructure to promote economic development. The sum of the administrative framework within much of the anti-insurgency policy, which has been implemented especially within the context of Boko Haram according to Akpan (2014:5), are as follows:

- ❖ Troops have been reinforced
- ❖ The leadership of the movement has been targeted
- ❖ The International Joint Task Force (JTF) has been put in place
The army has taken over the provision of internal security (declaration of state of emergency)
- ❖ A curfew has been imposed
- ❖ GSM services have been banned and restored
- ❖ Civilian JTFs have been established
- ❖ Road blocks have been set up, among many other measures

Despite the above measures, Boko Haram still gained more grounds against Nigerian forces and even MNJTF. Even the headquarters of MNJTF in Baga was overrun by the insurgent group. The capturing of over 300 Chibok girls forced the west to have a rethink about providing logistics to MNJTF and Nigerian forces on ending Boko Haram insurgency. The delay in the provision of logistics especially by United States of America is not unconnected with the region's lack of oil deposits. According to Bamidele (2013), the United States government has been known to evolve a direct confrontational strategy in protecting her interest in oversea countries especially where oil is found in abundance. This has been demonstrated in many places. Under President Barrack Obama, the strategy against terrorism was gradually given a new phase of non-violent confrontation. In fact, in a research conducted by the USAID, the Boko Haram insurgency is a mere expression of grievance against the non-performance of the Nigerian government and therefore, its fight should not attract direct confrontation from the United States. The government should use coordinated strategy that involves both the state and the local government, especially in the north (WIND Exclusive, 2012). Other scholars have continually argued that the involvement of the international community (the U.S for example) will hamper prompt solution to the problem of terrorism in Nigeria (Adefuye, 2012; Campbell 2012; among others). As a corollary, it is on record that 21 scholars with expertise on Nigeria, including Peter Lewis from SAIS and Jean Herskovits from SUNY, sent a letter to former U.S secretary of state, Hillary Clinton on Boko Haram (Levan, 2012). The letter began by noting the horrific violence perpetrated against civilians and government officials, but argued that responding to Boko Haram ultimately requires a diplomatic, developmental and demilitarized framework (Levan, 2012). As a counter to the call for diplomatic framework, the chairman of the U.S House Homeland Security Committee, Peter King and Patrick Meehan, the chairman of the sub-committee on counter-terrorism and intelligence, continued to pressure the secretary of state, Clinton, to adopt a more robust approach to checkmate the insurgence of Boko Haram in Nigeria; maybe by considering labelling the group foreign terrorist organisation. In their own letter to the secretary, they argued that "Boko Haram's evolution into an

operationally mature Al-Qaeda affiliate must be stopped before it is too late”. (<http://carlewan.com/2012/2015/boko-haram-letter-to-clinton-from-scholars>).

On the other hand, Campbell (2012), argued otherwise, noting that Boko Haram is different from other groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Tamil Tigers, which have an organisational structure and a unified goal. In fact, the name “Boko Haram” is a label applied only by the Nigerian government, mass media, and security agencies, usually to describe the violence occurring daily in the north of the country...the uniting feature of Boko Haram is its focus on Nigeria among other things, Meehan, in a lecture delivered at the Heritage Foundation on July 24, 2012, had warned that the U.S should increase its security operation with Nigeria, remain vigilant and officially designate Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (Zenn, 2013).

The United States government has adopted non-confrontational strategies involving three important U.S departments in the fight against Boko Haram. This has let the U.S and other western states to focus more on offering logistical support in the fight against insurgency, other than putting boots on the ground. The continuing violence has also prompted many international actors, including the European Union (EU) to consider urgent measures towards the country (Onuoha, 2013).

Therefore, most western countries shy away from supporting Nigeria in the war against Boko Haram. Despite initial reluctance to accept foreign assistance and risk external interference, the Nigerian government has claimed that Boko Haram is no longer solely national security challenge, defining it instead as a transnational terrorist organisation with links to Al-Qaeda and Islamic States. Such a position legitimizes the government’s acceptance of foreign support, and shares the burden of responsibility, including for any unsuccessful response (Perouse de Montclos, 2015).

In the light of the above, it is evident that scholars and organisations such as Onuoha (2013), Akintola (2014), Jackson (2015), Perouse de Montclos (2015), EUR (2015), Shafferran (2014),

Manni (2013) and Pearson and Zena (2015) have looked at the necessity and possibility of international aids and logistics in countering Boko Haram insurgency; its major challenges and possible success strategies, yet, none of them have tended to ascertain whether the provision of logistical support by western countries has led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria, hence, the need for this study.

Gap in the Literature

Since its inception in the early 2000 and resurgence in 2009, Boko Haram insurgency has occupied the front burner among scholars, governments, non-governmental organisations and other concerned groups. No doubt, much has been written about the sects by scholars such as Kukah (2011), Elegbe (2011), Kwaja (2011), Mustapha (2012), Marchal (2012), Agbibo (2013) and Nchi (2013), among other scholars who interrogated the origin of Boko Haram insurgency in north eastern Nigeria. Further, scholars such as Akintola (2014), Windsor (2015), Blanchard (2015), and Babb (2015) in addition investigated if the establishment of MNJTF have impeded Boko Haram insurgency. Despite its major challenges and possible solutions, none of them have tended to systematically probe whether the provision of logistical support by western countries has led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria. It is this gap in the literature that this study therefore intends to fill.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

In this chapter, we shall explore the various methods of research to be adopted in this study. The methodology used in conducting this study starts with theoretical framework for analysis which is the theory of political realism. It contains the two hypotheses designed to be tested by the study, the research design which is ex post facto research design, and the method of data collection which is the documentary method of data collection. It also contains the qualitative method of data analysis. This chapter ends with the table of logical data framework for the study.

3.1: Theoretical Framework

The essential characteristic of the study of Political Science is the preponderance of theories. A theory is seen as a set of interrelated constructs, definitions, and propositions that presents a systematic view of phenomenon by specifying relations among variables with the purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena (Kerlinger, 1973:43). Theory also embodies knowledge in a specific subject such that every theory is by and large a source of knowledge in a specific area. Hence, this work is anchored essentially on Functionalism Theory. Functionalism as an international relations theory was formulated by David Mitrany, the proponent and chief exponent of functional theory of international relations.

According to the tenets of functionalism, international integration is the collective governance and ‘material interdependence’ between states which develops its own internal dynamic as states integrate in limited, functional, technical, and/or economic areas. It also advocates that international agencies should be created to meet human needs, aided by knowledge and expertise. The benefits rendered by the functional agencies would attract the loyalty of the populations and stimulate their participation and expand the area of integration. There are strong assumptions underpinning functionalism which include but not limited to the following:

- That the process of integration takes place within a framework of human freedom, anchored on immediate needs, interest and objective. The above implies that integration of state is rooted in the need to achieve some specific functions which is subject to change and mutation.
- That knowledge and expertise are currently available to meet the needs for which the functional agencies are built. This entails that there are available know-how to tackle such needs, goals, interest or objective if such an integration or alliances are formed. That is the fallout of such integration and it must endeavour to have the needed acumen to tackle the reasons for its formation.
- That states will not sabotage the process. This implies that member states will not undermine the alliance. Total trust and commitment of member states making up the agencies and alliances will see to its successes. Their contributions are not to be contrary to the success of the alliance or agencies which they make up.

Functionalism therefore is a theory of international relations that emerged during the inter-war period principally from the strong concern about the obsolescence of the state as a form of social organisation. Rather than the self-interest of nation-states that realists see as a motivating factor, functionalists focus on common interests and needs shared by states (but also by non-state actors) in a process of global integration triggered by the erosion of state sovereignty and the increasing weight of knowledge and hence, of scientists as well as experts in the process of policy-making (Rosamond, 2000:22).

Conventionally, the theory of functionalism in international relations is thus based on the hope that more agencies will be created and more common tasks will be delegated to such specific functional organisations or agencies of United Nations (UN) like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and each of these organisations will become supranational, that is, superior to its member government in power and authority. In this way, the world's nations will gradually become integrated into a single community within which war will be impossible (Mitrany, 1984: 1966).

Classical functionalism as propounded by David Mitrany envisaged the treatment of those international or supranational functions and services as technical matters, non-political in nature and well removed from the clamour and pressures of interest groups, nations and the entire

population. As envisaged by David Mitrany, highly specific functional agencies would enter into direct contact with the people they serve in the country. Their services would somehow remain non-political, but they would win through their performance both increasing elite acceptance and popular support (Deutch, 1988:22-25; Echezona, 1998:20-40).

Deutch (1988:223) however notes that this hope of functionally integrating states seems rather uncertain as all those organisations are limited mainly to the exchange of views and of knowledge, the making of studies, the drafting of recommendations and the rendering of technical assistance to governments requesting it. Similarly, Nweke (2000:25-26), posits that functionalism is not just a theoretical formulation but a practical policy action as well, which is concerned with how best the world could be organised so as to eliminate violent conflicts and wars, thereby enable great powers and small states alike to focus on trade and development cooperation rather than engage in divisive political and ideological issues that evoke aggressive policies of intervention, imperialism, neo-colonialism and domination in international relations. The fact remains, he continues that within the several versions of the theory are to be found the essential kernel of Mitrany's new world model, namely, that a progressive economic, political and strategic integration would gradually eliminate sources of conflict and build the foundation for political unification.

Rourke (1999: 219-225), on his own describes functional cooperation in the light of classical functional theory as composed of the specialized agencies that deal with specific economic, political and social problems. He further pointed out that there is expanding roles of International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) both in number and on scope of activity. According to him, this is as a result of at least three major reasons: more and more common governmental functions are being dealt with by existing IGOs to take on the new function beyond its original economic focus to a wider range of political and social concern as well as developing an increasing import and organisational structures.

In the same vein, other functionalists like Keohane and Nye (Burchill and Linklater, 2001) have demonstrated how through membership of international organisations, states can scope on cooperation and compliance. Hence, compliance with the rules of these organisations not only discourages the narrow pursuit of national interest, it also weakens the meaning and appeal of state sovereignty.

Similarly, Williams (1989:210-211), states that there has been a growing quest for greater structure as a result of the fact that increasing political activity in the global system has been channelled as international organisations. International organisations have come to play a growing role in formulating international policy. IGOs, therefore, provide the framework within which governments can achieve agreement about the elements of international public policy.

According to Okolie (2005:215-216), “functionalism in international relations is used to denote an approach to the building of a supra-national community through economic integration”. Hence, it is closely associated with integration theory. With the end of cold war, functional theory of international relations has staged a comeback, though not in its orthodox or classical form as it has been re-interpreted and refined since it was originally formulated by David Mitrany (Nweke, 2000: 25). Functional idealism, whether in its orthodox form or modern version (Neo-functionalism) focuses on an issue eliminating conflict and war which is embedded in liberal internationalism (Burchill and Linklater, 2001:102). International institutions according to this functional formulation make, implement, interpret and enforce rules (or resolutions) in the international system in order to facilitate international peace and harmony in the basis of justice and fair-play.

On the other hand, functional realism of international relations proceeds from the notion that the world is composed of international institutions which constitute structures of the international system. In this regard, there is tendency of state in the international system to compose themselves into international organisations for their mutual benefits. In that respect, the reason d’être of

international institutions as an international structure is to perform functions of which mutual benefits of their members is primacy (Okolie, 2005: 202-216). Thus, international institutions are elevated on the extent to which they are able to perform these functions of ensuring mutual benefits for their members as embodied in their stated objectives, part of which could be social, economic or political integration. However, these mutual benefits must not necessarily be equal for it depends on how member states position themselves to enjoy these benefits. The notion of functionalism is noted in political and economic realism. Conceived in this manner, these international institutions and organisations are theatres or arenas of contests or struggles among principally nation-states. Functionalists, therefore, conceive international organisations and institutions as projections for the realisation of foreign policy objectives of nations like ending Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Application of the Theory

The relationship between International Military Alliance and Boko Haram Insurgency is better explained in the light of functionalist international relations. This framework unravels the hidden relations that ascertain if the establishment and operations of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) undermined Boko Haram. This is because the fight against Boko Haram terrorism is a tactical and expensive venture. Also, this theory enables us to go beyond analysis whose account are limited to the features, origin, types and potentials of alliances and their role in international arena. The theory mirrors vividly the actual conditions and organisational structure of the alliance and its effectiveness in quelling the tide of insurgency. The theory unravels and determines whether the provision of logistical support by western countries led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria. The theory explains why western nations whose strategic and business interests were affected by Boko Haram Insurgency had to also pool their assistance and quota in the efforts to defeat the insurgency, and these countries included the United States of America, France, Britain, among others.

3.2 HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses will guide this study:

1. The establishment and operations of Multinational Joint Task Force significantly contributed to the war against the Boko Haram Insurgency.
2. The provision of logistical support by western countries led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria.

3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

A research design is a blueprint that guides how to reach unassailable and plausible answers to research problems. It is the plan, the structure and the strategy of the investigation, so conceived as to obtain answer to research questions (Kerlinger, 1986). The research design thus provides the framework for the generation and analysis of data according to the priorities set by the researcher (Bryman, 2001). It is also a plan and structure that guide the investigator in the process of data collection, analysis and interpretation. It is a logical model or proof that permits the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relationship among variables being investigated (Asika, 1991:27). This study is based on a single case–ex post facto design which is also known as “after–the –fact” design. It is also based on the examination of independent and dependent variables after the event have occurred and the data are already in existence.

The ex post facto design according to Kerlinger (1977:12) is a form of descriptive research in which an independent variable has occurred and in which an investigator starts with the observation of a dependent variables, and then studies the independent relationship and effects on the dependent variable. In addition, Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2011) noted that ex post facto means “after-the-effect” or “retrospective studies” which are investigations geared towards knowing the cause-and-effect relationships by observing an existing condition and searching back in time for the plausible causal factors. In other words, the ex post facto or after-the-fact design attempts to identify a natural impetus for specific outcomes and is represented as follows:



Where:

- | |
|---|
| O |
|---|

 = Observation
- | |
|---|
| Y |
|---|

 =Dependent variable
- | |
|---|
| X |
|---|

 =Independent variable
- | |
|---|
| B |
|---|

 =Before observation
- | |
|---|
| R |
|---|

 =After observation

The analytical routine involved in testing the independent variable (X) and the dependent variable (Y) is based on concomitant variation. This is to demonstrate that (X) is the factor that determines (Y). This implies that whenever (X) occurs, there is the likelihood that (Y) will follow later. The criteria for entering causality have been summarized by Seltiz et al (1997: 32) as follows:

- Co-variation between the presumed cause and presumed effect
- Proper time order with cause preceding effect
- Elimination of plausible alternative explanation for the observed relationship.

The design is found appropriate for this study because it is a method of testing possible antecedent of the events that have occurred. Therefore, it cannot be engineered or manipulated by the investigator (Cooper and Schindler, 2006:32). In this method of research design also, the researcher can only report what has occurred or what is occurring by trying to hold factors constant by giving careful attention to the independent and dependent variables. The analytical routine involves testing structural causality on ex post facto analysis of the independent variable (X) and dependent variable (Y) which is based on concomitant variations. This is to demonstrate that (X) is

the factor that determines or causes (Y). In other words, when (X) occurs, then there is the tendency of (Y) to occur.

In testing hypothesis (1), we see “establishment and operations of Multinational Joint Task Force” and “undermined Boko Haram Insurgency” as (Y). The empirical referents of (X) are: the involvement of the army of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon in the fight against Boko Haram under a unified command. The conduct of jointly coordinated operations led to increased border patrol. Whereas the empirical referents of (Y) are: the overrunning of communities, the overrunning of government positions, control and administration of conquered territories: documentary evidence in this study indicates a correlation between the variables.

In hypothesis (2), we see “the provision of logistical support by western countries” as (X) and “effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism in Nigeria” as (Y). The empirical referents of (X) are: training of military personnel, intelligence sharing and financial support. The empirical referents of (Y) are: the capture or killing of key Boko Haram operatives, the bombing of Boko Haram command and control centre, and gaining territories previously controlled by Boko Haram.

3.4 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The method of data collection applied in this study is the documentary method based on secondary sources. Cohen and Manion (1980:13) in Odoeme (2013: 51) defined qualitative research method as “a set of non-statistical inquiry techniques and processes used to gather data about social phenomenon.” Essentially, documentary method of data collection is a broad category to include any data that can be obtained from the secondary source. Secondary source here involves information obtained in the works of authors published and unpublished journals, periodicals, government publications as well as internal materials.

The analysis of the documents in documentary research would be either qualitative or quantitative analysis (or both). The key issues surrounding types of documents and our ability to use them as reliable sources of evidence on the social world must be considered by all who use documents in their research.

Moreover, documents “must be studied as socially situated products” (Scott, 1990: 34). It is defined as “any written material other than a record that was not prepared specifically in response to some requests from the investigator” (Guba and Lincoln, 1981: 228). Silverman (1993:44) has provided a classification of documents as (i) files, (ii) statistical records, (iii) records of official proceedings and,(iv) images.

3.5 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

This study basically adopted the content analysis method of data analysis. According to Burnhan (2004:23) in Odoeme (2013:53), data analysis refers to the use of relevant techniques, tools, strategies and procedures for exploiting relationships among key variables gathered in the course of research. This implies that data collection naturally leads up to data analysis such that in the course of the analysis, the collected data are broken and given appropriate treatment so as to read meaning out of the data that have been generated, presented, tested and interpreted. Obasi (1999: 178) emphasized that the need for clarity in the presentation of data can only be fully appreciated when one recognized that a properly generated data which is free from the common problems of unreliability and inaccuracy, can still not serve a useful purpose if not properly analyzed and presented. In other words, analysis is the breakdown and ordering of the qualitative information gathered through research (Asika, 1991: 110).

The purpose of analysis, therefore, is to understand and explain how the constitutive elements of a complex whole are related in order to gain a better knowledge of the unit or subject being studied. The data used in this study were analyzed qualitatively and critically in order to arrive at a valid argument of the hypotheses. The main indicators for this study are presented in the Logical Data Framework.

3.6 LOGICAL DATA FRAMEWORK

Research Topic	Research Question	Hypotheses	Major variables of the hypothesis Independent (X) Dependent (Y)	Empirical Indicators of Variables	Sources of Data	Method of data collection	Method of Data Analysis
International Military Alliance and the War Against Boko Haram in Nigeria, 2011-2015	Has the establishment and operations of Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) undermined Boko Haram Insurgency?	The establishment and operations of Multi-National Joint Task Force undermined Boko Haram insurgency.	(X) The establishment and operations of Multi-National Joint Task Force.	--The involvement of the armies of Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in the fight against Boko Haram under a unified command. --increased border patrol along communities within MNJTF borders.	Textbooks, Journals, Conference Papers, Seminar Papers, Documents from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Central Bank of Nigeria.	Documentary Method Of Data Collection	Qualitative Method Of Data analysis
			(Y) Undermined Boko Haram Insurgency	--The overrunning of communities --The overrunning of	Textbooks, Journals, Conference Papers, Seminar Papers, Documents	Documentary Method Of Data Collection	Qualitative Method Of Data analysis

				Government positions --Control and administration of conquered territories.	from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Central Bank of Nigeria.		
International Military Alliance and the War Against Boko Haram in Nigeria, 2011-2015	Has the provision of logistical support by western countries led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria	The provision of logistical support led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria.	(X) The provision of logistical support by western countries.		Textbooks, Journals, Conference Papers, Seminar Papers, Documents from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Central Bank of Nigeria. Documentary Method Of Data Collection	Documentary Method Of Data Collection	Qualitative Method Of Data analysis
			(Y) Effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria.	--The capture or killing of key Boko Haram operatives --The bombing of Boko Haram	Textbooks, Journals, Conference Papers, Seminar Papers, Documents from Human	Documentary Method Of Data Collection	Qualitative Method Of Data analysis

				command and control centres --gaining territories previously controlled by Boko Haram.	Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Central Bank of Nigeria.		
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CHAPTER FOUR

ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATIONS OF MNJTF AND BOKO HARAM

INSURGENCY

The major focus of this chapter is to interrogate the nexus between the establishment and operations of MNJTF and Boko Haram insurgency. Specifically, this section ascertained impact of MNJTF in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Indicators from the X and Y variables of our first hypothesis was tested and these indicators includes the formation of MNJTF and the overrunning of communities, the conduct of coordinated operations by MNJTF and the overrunning of government positions and increased border patrol, control and administration of conquered territories.

4.1FORMATION OF MNJTF AND THE OVERRUNNING OF COMMUNITIES

The numerous acts of terror which Boko Haram has been orchestrating in the north have continued to threaten Nigeria's peace and security. According to Manni (2013), since its first uprising in 2009, Boko Haram has been responsible for thousands of deaths. In addition, the predominately Muslim northern states of Borno, Yobe, Kano, Bauchi and Kaduna have supplied Boko Haram with a steady stream of recruits who are willing to wage violent Jihad in order to find a better alternative to the current political situation within the country; believing the group's version of radicalism to be the answer to their woes. This increasing spread of its nefarious activities has resulted in the destruction of lives and properties and created their associated or attendant humanitarian problems. Boko Haram has carried out numerous acts of terror across the country. The group has resorted to killings, destroying properties and other related or similar acts in pursuit of their objectives. These acts place the group among the top ten terrorist groups in the world in the last fifteen years.



Source: AFP

According to GTI (2014:43), the group has been increasing its deadliness each year, with 2013 being four times as deadly as 2009. In the period between 2009 and 2012, over 3,500 Nigerians were killed by the group through shootings and bombings. Around 60 percent of attacks and fatalities are armed assaults using guns, with a quarter of attacks and fatalities from bombings. They have used at least 35 suicide bombings, 28 of which occurred in 2012. These incessant attacks by Boko Haram took a different dimension when most of the group's attacks and their attendant consequences became trans-national in nature. This led to the resuscitation of MNJTF that was established in 1998 to checkmate trans-border crimes. According to the Baga Incident Reports (2013:45):

Boko Haram has active or dominant presence in as many of 12 L.G.A as in a state, especially in the ten L.G.As in Borno. In addition to systematic attacks on law enforcement agents and internal security assets, Boko Haram is also credibly alleged to have attacked communities, churches and places of worship. Victims reported the shooting of family members by young men who spoke the local Kanuri language. In many communities, women were reportedly prevented from going to their farms or undertaking planting. Some who ventured were attacked or abducted. These constant attacks against the Nigerian states,

military personnel, churches, civilians, among others in these trans-border towns have led to the ranking of Boko Haram among the most lethal terrorist group in 2012.

Table 4.1: The World Most Terrorised Countries

Countries	G T I scales	World's Ranking
Iraq	9.56	1st
Pakistan	9.05	2nd
Afghanistan	8.62	3rd
India	8.15	4th
Yemen	7.30	5th
Somalia	7.24	6th
Nigeria	7.24	7th

Source: Global Terrorism Index (2013:49)

The activities of Boko Haram have fetched Nigeria a place among the infamous list of the most terrorised countries. North-east geopolitical zone has been the worst hit in terms of number of death, casualties and vandalized properties. Communities bordering Nigeria-Niger and Chad have all come under the attacks of Boko Haram despite the presence of MNJTF. Their very presence has not stopped the group from taking and raiding towns.

Table 4.2: Showing Most Lethal Perpetrator Groups (2011-2013)

Most Lethal Perpetrator Groups (2011-2013)	# of Attacks	# of Fatalities
Taliban	2328	7348
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	761	3804
Boko Haram	801	3666
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq	786	3417
Al-Shabaab	837	2149
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	467	1939
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)	1356	1660
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant	139	1436
Al-Nusra Front	66	1010
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	68	829

Source: Global Terrorism Index (GTI) (2014:23).

4.2 JOINTLY COORDINATED OPERATIONS AND THE OVERRUNNING OF GOVERNMENT POSTION

According to the Human Rights Watch Reports (2012), Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for attacks in Borno, Bauchi, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Niger, Pleateau, Sokoto, Yobe and the F.C.T., Abuja. The attacks have not only targeted members of the police and military: civilians, government officials, journalists and religious leaders have also been killed, and churches, schools, bars and media houses have been targeted. Also, prisons have been attacked, with inmates freed and prisons guards killed. In 2011, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for bombing the UN offices in Abuja, the Nigeria Police Headquarters and on the day of swearing-in ceremony of former President Goodluck Jonathan. Therefore, MNJTF arose to checkmate the activities of Boko Haram and it was later funded by African Union when Boko Haram became too much for the three member states. According to EUR (2015), the AU authorized the deployment of the MNJTF, comprising up to 7, 500 military and non-military staff, for an initial period of 12 months which can be renewed. The mission will aim to create a secure environment, restore state authority and facilitate humanitarian assistance in the affected areas. The MNJTF singular mandate is the decapitation of Boko Haram and the nuisance it represents. According to Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, START (2015), most of the terrorist acts in 2014 were carried out by Boko Haram insurgents. The map below shows the operational area of Boko Haram as well as neighbouring countries.


Figure 4.2: Operational Areas of Boko Haram Insurgency



Source: Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (2015)

Figure 4.3: No of reported deaths in Boko Haram attacks September 2010-April 2014

Reported civilian deaths in Boko Haram attacks Sep 2010 - Apr 2014



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, created by Prof. Clionadh Raleigh, University of Sussex

4.3 BORDER PATROL AND CONTROLLING OF TERRITORY

The MNJTF's major objectives include conducting military operations, achieving coordination at inter-state level, conducting border patrols, finding abducted persons, stopping the flow of arms, reintegrating insurgents into society and bringing those responsible for crimes to justice. MNJTF have achieved some commendable feat like the table below indicates.

Table 4.3: Showing Timeline of Events since the introduction of MNJTF

	DATE	EVENT	SOURCE
1.	November 24, 2014	Consideration and approval of MNJTF comprising Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Benin, the meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.	http://www.chathamhouse.org
2.	January 25, 2015	Nigerian troops successfully repelled simultaneous attacks on Monguno and Maiduguri by terrorist in coordinated air and land operations. Scores of the terrorist died in the course of the attacks, while, many were captured. A Cobra-armoured vehicle and a heavy artillery gun as well as machine guns and other weapons were recovered from the fleeing terrorists. Three cars loaded with explosives were destroyed. Troops in Konduga successfully repelled terrorist attacks twice same day.	http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201503020609.html

Source: START, (2004:4)

Despite the above, Boko Haram still controls some territory in Nigeria (Okoli, 2013). If anything, empirical indicators shows that Boko Haram grew stronger in spite of all the measures adopted by the government of Nigeria to contain it. Corroborating this view, Perouse de Montclos (2014) noted that:

since Boko Haram's resurgence in 2010, the Nigerian government has struggled to respond to the growing threat posed by the group, and its expanding impact on the civilian population deployed in counter-terrorism operations in the most affected states since 2011. Their

offensives against the group have some notable successes in 2012 and early 2013, temporarily reducing attacks, but the past year has been the deadliest for civilians in the group's history. Some local communities formed informant networks and vigilante groups in 2013 to protect themselves, in part due to reportedly ineffective responses by security forces. The map below shows area under Boko Haram Insurgency

Figure 4.4: Map showing areas of Boko Haram control at 10 January 2015



Source: START, (2015: 45)

The above diagram showed areas that were and some of them that are still under the administration of the sect. This was corroborated by Walker (2014) who noted that Boko Haram violence has affected over fifteen million people, caused the displacement of about six hundred and fifty thousand, and claimed over five thousand lives in the north eastern Nigeria, targeting both Christians and Muslims. Therefore, from the above analysis, we reject our first hypothesis which states that “the establishment and operations of Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) undermined Boko Haram Insurgency” because the insurgency continued unabated.

CHAPTER FIVE

PROVISION OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT BY WESTERN COUNTRIES AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES

The central preoccupation of this section is to explore the modalities and dynamics of the western countries' support and aid, including those of the U.S, in the war against terrorism in Nigeria. This is pertinent given the fact that Boko Haram insurgency has since graduated to the worrisome degree of global menace and threat to international peace and global systemic stability. From being a small religious deviant group organisation under a Muslim cleric, Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno state between 2002 and 2009, it has gradually extended its lethal attacks and heinous activities to the neighbouring countries of Northern Cameroon, Niger, Chad, thereby meeting up with the requirements for categorization as an international terrorist group.

5.1 TRAINING OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THE CAPTURE/KILLING OF BOKO HARAM OPERATIVES

External source of support and assistance in combating the dreaded Boko Haram, may perhaps never have been considered a viable or worthwhile option if not for the sudden transnational posture and activities of the group. Before the west indicated interest to come to the aid of Nigeria, indeed, west A indeed, west African countries, the African Union had in January 2015 authorized the deployment of seven thousand, five hundred (7,500) troops from the three West African nations-Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Nigeria to fight Boko Haram (Winsor, 2015).

Prior to President Obama of the US' declaration of his administration's willingness to send three hundred (300) troops to Cameroon to work with West African soldiers seeking to counter the Nigerian extremist group, Boko Haram, an advance force of about 90 military personnel had gun deploying to Cameroon, which borders Nigeria. the troops were invited by Cameroonian government as part of a larger international effort to stop the spread of violent extremists in West Africa were to conduct airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations. In a

letter to congress, Mr. Obama said that the troops would provide “intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance” in the region. The troops would be armed for the protection but would not engage in combat even when unarmed predator drones would be sent with the troops who will aid a multi-national task force composed of soldiers from Cameroon, Chad, benin, Niger and Nigeria (Winsor, 2015). The point therefore is that the United States has been providing training and equipment to Nigerian forces as part of the effort to defeat Boko Haram.

5.1.1 UNITED STATES AND SUPPORT FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM

America’s sudden interest in the elimination of the terrorist group is hardly unconnected to the Boko Haram’s widely alleged alliance with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The US state department designated Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organisations in November 2013, citing various reasons, including links with AQIM, “thousands of deaths in north-east and central Nigeria over the last several years, including targeted killing of civilians”, and Ansaru’s 2013 kidnapping and execution of seven international construction workers. In the statement, it noted however, that “these designations are an important and appropriate step, but only one tool in what must be a comprehensive approach by the Nigerian government to counter these groups through a combination of law enforcement, political and developmental efforts. As a counter, “American soldiers began training units of Nigeria’s army at the edge of the Sahara Desert in what a U.S official called “a new wave” of military support for African states battling Boko Haram militants. The training in Nigeria began on 19th October 2013 at Agadez, the largest city in central Niger, once a centre for Caravans crossing the Sahara.

While U.S officials have urged that training be used to fight extremists, military aid has been sent to these African countries without restrictions on the purpose of U.S funded programs. The U.S African command spokesperson, Chuk Prichard, saw the training as part of U.S AFRCOM’s core mission to help U.S partners strengthen their defence capabilities. He added that the skills gained

during these military-to-military exchanges can be used by the participants for a broad range of activities to secure their home countries or contribute to a regional security effort.


Nigeria, the home base of Boko Haram militants, and Chad also are expected to receive training and other military support from the United States in the coming months, according to the U.S official. It is however, pertinent to remark that the United States had started training Nigerian forces to fight Boko Haram militants in 2014 before the Nigerian government cancelled the training after the Americans allegedly blocked its effort to buy arms to fight Boko Haram (Premium Times, May 2, 2015). The American government had asked its Nigerian counterparts to withdraw its (Nigeria's) military and strategic machines and other ancillary from the hot region of Maiduguri where they were to combat the insurgents from training exercise. The Nigerian government have rejected this idea on security grounds; maintain that it would amount to greater security and incursion of the insurgents. Similarly, the U.S government was said to have denied Nigeria the sales of U.S made Cobra fighter helicopters. Information had it that the sales were coming from Israel which had okayed the deal from its own inventory, but needed U.S approval since the fighter helicopters were from America. The Israeli government under the terms of the U.S assistance cannot transfer the military helicopter to another foreign country except the U.S government approved it.

The United States had criticized the Nigerian military's human rights record and its handling of the Boko Haram crisis, particularly, the search for over 200 school girls abducted by the group from Chibok, Borno state. Owing to the end of former President Goodluck Jonathans's administration, the American government appears ready to provide improved assistance to Nigeria in the fight against Boko Haram, now that President Muhammadu Buhari takes sway. President Barack Obama has ordered the release of \$35 million worth of U.S military and defence assistance to France which has been backing the military of Chad, Niger, and Mali in the fight against Jihadist group, Boko Haram, ignoring Nigeria that has been at the centre of the eight-year insurgency. A press

statement from the White House on Wednesday said the United States leader gave the support to enable France secure the three French-speaking African nations, who all share borders with Nigeria. in the White House statement, President Obama gave authority to U.S Secretary of State, John Kerry, to facilitate the U.S assistance to Mali, Niger and Chad. In his statement, he remarked:

by the authority vested in me as President by the constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 301 of title 3, United States code, I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State the authority under section 506 (a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to direct the drawdown of up to \$35 million in defence services of the Department of Defence to provide assistance to France in its efforts to secure Mali, Niger, and Chad from terrorists and violent extremists, and to make the determinations required under such section to direct such a drawdown (<http://www.premuimtimesng.com/news/headlines/182340-bokoharam-obama-snubs-nigeria-again-gives-35m-military-support-to-france.html>)

Figure 5.1: Impact of Boko Haram violence in Nigeria over 2014 and January 2015



Source: Basemap data: GADM, SALB, OCHA, NGA, OSM, Situational data: IDMC, ACLED

5.1.2 France, British and Chinese Assistance

In February 2013, according to the U.S Bureau of Counter-Terrorism, Boko Haram was responsible for kidnapping seven French tourists in the far north of Cameroon. In November 2013, Boko Haram members kidnapped nine French citizens, including a priest in northern Cameroon and obtained ransom payments for their release. In a move aimed at completely annihilating the terror group, Boko Haram, France has committed to increasing its West African counter-insurgency force to support regional forces fighting Boko Haram. France has headquartered its more than 3,000 strong Sahel counter-insurgency force.

France and the U.K, in coordination with the U.S, have sent trainers, and material assistance to Nigeria to assist in the fight against Boko Haram (Haaretz, 2014). France planned to use 3,000 troops in the region for counter-terrorism operations. Israel and Canada also pledged their support. In May 2014, China offered Nigeria assistance that included satellite data, and possibly, military equipment (South China Morning Post, 8th May, 2014).

5.1.3 Capture and Killing of Boko Haram Operatives

The campaign against insurgents in the North-East intensified with the capture of a top leader of Boko Haram and the killing of about 70 insurgents at the sect's stronghold on May 16, 2014 in Gwoza Hills, Borno state (<http://www.naij.com/62549.html>). The leader was reportedly said to have been arrested in the morning in the evening while he was trying to flee the bombarded Gwoza Hills with some black Toyota Land Cruiser Sports Utility Vehicle in his escort. In the early morning hours of May 13, 2015, between 300 and 400 insurgents disguised in military outfit stormed Rann and nearby Kalabage village in two armoured tanks, eight Hilux Pic-up vehicles and seven SUVs, also painted in Nigerian Army colours. They were met by armed locals who had knowledge of impending attacks and dug up trenches to obstruct the terrorists' movements. At the end of the encounter, the number of captured insurgents was put up at 35 in addition to many that lost their lives. (<http://naij.com/66259.html>).

Security officials were of the view that the captured Boko Haram leader might be a very key person to the operation of the sect for him to have such a massive and luxurious escort comprising Toyota Land Cruiser vehicles. It was said that soldiers arrested a top member of the Boko Haram sect around the Gwoza Hills after the battle when the troops took over the hills. The encounter was not a total walkover on the part of the soldiers as some soldiers sustained gunshot wounds that were being treated at a hospital in Maiduguri. It was learnt that some other insurgents were later killed in the evening on their way to Bama after the first encounter which resulted in the killing of over 40 members of the sect. It was gathered that the special force waited for the convoy of the insurgents on their way when an intelligence report was received that they (the insurgents) were on their way to launch another attack in Bama. It was also gathered that the insurgents were moving in 15 trucks loaded with fighters when they ran into the ambush of the troops. The troops destroyed seven of the trucks which caught fire and killed about 30 of the insurgents. However, it was stated that the insurgents escaped with eight of the vehicles in the convoy. When the then Director of Defence, Information, Maj. Chris Olukolade was contacted, he confirmed the deployment of APCs and military tanks but asked to be given more time to confirm the capture of the Boko Haram commander and those killed in the two battles.

Table 5.1: Showing a timeline of major facts on Boko Haram since 2012

DATE OF EVENT	EVENT DESCRIPTION
December 2003	The first known attack by the Boko Haram which included roughly 200 militants, who attacked multiple police stations in the state of Yobe, near the Niger border.
July 2009	The Boko Haram uprising begins in Bauchi and spreads to the states of Borno, Kano and Yobe. The militant group kills scores of police officers. A joint military task force responded, leaving more than 700 Boko Haram members dead and its operational Mosque destroyed. The uprising ended when police captured the group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf. His deputy, AbubakarShekau, was reportedly dead in the uprising. Yusuf later died in police custody; police said he was shot during an attempted escape, but Boko Haram claimed it was an extra-judicial execution.

August 2009	Senior Boko Haram militant, SanniUmaru, released a statement claiming to be the new leader.
July 2010	Book Haram released a video statement in which Yusuf's deputy who allegedly died the previous year, AbubakarShekau, claimed to be the new leader of the group.
September 7, 2010	In the state of Bauchi, 50 Boko Haram militants attacked a prison, killing 5 people and releasing more than 700 inmates
May 29, 2011	The day of former President Goodluck Jonathan's inauguration, Boko Haram detonated three Improvised Explosive Device (IED) near a military barracks in the city of Bauchi state. At least 10 people died in the attack.
July 7, 2011	Boko Haram Warns Muslims To Avoid Christians, public servants and public buildings, and anything related to politics, "This is a government that is not Islamic. Therefore, all its employees-Muslims or non-Muslims are infidels", they claimed.
August 26, 2011	Book Haram attacked the United Nations compound in Abuja. A car bomb killed 23 people and injured more than 75 others.
November 4, 2011	More than 100 died in multiple attacks in the Damaturu and Borno states. Boko Haram militants utilized IEDs and vehicles-borne IEDs to target security forces and their offices, markets and churches.
January 2012	A newly formed splinter group, known as Ansaru, announced Abu Usmatul Al-Ansari as its leader.
January 20, 2012	More than 200 people were killed when Boko Haram launched coordinated attacks targeting police, military, a prison and other targets in the city of Kano in Kano state.
August 23, 2012	Unverified media reports claimed that Boko Haram has begun peace talks with the Nigerian government. Book Haram spokesperson, Abu QaQa, warns the media against making more claims. "we are telling the government to understand that if it is not ready to embrace Sharia and Quran as the guiding book from which the laws of the land derive, there shall be no peace...(and media agencies) should understand that for us there is no there is no difference between those fighting with guns and with the pen".
February 19, 2013	Militants alleging to be Boko Haram Kidnapped a French family of 7 in a national park in northern Cameroon, however, the affiliation with Boko Haram cannot be verified. The family was later released.
April, 2013	Former President Goodluck Jonathan stated that he has appointed a team to explore the possibility of amnesty for Islamist militants. Shekau responded in an audio statement: "surprisingly the Nigerian government is talking of granting amnesty. What wrong have we done? On the contrary, it is we that should grant you pardon".

April 19, 2013	Boko Haram battles with MNJTF security forces from Nigeria, Niger and Chad in the city of Baga in Borno state, leaving nearly 200 people dead, including many civilians. Shekau releases a video in May saying that Boko Haram was not responsible for the civilian deaths.
June 4, 2013	Former President Jonathan approved the proscription of Boko Haram and splinter group, Ansaru as terrorist organisations.
November 13, 2013	The U.S state Department added Boko Haram and Ansaru to its list of terrorist organisations.
May 13, 2013	Hundreds of Boko Haram militants stormed three villages in the state of Borno. Villagers resisted them, killing more than 200 Boko Haram fighters.
May 20, 2014	Twin blasts in the Jos killed 118 people at a market. Nigerian authorities declined to say who was responsible.
May 20, 2014	The White House announced that the United States has sent 80 troops to Chad to help search for the kidnapped school girls.
June 3-4, 2014	Hundreds of people were killed in raids by Boko Haram Islamic militants in the state of Borno, with some sources putting the death toll at 400 to 500.
June 7-8, 2014	Suspected Boko Haram militants kidnapped at least 20 young women over a weekend in the north-eastern Nigerian village of Garkin Fulani, 8 kilometres from a town where more than 200 school girls were taken nearly 2 months earlier.
July 17-20, 2014	Boko Haram raided the Nigerian town of Damboa. By the time the raids was over, 66 residents were killed and more than 15,000 fled.
October 16, 2016	The Nigerian government announced that they reached a ceasefire agreement with the Islamist terror group, that included the promised release of more than 200 school girls that were kidnapped.
November 1, 2014	In a video, the group's leader denied the Nigerian government's claim of a ceasefire.
March 12, 2015	In an audio message, a speaker purportedly identified as ISIS spokesperson, Abu Mohammed al Adani, claimed the caliphate has expanded to western Africa and that ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has accepted Boko Haram's pledge of allegiance.
April 28-30, 2015	Nigerian troops rescued about 450 women and girls in the Sambisa Forest during a military operation centred around destroying Boko Haram camps and rescuing civilians. According to the military, none of the rescued has been identified as the Chibok school girls kidnapped in April 2014.
July 1, 2015	Boko Haram militants raided three villages in north-eastern Nigeria of

	Borno, killing at least 145, according to a witness.
September 3, 2015	An estimated 30 civilians died and 145 injured after Boko Haram militants attacked a crowded market in Kerawa, Cameroon and an infirmary near a Cameroonian military camp, according to Cameroonian military spokesman, Col. Didier Badjeck.
September 23, 2015	241 women and children were rescued and 43 Boko Haram militants arrested after the Nigerian military raided camps run by the terrorist group in two towns.

Source: compiled by researcher

5.2 INTELLIGENCE-SHARING AND BOMBING OF BOKO HARAM

COMMAND/CONTROL CENTRES

The U.S in 2014 provided intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance expertise to Nigeria in the hunt for more than 200 school girls abducted from their school in Chibok, Borno state. The assistance included drones and spy planes as well as up to 80 military personnel sent to Chad's capital, N'Djamena. In 2013, the U.S set up a drone base in neighbouring Niger.

For years, the U.S African Command (AFRICOM) has deployed the size and scope of its missions on the continent and without large battalions of actual boots on the ground, as was the case in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the U.S military officials have already started seeing Africa as the new battleground for fighting extremism. It is interesting to note remark that these efforts support activities that American troops are currently involved in Africa include: airstrikes targeting suspected militants, night raids aimed at seizing terror suspects, airlift of French and African troops onto the battlefields, and evacuation operations in conflict zones (magafrika.com).

The U.S has only one permanent base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, and the headquarters of the combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Concrete figures on the number of troops stationed there are sketchy., but various reports put it anything between 3,500 and 4,500 soldiers. It provides a vital base for U.S Special Forces, fighter planes and helicopters, as well as serving as a base for drone operations into Somalia, Yemen, and maritime surveillance

in the Indian Ocean. Although this is true, the U.S has numerous other “temporary” bases across the continent, and though on their own they seem small, together they are sweeping and expansive, forming a seemingly endless string of engagements, projects and operations. There are, for instance, drone ports in Indian Ocean island of Seychelles, off the eastern coast of Africa, as well as Ethiopia, in the southern region of Arba Minch, that provide support for flying intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Nzara in Southern Sudan is another shadowy operating post on the continent where U.S Special Operations Forces have been stationed in recent years, according to reports by investigative journalist, Nick Turse, who has written extensively on AFRCOM’s growing presence on the continent. Other temporary sites include Obo and Djema in the Central African Republic and Dungu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). <http://www.reinforcement-against-BokoHaram-388477>.

With respect to the military operations, the U.S has deployed missions codenamed Jupiter Micron, that aided French troops in Mali, Echo Casemate, that airlifted Burundian troops to the central African Republic, as well as Observant Compass, that deployed U.S soldiers to destroy what’s left of Ugandan rebel leader, Joseph Kony’s murderous Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

5.2.1 Bombing of Boko Haram Command and Control Centre

On 9th September 2015, the Director of Information at the Defence Headquarters, Col. RabeAbubakar announced that all known Boko Haram camps and cells have been destroyed, and that the group was so weakened that they could no longer hold any territory. In his words:

these territories have been subdued, even if they are adopting other means and as they are re-strategising, we are also doing the same and pre-emptying them. We have coordinated the air and ground assaults to make sure that these terrorists’ hideouts are completely decimated. As I am speaking to you, all the terrorists’ camps have completely been wiped out. So right now, they are completely in disarray, have no command control of where to plan. We have even taken over their camps that

most of them abandoned and are attempting to blend into towns and communities. We have also apprehended some of them and very soon, innocent Nigerians can move back to their communities. We are making a lot of headway, so people should know that Boko Haram is no longer strong enough to hold grounds. Very soon, this issue of whether they are in control of any territory in Nigeria or not will come to the open. I am assuring you that they will never again recapture the territory taken from them because what is happening right now with the deployment of troops, equipment and morale will ensure that. (<http://www.premuimtimesng.com/new/top-news/189748-boko-haram-camps-wiped-out-nigerian-military.html>)

On 20th September same year, series of bombings occurred in Maiduguri and Monguno. The attack followed an announcement by Shekau refuting the army's claims of defeat. A military spokesman stated that the event showed the "high level of desperation" of Boko Haram. The Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) released a statement condemning the bombings and commending the military offensive.

In December 2015, the focus of activity switched to the far northern region of Cameroon, beginning on the morning of 17th December when an army convoy was attacked with an IED and ambushed by hundreds of militants near the border town of Amchide, 60 kilometres north of the state capital Marona. One soldier was confirmed dead, and an estimated 116 militants were killed in the attack, which was followed by another attack overnight with unknown casualties. On December 22nd, the Rapid Intervention Battalion followed up with an attack on Boko Haram training camp, arresting 45 militants and seizing 84 children aged 7-15 who were undergoing training, according to a statement from Cameroon's Ministry of Defense.

5.3 FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND THE REGAINING OF TERRITORIES

PREVIOUSLY CONTROLLED BY BOKO HARAM

Western countries have contributed in checkmating the advances of Boko Haram insurgents by providing financial support to Nigerian government. These countries comprise U.S, EU, Japan, Norway, among others. Though the reasons and method of assistance differs, yet their

contributions towards the crisis were borne out of the need to aid Nigeria and other affected countries in the fight against the insurgency.

In response to the increased militant activity, the Cameroonian President sacked two senior military officers and sent his army chief with 1000 reinforcements to the northern border region. On 27th March, 2015, the Nigerian army captured Gwoza, which was believed to be the location of Boko Haram headquarters. The Boko Haram also lost control of the northern Nigerian towns of Bama and Gwoza to the Nigerian army. The Nigerian authorities said that they had taken back 11 of the 14 districts previously controlled by Boko Haram. In April, four Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa Forest were overrun by the Nigerian military who freed nearly 300 females. Boko Haram forces were believed to have retreated to the Mandara mountains, along the Nigerian-Cameroonian borders.

Table 5.2: showing Some BokoHaram Captured Territories Regained by the Military

S/N	DATE CAPTURED BY INSURGENTS	TERRITORY CAPTURED	DATE RECAPTURED BY THE MLITARY
1.	24 th August, 2014	Gwoza	27 th March, 2015
2.	29 th October, 2014	Mubi	13 th November, 2014
3.	NA	Several towns in north Adamawa	3 rd December, 2014
4.	3 rd January, 2015	Baga	21 st February, 2015
5.	25 th January, 2015	Monguno	21 st February, 2015

Source: compiled by the researcher

Still on a happy note, the National Information Centre (NIC) spokesman, Mike Omeri, was in March 2015 quoted to have said that 36 town have been recovered from the sect with eight bombers arrested in Maiduguri ,Borno state. On the basis of the foregoing data presentation and analysis, the study hereby validates the second hypothesis of the inquiry thus: the provision of logistical support by western countries led to effective implementation of counter-terrorism measures.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study was conducted on International Military Alliance and the War against Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. Boko Haram insurgency evolved from a mere disgruntled muttering to pockets of resistance, a challenge to national cohesion and belligerent confrontation to international peace and security. Since 2002, the constant upheaval in the north, particularly north-eastern Nigeria, has been Boko Haram, which literally stands for “western education is sinful”.

Chapter One introduced the study, setting its background, including the statement of the problem. It explored the nature, character and operational dynamics of insurgency generally and Boko Haram in particular, establishing that the latter in every respect has been found to be analogous to a full blown insurgency. The global dimension which the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents has taken to itself of recent has correspondingly necessitated an international approach and modality in addressing the grave security concern it poses. The group’s weaponry includes bombs, arms and ammunitions of various degrees of sophistication, while its targets have included churches and other places of worship, schools, international agencies, members of the police and armed forces, market places and other highly-public places. Rough estimate of its casualties has been in hundreds of thousands. The increasing level of the organisation of the group as well as the sophistication of their attacks have led many observers to believe that there could be technical assistance being rendered to the group by seasoned international terrorist organisations. While numerous attempts by the Nigerian government to engage the insurgents in a dialogue with a view to arresting the carnage and sheer savagery have translated into fiasco, successive administrations have had to stretch its security apparatuses and resources to contain the surge, momentum and the daring brazenness that are now the hallmark of the insurgents. It is in the light of the foregoing background that the study have sought to broadly examine the role of international military

alliance in the war against Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, while specifically addressing the following research questions:

1. Has the introduction of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the insurgency theatre in north-eastern Nigeria checked the advances of the Boko Haram sect?
2. Has the provision of logistical support by western countries led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria?

Therefore, while the broad objective of the study is to examine the efficacy of international military alliance in the war against Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the specific objective of the study, which derive and correspond to the research questions, are:

- i. To determine if the establishment and operations of Multinational Joint Task Force undermined Boko Haram insurgency.
- ii. To ascertain whether the provision of logistical support by western countries led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria.

The study is not without some significance, as it bristles with glowing theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, the study provided an in-depth understanding of the role of international alliance in the fight against insurgency. It therefore contributes and enriches extant literature in this sphere of knowledge. In practical terms, the study will provide policy makers in the country with insights on how to go about giving a final and definitive solution to the lingering problem of Boko Haram insurgency, and similar belligerent uprisings.

In a bid to appreciating the views of and opinions of other scholars on the issue, **Chapter Two** of the study reviewed relevant literature on varying dimensions and implications of insurgency, particularly as it has to do with counter-insurgency strategies and the different approaches that

have been adopted in the numerous phases of the efforts to wrestle down insurgency. The study found a lacuna or gap in the extant literature and set to fill it.

Chapter Three of the study addressed the methodological issues. The study adopted as a theoretical framework of analysis, the theory of functionalism as developed and enriched by David Mitrany. This theory, as espoused, lends credit to the argument that combined and organised efforts by the affected states will largely check the tide of a given insurgency. As a follow up to that, the study hypothesised as follows:

1. The establishment and operations of Multinational Joint Task Force undermined Boko Haram insurgency.
2. The provision of logistical support by western countries led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria.

The study adopted the ex-post facto research design, which is based on the examination of the dependent and independent variables after the events have taken place and data already in existence. While the documentary method which is inherently secondary was used for data collection, qualitative descriptive method was adopted in running analysis of the data so collected via documentary method. A logical framework of the study is also presented in this chapter.

Chapter Four examined the nexus between the establishment and operations of Multinational Joint Task Force and Boko Haram insurgency. The thrust of the chapter is the validation or otherwise of the first hypothesis of the study which is: the establishment and operations of Multinational Joint Task Force undermined Boko Haram insurgency. To this end, this researcher explored the dynamics of Boko Haram and the impacts of its activities. This was subsequently followed by an assessment of the strategies so far adopted by the Nigerian government in combating the group's menace. The analysis run through the discussion of the formation of MNJTF and the overrunning of communities, the conduct of coordinated operations by MNJTF

and the overrunning of government positions and increased border patrol, control and administration of conquered territories.

Chapter Five assessed the provision of logistical support by western countries and effective implementation of counter-terrorism measures. Like the preceding chapter, the fundamental objective of this chapter is to test the validity of the second hypothesis of the study. The provision of logistical support by western countries led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria. To do justice to this mission, the chapter examined the relationship between the (west's) training of national/regional military personnel and the capture/killing of key Boko Haram operatives. In similar vein, the role of intelligence-sharing in the bombing of Boko Haram command and control centres was explored. Also addressed in this chapter is the nexus between financial support and the regaining of territories previously controlled by Boko Haram insurgents. The support from the U.S, France, UK and China to the affected areas was equally discussed.

6.2 CONCLUSION

The study examined the role of international military alliance on the war against Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The study specifically seeks to :

- Ascertain whether the provision of logistical support by western countries led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria. The findings indicate that international military alliance , particularly, the MNJTF, have not resulted in the checking of the unrelenting advances made by the Boko Haram insurgents, while the provision of logistical support by western countries that are not members of the MNJTF have significantly improved the condition and implementation of strategies against the insurgency in Nigeria.
- Furthermore, another salient finding of the study is that the major significance of the MNJTF approach to the fight against Boko Haram insurgency is that formation of

MNJTF has not improved the security situation, rather, it led to the overrunning of communities. The conduct of coordinated operations by MNJTF has not quelled the insurgency, rather, it motorized the overrunning of government positions and finally, the increased border patrol of MNJTF did not stop Boko Haram insurgency in its track, but rather emboldened the control and administration of conquered territories.

➤ Finally, the central hypothesis of the study that:

1. The establishment and operations of MNJTF undermined Boko Haram insurgency and 2. The provision of logistical support by western countries led to effectiveness in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria were therefore validated and upheld upon the strength of the evidence of our analysis.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Following from the above findings of the study, we put forward the following recommendations:

- ❖ The Nigerian government and its counter-parts in Cameroon, Chad and Niger whose borders are vulnerable to Boko Haram belligerence should, with deep sense of commitment and understanding re-strategise on how best to make the alliance workable to the point that its mission of flushing Boko Haram will be achieved.
- ❖ The federal government should go beyond the rhetoric of Terrorism Preventive Act by showing strong desire to prosecute suspected Boko Haram Islamic sects to serve as deterrence to intending recruits.
- ❖ The government should reform the Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU) after that of defunct American CTU which was characterized by undercover operations aimed at foiling coordinated terror attacks and provision of credible intelligence information to government.
- ❖ The federal government of Nigeria as a matter of sublime necessity should strike up an arrangement under which provision would be made for advanced training of military personnel and intelligence-sharing in putting up a firm and undaunted counter-terrorism.

This could come in the form of bilateral or multilateral strategic agreement with countries whose military sophistication is at the cutting edge of both conventional and unconventional combat and strategic wizardry.

- ❖ There is also the need for the government to go into some other forms of economic alliance with foreign powers so as to muster the needed economic might and requisite rehabilitative sagacity to holistically rebuilding liberated communities that have been devastated by the insurgency.

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